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Brexit: evidence and policy appraisals

Detailed research records, alternatives, costs and provisional assessments. These records preserve different scopes and historical reviews; they are not an additional ranked action plan.

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

Less avoidable friction in UK–EU trade, with the autonomy each choice gives up stated openly.

These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal

    Conclude the SPS agreement.

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Red

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Observed trade friction does not identify the effect of a future agreement; scope and baseline need updating.

    Define covered goods, alignment, oversight and border changes; secure agreement and business transition.

    Growth and prosperity listEvidence and assessment

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

Detailed policy appraisal

The outcome we want: Less avoidable friction in UK–EU trade, with the autonomy each choice gives up stated openly.

The main constraint: Lower friction depends on a negotiated UK–EU agreement and implementing legislation, and each gain in access is traded against regulatory autonomy — a negotiation, legislation and consent constraint, with the remaining border processes falling hardest on small exporters.

Constraint type: legislation, public consent, coordination.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm dealDelivery risk: Red

    Funded now
    Agreed in principle in May 2025; at September 2026 the FSA reported negotiations “at an advanced stage” after the July 2026 summit was postponed, with implementation planning assuming summer 2027 and legislation expected through an anticipated European Partnership Bill. Not yet an operating agreement.
    The change assessed
    Conclude the SPS agreement.

    Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 19 options listed under the points in the position today (11 without an action record), and 4 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (2)
  • What is holding us back (4)The OBR assumes UK trade intensity about 15% lower and productivity about 4% lower in the long run than if the UK had stayed in the EU. This is a modelled counterfactual, not an observation, and about 64% of British adults say leaving has gone badly: a perception, not a measure. (Updated July 2026 · United Kingdom)
  • What could improve things (1)A concluded SPS agreement would remove most export health certificates and routine checks on agri-food trade, and practical help could make the remaining processes usable for small firms.
  • What could make it worse (2)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

  1. Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal — not a direct public-spending programme
  2. Make the remaining border process usable for small exporters — not yet costed / funding not identified

  • Action 1A29Policy status: announced proposal

    Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal

    A UK–EU SPS agreement with dynamic alignment would remove most export health certificates and routine border checks, in exchange for following EU rules in scope.

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: Goods exports to the EU were −14% in volume between 2019 and 2025, against −8% to the rest of the world; the EU series has a recording break in January 2021. Also: threat, opportunity, strength
    2. Evidence Goods exports to the EU, volume change since 2019
    3. Action A29, this action

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    UK government (Defra, Cabinet Office) and the European Commission; Parliament for implementing legislation; devolved administrations (UK)
    Evidence:
    Observational analysis. Strong evidence on the costs of the frictions an agreement would remove; the gains from this agreement are government estimates of administrative savings, not evaluated trade effects.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme

    Why it is shortlisted here: The largest friction the current relationship can realistically remove, and the one under negotiation now.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Since 2021, animal and plant products traded with the EU face certificates and checks that add cost and have pushed some smaller exporters out.

    Who is affected, and where

    Agri-food exporters and importers in Great Britain, consumers, and Northern Ireland traders. Territory: UK. Food and agriculture are partly devolved; the Scottish and Welsh governments and the Northern Ireland Executive have roles in implementation, not assessed here.

    Policy status

    Announced by government, not yet in place. Agreed in principle in May 2025; at September 2026 the FSA reported negotiations “at an advanced stage” after the July 2026 summit was postponed, with implementation planning assuming summer 2027 and legislation expected through an anticipated European Partnership Bill. Not yet an operating agreement.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    CEP research found the TCA cut the number of product-country varieties exported to the EU by about 30%, driven by low-value trade relationships. The government says the agreement would remove export health certificates (up to £200 a consignment) and routine checks on goods such as dairy, fish and meat, now subject to 100% paperwork and up to 30% physical checks.
    Evaluated on:
    UK–EU goods trade after the Trade and Cooperation Agreement; United Kingdom and EU, 2021 onwards
    Transfer to this case:
    Administrative savings per consignment do not translate directly into trade growth or GDP.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Track certificates, border delays, rejected consignments and exporter numbers before and after; publish what alignment requires firms and regulators to change.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Dynamic alignment means taking EU rules the UK does not vote on, limiting divergence in areas such as gene editing; enforcement obligations follow; gains differ sharply by sector and firm size.
    Effects on record
    • Cost and time of agri-food trade with the EU: Direction plausible; size not established. plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain and EU. Savings per consignment are government statements, not evaluated trade effects; the agreement is not yet concluded.
    • UK freedom to set its own food and plant rules: A cost or harm; size not established. plausible spillover, moderate confidence; United Kingdom. Whether this is a cost is a value judgement; the trade-off is real.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

    • Public administration, business compliance and transition for an SPS agreement (administration; paid by central government, employers): Not yet costed. No published estimate of implementation or business alignment costs. A GDP estimate is not tax receipts.
    • FSA SPS programme funding from HM Treasury, 2026–27 (amount not published): amount not established, 2026–27 to 2026–27 — not committed (allocated to this scope). Covers FSA readiness only, not Defra, port health or business costs.
    Who pays:
    Government (Defra, FSA, port health authorities) for implementation; businesses for changes to processes, labelling and IT to align with EU rules.
    Financing proposed:
    The FSA secured 2026–27 funding from HM Treasury for its SPS programme (amount not published); funding for later years is under consideration. A GDP estimate is not tax receipts.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown: neither total implementation cost nor business compliance cost has been published.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Regulatory and veterinary staff.
    Operational capacity:
    FSA, Defra and port health readiness.
    Infrastructure:
    Border control post use changes.
    Permissions:
    EU agreement.
    Law:
    Implementing legislation (an anticipated European Partnership Bill).
    Public consent:
    Parliamentary approval; acceptance of dynamic alignment.
    First step and stages

    First step: Publish the final scope, the exceptions and the affected product groups once negotiations conclude. (owner: Defra and the Cabinet Office)

    1. Conclude negotiations — UK government and European Commission (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Pass implementing legislation — Parliament (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Operate the agreement (FSA planning assumption: summer 2027, not an agreed date) — Defra, FSA, port health authorities

    Depends on: Conclusion of negotiations; Implementing legislation; A30 for remaining border processes

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Food exporters, especially smaller firms, gain most; firms that wanted to diverge from EU rules lose flexibility.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Negotiating capital spent here is not available for other EU issues.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Regulatory autonomy has value, including for new technologies; non-EU trade deals may be constrained.
    Risks:
    Delay; disputes over exceptions; benefits concentrated in a few sectors.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Goods exports to the EU 14% lower in volume in 2025 than in 2019 (ONS).
    Leading indicator:
    Export health certificates issued; border delays.
    Outcome:
    Rejected consignments, exporter numbers and agri-food trade with the EU against comparable trade.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Review if certificates and checks are not removed within a year of operation.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “A UK–EU agreement on food and plant checks (SPS)” (announced: Agreed in principle at the May 2025 summit; the December 2025 joint statement aimed to finish negotiations by the next summit.). Its evidence: The government says the deal would remove export health certificates costing up to £200 a consignment and end routine checks on products such as dairy, fish and meat, which currently face 100% document checks and up to 30% physical checks. Those are administrative savings stated by the government, not an evaluation of trade effects. UK Government, UK–EU Summit key documentation (Common Understanding, 19 May 2025; Joint Statement, 17 December 2025) · UK Government, UK–EU Summit package explainer (19 May 2025)

    Sources

    Source published April 2026 (UKICE); September 2026 (FSA); April 2022 (CEP); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Negotiations conclude or stall; The European Partnership Bill is published; A new UKICE divergence tracker.

  • Action 2A30Policy status: site-editorial action

    Make the remaining border process usable for small exporters

    Map one costly exporter journey, remove duplication that can lawfully be removed, and test joined-up guidance and digital documents with a cohort of small exporters.

    The thread: issue, evidence, action

    1. Issue Weakness: The new rules cut the number of product-country varieties exported to the EU by about 30%, driven by the loss of low-value trade relationships — consistent with smaller exporters leaving smaller EU markets. Also: weakness
    2. Evidence Goods exports to the EU, volume change since 2019
    3. Action A30, this action

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Not assessed in the 6 October review; this action stays in the topic plan with its own evidence.

    Who decides:
    Department for Business and Trade, HMRC and border authorities, with devolved business-support bodies (UK)
    Evidence:
    Untested proposal. The problem is evidenced by trade research; the remedy has not been evaluated and its unit cost is unknown.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: Some checks and paperwork will remain whatever is agreed, and small exporters bear them most.

    What it takes
    The problem

    Fixed costs of exporting to the EU rose in 2021 and the loss of low-value export relationships suggests smaller exporters were hit hardest; rules will remain even with an SPS agreement.

    Who is affected, and where

    Small and medium-sized UK exporters to the EU. Territory: UK. Trade policy is reserved; business support is partly devolved, so pilots in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland need devolved partners.

    Policy status

    UK Facts proposal. A UK Facts operating proposal; existing export support services were not audited in this review.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    CEP research found a large, persistent drop in the number of UK export relationships with the EU driven by low-value trade, and conjectures that higher fixed costs pushed small exporters out of small EU markets.
    Evaluated on:
    UK exporters to the EU, 2021 onwards; United Kingdom
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Pilot with a defined SME cohort, measure compliance time and cost, and expand only if exporters keep trading.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Process support cannot remove legal barriers; firms that stopped exporting may not return; subsidised support can pay for what would have happened anyway.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

    • Digital integration, support staff and firms’ compliance time for an SME pilot (administration; paid by central government, employers): Not yet costed. Existing trade-support allocations were not audited in this review.
    Who pays:
    Department for Business and Trade and HMRC (digital integration and support staff); firms (time spent on compliance).
    Financing proposed:
    Check existing trade-support allocations first; none identified here.
    Gap remaining:
    Unknown.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Customs and SPS specialists.
    Operational capacity:
    Business support advisers.
    Infrastructure:
    Interoperable digital documentation.
    Permissions:
    EU acceptance of any digital documents.
    Law:
    None for guidance; possibly secondary legislation for documents.
    Public consent:
    Firms willing to take part.
    First step and stages

    First step: Map one costly exporter journey and identify duplication that can lawfully be removed. (owner: Department for Business and Trade with HMRC)

    1. Map the journey and pick an SME cohort — Department for Business and Trade (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Pilot joined-up guidance and digital documents — DBT, HMRC, devolved partners (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Evaluate and expand or stop — Independent evaluator (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: A29: which SPS checks remain; Border systems

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Small exporters gain most; firms without digital capacity may not.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    Support staff and IT budgets not used elsewhere.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Large firms drive aggregate exports; small-exporter support may not move national trade figures.
    Risks:
    Digital exclusion, duplicated systems and deadweight.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    About 30% fewer product-country export varieties to the EU after the TCA (CEP estimate).
    Leading indicator:
    Compliance time and cost for the pilot cohort.
    Outcome:
    Sustained exporter participation compared with similar firms.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Stop if pilot firms do not export more than a comparison group after a year.
    Sources

    Source published April 2022 (CEP); April 2026 (UKICE); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: An SPS agreement changes the remaining checks; Official data on exporter numbers by size.

How the options are assessed

One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery risk, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

  • Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal — Red delivery RAG; gate pending

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • A29Delivery risk: RedGate: pending

    Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal

    Existing action A29, assessed at the same scope.

    Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

    Who and where
    Agri-food exporters and importers in Great Britain, consumers, and Northern Ireland traders. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: UK.
    Result so far
    Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
    Funded now (baseline)
    Agreed in principle in May 2025; at September 2026 the FSA reported negotiations “at an advanced stage” after the July 2026 summit was postponed, with implementation planning assuming summer 2027 and legislation expected through an anticipated European Partnership Bill. Not yet an operating agreement. (from the action record)
    The change assessed (marginal)
    Conclude the SPS agreement. (from the superseded 4 October selection table)
    What the evidence supports—and the next decision

    Reduced food and farm border friction is narrower than reversing the economy-wide effects of Brexit.

    AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

    Define the change
    Appraise the actual SPS agreement and its implementation requirements against current border procedures, separately for affected products and businesses.
    Test whether it works
    Certification cost, rejected consignments, delays and trade in affected goods; distinguish new trade from diversion and changes in demand.
    Establish the cost
    Public implementation and inspection, business adjustment, ongoing compliance and distribution across firms. Use the agreed legal text before a final estimate.
    Protect against harm
    Retain food safety and biosecurity. Do not transfer an economy-wide Brexit estimate to this agreement.

    Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

    Full assessment of Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
    The ten criteria (0–3)

    Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

    1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

      Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

    2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

      Reviewer’s reason: Define covered goods, alignment, oversight and border changes; secure agreement and business transition. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

    3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

      Reviewer’s reason: Observed trade friction does not identify the effect of a future agreement; scope and baseline need updating.

    4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

    5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

      Reviewer’s reason: External agreement required; regulatory autonomy and uneven sector impacts.

    6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

      Reviewer’s reason: Public implementation, business compliance, adjustment and distributional costs under alternative agreements.

    7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

      Reviewer’s reason: Define covered goods, alignment, oversight and border changes; secure agreement and business transition.

    8. Distribution (Fa)2 of 3 — Mixed or broadly neutral with safeguards

      Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

    9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)1 of 3 — More than three but less than ten years

      Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Border time/cost, trade and consumer prices, with external shocks separated.

    10. Readiness (Rd)1 of 3 — Legislation/external agreement or major enabling work

      Reviewer’s reason: UK government and EU counterparts; relevant devolved authorities; Negotiation and scenario appraisal

    Four weightings

    Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

    • Equal weights: Range if completed: 11.0–17.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 10.9–16.4 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 11.8–17.3 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
    • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 12.2–15.6 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

    Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

    Delivery risk and gate

    Delivery risk shown: RedReview’s claim: Red. Best the recorded evidence allows: Red.

    Review’s reason: External agreement required; regulatory autonomy and uneven sector impacts.

    Why it is not Green yet

    • Delivery obstacle: External agreement required; regulatory autonomy and uneven sector impacts..
    • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
    • No verified owner with the powers in place.
    • Delivery capacity not verified.
    • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
    • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
    • Safeguards not specified.
    • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

    Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

    Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

    Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

    The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

    Cost and funding

    Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

    • Public administration, business compliance and transition for an SPS agreement (not costed; C-A29-IMPLEMENTATION)

    Still to cost: Public implementation, business compliance, adjustment and distributional costs under alternative agreements.

    Funding status: not a spending proposal.

    Owner, powers and capacity

    Proposed owner: UK government and EU counterparts; relevant devolved authorities (proposed, unverified).

    Powers: needs legislation or external agreement. Capacity: binding constraint.

    Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

    England:
    UK government (Defra, Cabinet Office) and the European Commission; Parliament for implementing legislation; devolved administrations (action record)
    Scotland:
    UK government (Defra, Cabinet Office) and the European Commission; Parliament for implementing legislation; devolved administrations (action record)
    Wales:
    UK government (Defra, Cabinet Office) and the European Commission; Parliament for implementing legislation; devolved administrations (action record)
    Northern Ireland:
    UK government (Defra, Cabinet Office) and the European Commission; Parliament for implementing legislation; devolved administrations (action record)

    Food and agriculture are partly devolved; the Scottish and Welsh governments and the Northern Ireland Executive have roles in implementation, not assessed here.

    Dependencies, safeguards and risks

    Depends on: None recorded.

    Safeguards

    None specified yet.

    Risks and residual harms: External agreement required; regulatory autonomy and uneven sector impacts.

    Monitoring and measured results

    Metric: Border time/cost, trade and consumer prices, with external shocks separated.

    Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

    Measures already on the domain page

    A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

    Evidence for the outcome

    Outcome: Border time/cost, trade and consumer prices, with external shocks separated.

    Observed trade friction does not identify the effect of a future agreement; scope and baseline need updating.

    Effect records for this action

    • Cost and time of agri-food trade with the EU: size not established (plausible spillover, limited confidence; Great Britain and EU)
    • UK freedom to set its own food and plant rules: size not established (plausible spillover, moderate confidence; United Kingdom)
    Review record

    Assessment status: Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

    Reviewer: Original assessment author (name not supplied). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

    Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

    First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Define covered goods, alignment, oversight and border changes; secure agreement and business transition. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

    Decision route: Negotiation and scenario appraisal

    An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.

    An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

Decision briefs

  • Finish the UK–EU food and plant health deal — and set the baseline to measure it before it starts
  • Fix one small exporter’s journey: a seafood firm still needs catch certificates and customs after the SPS deal

The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

Finish the UK–EU food and plant health deal — and set the baseline to measure it before it starts

The thread: issue, evidence, action

  1. Issue Weakness: Goods exports to the EU were −14% in volume between 2019 and 2025, against −8% to the rest of the world; the EU series has a recording break in January 2021. Also: threat, opportunity, strength
  2. Evidence Goods exports to the EU, volume change since 2019
  3. Action Reduce food-trade friction through a clearly scoped agreement
Decision required
The UK government concludes the SPS agreement, publishes its final scope and exceptions, legislates through the planned European Partnership Bill and, before it operates (planned summer 2027), publishes a baseline of certificates, checks, rejected consignments and exporter numbers so the effect can be measured.
Who and where
Agri-food exporters and importers in Great Britain, consumers, and Northern Ireland traders. Applies in: UK.
Accountable body
UK government (Defra and the Cabinet Office), with the European Commission
Intervention
Align UK sanitary and phytosanitary rules with the EU’s in scope, in exchange for removing certificates and routine border checks.
Best evidence, and where it applies
The government says the agreement would remove export health certificates (saving up to £200 a consignment) and routine checks on goods now facing 100% paperwork and up to 30% physical checks; LSE research found UK exports to the EU lost about 30% of product-country varieties after the TCA, mostly low-value trade relationships.Studied in: UK exports to the EU and the rest of the world (2021 against earlier years).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Switzerland and the European Union — partial.
Extra cost of this change
Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: none identified in the brief.One-off or mixed: Public administration, business compliance and transition — Not yet costed; Independent evaluation with pre-implementation baseline — not yet established.
Funding
Mainly a legal or regulatory change: administration costs still need a budget.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: Neither total implementation cost nor business compliance cost has been published; the FSA’s one-year readiness funding covers only the FSA.
Savings and wider benefits
Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
First 90-day step
Publication of the final scope, exceptions and affected product groups, with a baseline dataset for the evaluationThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: Defra and the Cabinet Office. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
Twelve-month milestone
Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: First operational data a year after implementation (planned summer 2027).
Outcome, and when to scale or stop
Measure: Certificates and checks removed in practice; border waiting times.Scale if: Certificates and routine checks are removed and small-exporter numbers recover relative to the comparison.Stop if: Not a stop decision: if certificates and checks are not removed within a year of operation, review the implementation with the EU.
Main trade-off
Removing certificates and checks requires following EU food and plant rules in scope without a vote on them, limiting UK divergence (for example in gene editing).
Source and review date
UK trade in the wake of Brexit (CEP Discussion Paper 1847) (2022); UK–EU Summit package explainer (19 May 2025) (19 May 2025). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A29 · effects E-A29-FRICTION, E-A29-AUTONOMY · costs C-A29-IMPLEMENTATION

Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

1.The change, in plain words

Finish the UK–EU food and plant health deal — and set the baseline to measure it before it starts

2.The decision requested

Decision
Conclude the agreement and publish the final scope, exceptions and affected product groups; legislate; and commission an evaluation with a pre-implementation baseline and a comparison (agri-food trade not covered by the agreement, or trade with non-EU partners).
Accountable institution
UK government (Defra and the Cabinet Office), with the European Commission
Geography
UK
Powers
Treaty-making prerogative, implemented through the anticipated European Partnership Bill and secondary legislation; devolved administrations for devolved food and agriculture law.
Delivery partners
European Commission; Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland; Animal and Plant Health Agency; Port health authorities; Devolved governments; Trade bodies

3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

Target population
Agri-food exporters and importers in Great Britain, consumers, and Northern Ireland traders.
Eligibility
Animal and plant products in the agreement’s final scope (for example dairy, fish, eggs and red meat exported to the EU).
Scale
All GB–EU agri-food trade in scope.
Baseline
At September 2026 the July summit had been postponed; negotiations were “at an advanced stage”, with implementation planned for summer 2027. GB goods exports to the EU were 14% lower in volume in 2025 than in 2019 (ONS), a change with several causes, not only Brexit. About 140,000 export health certificates were signed in January–July 2021 alone.

Source: Food Standards Agency, An update to the Board on the Food Standards Agency’s SPS programme: September 2026 (board paper) (Paragraphs 2.2, 5.16); Office for National Statistics, UK trade time series (MRET), chained volume measures (Goods exports to the EU, chained volume); National Audit Office, The UK border: post UK–EU transition period (HC 736, Session 2021–22) (Paragraph 2.15)

Change beyond existing law or funding
The agreement is government policy under negotiation. What this brief adds is the evaluation design: a published baseline and comparison set before operation, so that savings per consignment can be distinguished from trade growth and from other causes.

4.How it would work

Do: Align UK sanitary and phytosanitary rules with the EU’s in scope, in exchange for removing certificates and routine border checks Changing: so that the fixed cost and delay of each consignment fall, especially for small, low-value shipments

  • Lower cost and time of agri-food trade with the EU

    Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A29-FRICTION

    Savings per consignment are government statements, not evaluated trade effects; the agreement is not yet concluded.

  • Less UK freedom to set its own food and plant rules

    Hypothesis to testEffect record E-A29-AUTONOMY

    Whether this is a cost is a value judgement; the trade-off is real.

Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

5.Best evidence

  • UK trade in the wake of Brexit (CEP Discussion Paper 1847)

    Author or institution:
    Centre for Economic Performance, LSE
    Published:
    2022
    Evaluation period:
    2021 against earlier years
    Design:
    Observational analysis of product-level trade data
    Sample or population:
    UK exports to the EU and the rest of the world
    Effect and uncertainty:
    About a 30% fall in product-country export varieties to the EU after the TCA, driven by low-value trade relationships; conjectures higher fixed costs pushed small exporters out.
    Limits:
    Observational; covers all goods, not only SPS goods; early period.

    Where: Introduction; PDF p.4. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

  • UK–EU Summit package explainer (19 May 2025)

    Author or institution:
    UK government (Cabinet Office)
    Published:
    19 May 2025
    Evaluation period:
    Not an evaluation
    Design:
    Government statement of intended effects
    Sample or population:
    GB–EU agri-food trade
    Effect and uncertainty:
    Removal of export health certificates, saving up to £200 a consignment; removal of routine checks on dairy, fish, eggs and red meat (now 100% paperwork, up to 30% physical).
    Limits:
    Government’s own claims of savings, not measured outcomes.

    Where: SPS section. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

Closest feasible alternative
A narrower equivalence-based deal (as Switzerland’s veterinary agreement was originally built) that keeps more UK rule-making but removes fewer checks.
Strongest counter-evidence
Dynamic alignment means taking EU rules the UK does not vote on; enforcement obligations follow; gains differ sharply by sector and firm size.

Source: UK in a Changing Europe, UK-EU Regulatory Divergence Tracker Q1 2026 (sixteenth edition) (PDF pp.9–10)

Distributional effects
Food exporters, especially smaller firms, gain most; firms wanting to diverge from EU rules lose flexibility; importers and consumers may see lower costs for EU food.
Main downside
Benefits may be concentrated in a few sectors while the alignment obligation covers all goods in scope.

The options compared, including current policy

  • The proposal

    Conclude the SPS agreement with dynamic alignment; baseline and evaluate it

    Who is reached
    GB agri-food exporters and importers
    Evidence
    Government statements; CEP trade analysis
    Likely outcome and timing
    From summer 2027 if concluded
    Cost and funding
    Implementation not costed; FSA readiness funded for 2026–27 only
    Main trade-off
    Rule-taking in scope

  • Current policy

    Current position: certificates and checks continue while negotiations go on

    Who is reached
    Same
    Evidence
    NAO on post-2021 border costs
    Likely outcome and timing
    No change
    Cost and funding
    Ongoing costs to firms
    Main trade-off
    Small exporters remain priced out of small markets

  • Alternative

    A narrower equivalence deal covering fewer products

    Who is reached
    Fewer exporters
    Evidence
    Swiss arrangement (no trade evaluation)
    Likely outcome and timing
    Uncertain; needs EU agreement
    Cost and funding
    Not costed
    Main trade-off
    Fewer checks removed

7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

Country lesson · Switzerland and the European Union, Border veterinary checks abolished 1 January 2009

A common veterinary area between Switzerland and the EU

Evidence: Expert or audit recommendationPartial match: some conditions differ

What was changed
Under Annex 11 of the 1999 EU–Swiss agricultural agreement, the EU recognised Swiss veterinary and food-safety law as equivalent; veterinary border checks between Switzerland and the EU ended and trade in animal products is treated like trade between member states.
Study design and population
Description of an operating arrangement; no evaluation of trade effects found Swiss and EU traders in animals and animal products
Measured outcome there
Administrative result: veterinary border controls removed since 2009; third-country goods are checked at Swiss airports instead. No measured trade effect was found.
Cost status
Not published.
What failed or remains uncertain
Trade effects are unmeasured. Switzerland keeps its law aligned (over 90% with EU food law, by its own account); customs duties and customs formalities remain.
Why the UK differs
The UK–EU arrangement is proposed on dynamic alignment, not recognised equivalence, and covers a much larger trade flow; the UK left EU structures rather than building up from outside them.
First change required here
Set an evaluation baseline (certificates, checks, rejected consignments, exporter numbers) before the SPS agreement operates, so its effect can be measured where the Swiss one never was.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Swiss Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO/BLV), International agreements (Swiss–EU veterinary agreement, Annex 11 of the 1999 Agricultural Agreement) (Veterinary agreement section). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

8.What delivery needs first

  • dependency — The European Commission and member states agree the final text. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: European Commission)
  • law — The European Partnership Bill and secondary legislation; devolved consent where devolved law is affected. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Parliament and devolved legislatures)
  • data — Certificate, check and rejection data published before operation, for the baseline. (Requirement; owner: Defra, APHA and FSA)
  • staff — FSA, APHA and port health staff to run the new regime. (Requirement; owner: FSA, APHA and councils)

9.What it would cost

How the cost is built up: Defra, FSA, APHA and port health implementation + business changes to processes, labelling and IT + evaluation. A GDP estimate is not tax receipts and is not netted off.

  • Public administration, business compliance and transition

    Great Britain–EU agri-food trade

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A29-IMPLEMENTATION)

    mixed; price year not stated; 2026–27 onwards; Not yet established

  • Independent evaluation with pre-implementation baseline

    Certificates, checks, rejections, exporter numbers and trade

    Not yet established one evaluation

    one-off revenue; price year not stated; 2027 onwards; Not yet established

10.Who pays, and what is missing

Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
None identified
Allocation committed to this change
None
Remaining gap
Neither total implementation cost nor business compliance cost has been published; the FSA’s one-year readiness funding covers only the FSA.
Proposed financing
Mainly a treaty and legal change. The FSA secured HM Treasury funding for its SPS readiness in 2026–27 (amount not published); funding for later years is being considered.
Responsible payer
central government, employers
Budget displaced
Departmental implementation budgets; businesses’ own compliance costs.

11.First milestone and time to a useful result

Publication of the final scope, exceptions and affected product groups, with a baseline dataset for the evaluation (Owner: Defra and the Cabinet Office. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

Time to first useful result: First operational data a year after implementation (planned summer 2027).

What could delay it: The postponed summit delays conclusion The European Partnership Bill is not introduced in time Exceptions are wider than expected

12.How we would know

Baseline
Export health certificates issued, checks, rejected consignments and GB agri-food exporter numbers in the year before operation.
Comparison
Agri-food trade outside the agreement’s scope and GB exports of the same products to non-EU partners.
Leading indicator
Certificates and checks removed in practice; border waiting times.
Follow-up
One and three years after operation.
Continue if
Certificates and routine checks are removed and small-exporter numbers recover relative to the comparison.
Adapt if
Checks fall but exporter numbers do not: look at the remaining frictions (customs, rules of origin, catch certificates).
Stop if
Not a stop decision: if certificates and checks are not removed within a year of operation, review the implementation with the EU.
Thresholds
Not yet set: No published business case or impact assessment sets numerical trade targets.

What is not yet known, and how to find out

  • Total implementation and business compliance cost (cost)Next step: Defra to publish an impact assessment with the European Partnership Bill.Scope: GB–EU agri-food trade in scope · Data or quotes needed: Departmental and port health costs; business survey of alignment costs · Who can estimate it: Defra (impact assessment)
  • Effect on trade volumes and exporter numbers (effect)Next step: Evaluate against the pre-implementation baseline and comparison.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery
  • The final scope and exceptions (legal)Next step: Await the concluded text; update the brief on publication.

Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: HMRC UK overseas trade in goods statistics: August 2026 (15 October 2026) or the first trigger: Text, ratification or entry into force of the UK–EU sanitary and phytosanitary agreement.

Decision briefPublic-policy proposalReviewed 2026-10-04

Fix one small exporter’s journey: a seafood firm still needs catch certificates and customs after the SPS deal

The thread: issue, evidence, action

  1. Issue Weakness: The new rules cut the number of product-country varieties exported to the EU by about 30%, driven by the loss of low-value trade relationships — consistent with smaller exporters leaving smaller EU markets. Also: weakness
  2. Evidence Goods exports to the EU, volume change since 2019
  3. Action Make the remaining border process usable for small exporters
Decision required
The Department for Business and Trade, HMRC and Defra map the full journey of a small GB seafood exporter sending consignments to the EU, remove the duplication that can lawfully be removed, and test joined-up guidance and digital documents with a cohort of small firms against a comparison group.
Who and where
Small and medium-sized GB seafood exporters to the EU. Applies in: Great Britain.
Accountable body
Department for Business and Trade
Intervention
Map the remaining steps for one exporter type, remove lawful duplication and test single-entry digital documents with support.
Best evidence, and where it applies
Defra says catch certificates and processing statements will still be required for wild-caught seafood after the SPS agreement, and customs controls will remain; the NAO found exporting could take more than 20 steps rather than two.Studied in: UK border operations and traders (January to July 2021).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Switzerland and the European Union — partial.
Extra cost of this change
Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: none identified in the brief.One-off or mixed: Digital integration, support staff and firms’ compliance time — Not yet costed.
Funding
Not funded: no funding route identified yet.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: Not costed; no funding route identified.
Savings and wider benefits
Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
First 90-day step
A published map of the small seafood exporter journey after the SPS agreement, marking each step as removed, remaining or duplicatedThe proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: Department for Business and Trade with HMRC and Defra. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
Twelve-month milestone
Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: The map within six months of the agreement’s final text; pilot results a year after it starts.
Outcome, and when to scale or stop
Measure: Compliance time and cost per consignment.Scale if: Pilot firms’ time and cost per consignment fall and they keep exporting relative to the comparison group.Stop if: Pilot firms do not export more than the comparison group after a year.
Main trade-off
Process support cannot remove legal requirements, and subsidised help may pay for exporting that would have happened anyway.
Source and review date
The UK border: post UK–EU transition period (HC 736, Session 2021–22) (5 November 2021). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A30 · costs C-A30-PILOT

Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

1.The change, in plain words

Fix one small exporter’s journey: a seafood firm still needs catch certificates and customs after the SPS deal

2.The decision requested

Decision
Commission a mapped journey for small seafood exporters (from catch to EU customer), publish which steps remain after the SPS agreement and which duplicate each other, and run a bounded pilot of single-entry digital documents and assisted support with a comparison group.
Accountable institution
Department for Business and Trade
Geography
Great Britain
Powers
Existing departmental powers for trade support and HMRC’s customs systems; the IUU catch-documentation rules are outside the SPS agreement and stay in force.
Delivery partners
HMRC; Defra (catch documentation); Animal and Plant Health Agency; Seafood trade bodies and logistics hubs; Devolved business-support bodies

3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

Target population
Small and medium-sized GB seafood exporters to the EU.
Eligibility
Firms sending wild-caught seafood consignments to EU customers, including those using logistics hubs to consolidate shipments.
Scale
A pilot cohort sized by DBT for comparison; not a national scheme.
Baseline
Today each consignment needs an export health certificate certified by an official vet or certifying officer (APHA charges no issuing fee but exporters pay for inspection and certification), a catch certificate and processing statement, and customs declarations. After the SPS agreement, catch documentation and customs controls remain. About 30% fewer product-country export varieties to the EU after the TCA (CEP).

Source: Defra / APHA; House of Commons, Get an export health certificate (guidance) and written answer 128122 on EHC fees (Guidance; written answer 128122); Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Fish and shellfish: preparing your business (SPS agreement guidance) (IUU and customs sections); LSE Centre for Economic Performance, UK trade in the wake of Brexit (CEP Discussion Paper 1847) (Introduction, PDF p.4)

Change beyond existing law or funding
The SPS agreement removes health certificates and routine checks; the business-preparation guidance says what remains. Nobody has mapped the remaining small-exporter journey step by step or tested whether joined-up documents cut its time and cost.

4.How it would work

Do: Map the remaining steps for one exporter type, remove lawful duplication and test single-entry digital documents with support Changing: so that the fixed time and cost of each small consignment fall

  • Lower compliance time and cost per consignment for pilot firms

    Hypothesis to test

    No official per-consignment estimate exists beyond the £200 certificate saving; the pilot measures it.

  • More small firms keep exporting to the EU, compared with similar firms

    Hypothesis to test

    The CEP conjecture that fixed costs pushed small exporters out is untested.

Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

5.Best evidence

  • The UK border: post UK–EU transition period (HC 736, Session 2021–22)

    Author or institution:
    National Audit Office
    Published:
    5 November 2021
    Evaluation period:
    January to July 2021
    Design:
    Value-for-money audit
    Sample or population:
    UK border operations and traders
    Effect and uncertainty:
    About 140,000 export health certificates signed in seven months; smaller traders could no longer use groupage in the same way; exporting could take more than 20 steps rather than two (industry estimate).
    Limits:
    Early period; step counts and cost estimates come from industry representatives.

    Where: Summary paragraph 13; paragraph 2.15. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

Closest feasible alternative
Rely on the SPS agreement and existing export support services without a journey-specific pilot.
Strongest counter-evidence
Process support cannot remove legal barriers; firms that stopped exporting may not return; subsidised support can pay for what would have happened anyway.

Source: LSE Centre for Economic Performance, UK trade in the wake of Brexit (CEP Discussion Paper 1847) (Introduction)

Distributional effects
Small exporters gain most; firms without digital capacity may not unless assisted support is offered.
Main downside
A journey pilot for one sector may not generalise to others.

The options compared, including current policy

  • The proposal

    Map and pilot the small seafood exporter journey after the SPS deal

    Who is reached
    A cohort of small seafood exporters
    Evidence
    Defra guidance on remaining steps; NAO on step counts
    Likely outcome and timing
    Map within six months; results after a year
    Cost and funding
    Not costed; no route identified
    Main trade-off
    Cannot remove legal requirements

  • Current policy

    Current policy: SPS agreement plus existing business-preparation guidance

    Who is reached
    All affected firms
    Evidence
    Defra guidance; call for information
    Likely outcome and timing
    From mid-2027
    Cost and funding
    Within departmental budgets
    Main trade-off
    Remaining steps not mapped per journey

7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

Country lesson · Switzerland and the European Union, Border veterinary checks abolished 1 January 2009

A common veterinary area between Switzerland and the EU

Evidence: Expert or audit recommendationPartial match: some conditions differ

What was changed
Under Annex 11 of the 1999 EU–Swiss agricultural agreement, the EU recognised Swiss veterinary and food-safety law as equivalent; veterinary border checks between Switzerland and the EU ended and trade in animal products is treated like trade between member states.
Study design and population
Description of an operating arrangement; no evaluation of trade effects found Swiss and EU traders in animals and animal products
Measured outcome there
Administrative result: veterinary border controls removed since 2009; third-country goods are checked at Swiss airports instead. No measured trade effect was found.
Cost status
Not published.
What failed or remains uncertain
Trade effects are unmeasured. Switzerland keeps its law aligned (over 90% with EU food law, by its own account); customs duties and customs formalities remain.
Why the UK differs
The UK–EU arrangement is proposed on dynamic alignment, not recognised equivalence, and covers a much larger trade flow; the UK left EU structures rather than building up from outside them.
First change required here
Set an evaluation baseline (certificates, checks, rejected consignments, exporter numbers) before the SPS agreement operates, so its effect can be measured where the Swiss one never was.

Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Swiss Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO/BLV), International agreements (Swiss–EU veterinary agreement, Annex 11 of the 1999 Agricultural Agreement) (Veterinary agreement section). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

8.What delivery needs first

  • dependency — The SPS agreement’s final scope, which decides which steps disappear. (Genuine veto: nothing proceeds without it; owner: Defra and the European Commission)
  • infrastructure — HMRC and Defra systems able to accept data once (customs and catch documentation). (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: HMRC and Defra)
  • law — The IUU catch-certificate requirement stays; only duplication can be removed. (Requirement; owner: Defra)

9.What it would cost

How the cost is built up: Journey mapping + system changes for single entry + support staff × cohort + evaluation.

  • Digital integration, support staff and firms’ compliance time

    A cohort of small seafood exporters

    Not yet costed (ledger C-A30-PILOT)

    one-off revenue; price year not stated; One year of operation after the SPS agreement; Not yet established

10.Who pays, and what is missing

Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
None identified
Allocation committed to this change
None
Remaining gap
Not costed; no funding route identified.
Proposed financing
Check existing DBT export-support allocations first; none identified in this review.
Responsible payer
central government, employers
Budget displaced
Other export-support services if funded from existing DBT budgets.

11.First milestone and time to a useful result

A published map of the small seafood exporter journey after the SPS agreement, marking each step as removed, remaining or duplicated (Owner: Department for Business and Trade with HMRC and Defra. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

Time to first useful result: The map within six months of the agreement’s final text; pilot results a year after it starts.

What could delay it: The SPS agreement is delayed Systems cannot share data without new procurement

12.How we would know

Baseline
Steps, time and cost per consignment for the pilot cohort before changes, measured by time-use diaries.
Comparison
Similar small seafood exporters not in the pilot.
Leading indicator
Compliance time and cost per consignment.
Follow-up
Exporter participation and consignments after one year.
Continue if
Pilot firms’ time and cost per consignment fall and they keep exporting relative to the comparison group.
Adapt if
Time falls but participation does not: the binding cost lies elsewhere (customs or market access).
Stop if
Pilot firms do not export more than the comparison group after a year.
Thresholds
Not yet set: Set from the baseline diaries and the pilot’s power calculation.

What is not yet known, and how to find out

  • Pilot cost (cost)Next step: DBT to scope system changes with HMRC and Defra and price support staff.Scope: One cohort, one year · Data or quotes needed: System change quotes; support staffing · Who can estimate it: Department for Business and Trade
  • Compliance time and cost per consignment (data)Next step: Collect time-use diaries from a sample of small exporters before changes.
  • Whether lower friction brings small exporters back (effect)Next step: The comparison-group pilot.Defensible route: bounded pilot

Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: HMRC UK overseas trade in goods statistics: August 2026 (15 October 2026) or the first trigger: Text, ratification or entry into force of the UK–EU sanitary and phytosanitary agreement.

What it would take

The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

The order things have to happen in

  1. First, the prerequisite

    Conclude SPS negotiations and publish scope and exceptions

    Owner: UK government (Defra, Cabinet Office) and European Commission

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  2. Then, the decision

    Pass implementing legislation (an anticipated European Partnership Bill)

    Owner: Parliament

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

  3. Then, delivery

    Operate the agreement; pilot support for a cohort of small exporters

    Owner: Defra, FSA and port health authorities; Department for Business and Trade

    Summer 2027 (FSA planning assumption, not an agreed date) — source

  4. Finally, the measured outcome

    Certificates, border delays and exporter numbers against comparable trade

    Owner: Defra; HMRC trade statistics; ONS

    No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

Who pays, and what is still missing

Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. None of these costs has been established yet, so no total is shown.

Cost and funding ledger

  • Public administration, business compliance and transition for an SPS agreement

    A29 · administration · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    central government, employers
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    FSA SPS programme funding from HM Treasury, 2026–27 (amount not published)
    Gap
    Not established

  • Digital integration, support staff and firms’ compliance time for an SME pilot

    A30 · administration · not costed

    Amount
    Not yet costed
    Who pays
    central government, employers
    Committed
    None identified
    Proposed, not committed
    —
    Gap
    Not established

“Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

Effects on record, with evidence ratings (2 records)

What the evidence says each action changes

Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
ActionOutcome and areaEffectCompared withEvidence
Reduce food-trade friction through a clearly scoped agreementCost and time of agri-food trade with the EU Trade and EU relationsDirection plausible; size not established—plausible spillover; limited confidence; Great Britain and EUSavings per consignment are government statements, not evaluated trade effects; the agreement is not yet concluded.
Reduce food-trade friction through a clearly scoped agreementUK freedom to set its own food and plant rules Trade and EU relations · harmSize not established—plausible spillover; moderate confidence; United KingdomWhether this is a cost is a value judgement; the trade-off is real.

How we would know

Goods exports to the EU, volume change since 2019; Goods exports to the rest of the world, volume change since 2019.

The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

Measured results

What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

Where the ideas come from

Research, counter-evidence and methods (11 sources; 2 claims held back)

Counter-evidence and criticism

  • Cut EU trade friction with a scoped food-and-farm deal: Dynamic alignment means taking EU rules the UK does not vote on, limiting divergence in areas such as gene editing; enforcement obligations follow; gains differ sharply by sector and firm size. (UK in a Changing Europe)
  • Make the remaining border process usable for small exporters: Process support cannot remove legal barriers; firms that stopped exporting may not return; subsidised support can pay for what would have happened anyway. (LSE Centre for Economic Performance)

Claims held back

  • The US tariff rate on most UK goods in October 2026 — The latest source read (Commons Library, April 2026, archived copy) describes a 10% tariff under a 150-day section 122 proclamation after the February 2026 Supreme Court ruling; what replaced it was not confirmed from a primary source. Needed: A US proclamation or a UK government statement on the current rate, or an updated Commons Library briefing.
  • Expected trade or GDP gains from an SPS agreement — Only government statements of administrative savings were found; no independent estimate on current terms was checked. Needed: An independent impact assessment of the final agreement.

“Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

Other options compared — not on the shortlist (4)

Other options compared

Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

  • structuralStatus: announced

    Linking UK and EU carbon markets

    Aims to:
    UK exporters exempted from the EU’s carbon border levy, and a larger, more stable carbon market.
    How:
    Linking the UK Emissions Trading Scheme with the EU’s means carbon prices converge, so the EU no longer charges its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on UK goods.
    Who decides:
    DESNZ and the UK ETS Authority; the European Commission.
    Main constraint:
    Requires aligning cap and rules with the EU system.
    Evidence:
    Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    The government estimates around £7bn of UK trade would otherwise face the EU carbon levy, and that UK exporters could pay up to £800m by 2030. These are government estimates, not independent evaluations.
    Policy status
    Agreed to work towards at the May 2025 summit; negotiation continuing.
    Resources
    Negotiation and market regulation; no large public spending.
    Consent and decisions needed
    UK–EU agreement; Parliament for any legislation.
    Time
    Depends on negotiation; the EU levy’s definitive phase began in 2026.
    Cost and yield
    Avoided levy payments of up to £800m by 2030 (government estimate); higher carbon prices for some UK emitters if UK prices rise to EU levels.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Avoids a border levy but ties UK carbon policy to EU decisions.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Agreement signed and linked registries operating. Outcome: EU carbon levy payments by UK exporters. It would not be working if: Linking delayed past the levy’s full application, so exporters pay anyway.
  • structuralStatus: announced

    A youth experience scheme and Erasmus+ association

    Aims to:
    Young people from the UK and EU able to work, study or travel for a limited period in each other’s countries.
    How:
    A capped, time-limited visa route for under-30s, plus UK participation in the EU’s Erasmus+ education programme.
    Who decides:
    Home Office and DfE; the European Commission.
    Main constraint:
    Counts towards migration figures; the size of any cap is politically sensitive.
    Evidence:
    Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    The EU and UK concluded terms for UK association to Erasmus+ from 2027 (December 2025). The youth scheme’s terms, caps and duration were still under negotiation; no published evaluation of its economic effect.
    Policy status
    Erasmus+ association terms concluded December 2025 for 2027; youth experience scheme in negotiation.
    Resources
    A financial contribution to Erasmus+; visa processing capacity.
    Consent and decisions needed
    UK–EU agreement; changes to UK immigration rules.
    Time
    Erasmus+ from 2027; youth scheme dependent on negotiation.
    Cost and yield
    Erasmus+ terms described as a “fair balance” of contributions and benefits; the figure is not stated in the joint statement.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Wider opportunities for young people versus higher measured migration and a payment to an EU programme.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Number of UK participants in Erasmus+ and visas issued under the scheme. Outcome: Two-way youth mobility compared with before 2021. It would not be working if: Take-up is a small fraction of the cap.
  • structuralStatus: external option

    Mutual recognition of professional qualifications and services access

    Aims to:
    UK professionals and service firms able to work in EU countries with less duplicated authorisation.
    How:
    Agreements recognising qualifications (architects, engineers, auditors and others) and easing short business visits.
    Who decides:
    Department for Business and Trade; professional regulators; the European Commission and member states.
    Main constraint:
    Each profession and member state differs; the EU has been reluctant to grant broad recognition outside the single market.
    Evidence:
    Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    The Trade and Cooperation Agreement allows recognition arrangements profession by profession; the 2025 Common Understanding lists qualifications and business mobility among areas for further work. No evaluation of the trade effect on this site.
    Resources
    Regulator time to negotiate profession-by-profession arrangements.
    Consent and decisions needed
    UK–EU agreement under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement’s procedures.
    Time
    Years, profession by profession.
    Cost and yield
    No reliable estimate.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    May require reciprocal recognition of EU qualifications in the UK.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Number of recognition arrangements agreed. Outcome: Services exports to the EU (current prices) relative to non-EU. It would not be working if: Arrangements agreed but services exports to the EU lag other markets.
  • structuralStatus: external option

    Rejoining a customs union or the single market

    Aims to:
    Removing tariffs and rules-of-origin checks (customs union; customs declarations would remain, as in EU–Turkey trade), or most goods and services barriers (single market).
    How:
    A common external tariff ends rules-of-origin checks; single-market membership also removes regulatory checks and restores free movement of people.
    Who decides:
    UK government and Parliament; the EU and all member states.
    Main constraint:
    A customs union ends an independent tariff and trade policy, including the new FTAs; single-market membership requires free movement and accepting EU rules without a vote.
    Evidence:
    Moderate evidence — evaluated, with limits on scope or transfer
    See the trade-offs and evidence
    What the evidence shows
    Studies of the existing trade deal find large costs from the frictions these options would remove — for example a 25% relative fall in imports from the EU — but there is no official estimate of the gain from re-entry.
    Policy status
    Ruled out by the current UK government.
    Resources
    Treaty negotiation; for the single market, a budget contribution.
    Consent and decisions needed
    A major treaty requiring political consent in the UK and agreement by all EU members.
    Time
    Years to negotiate.
    Cost and yield
    No official costing.
    Trade-offs and who pays
    Most of the trade friction removed, most of the policy autonomy given up — the central trade-off of the whole debate.
    How we would know it worked
    Leading indicator: Rules-of-origin requirements and regulatory checks on UK–EU trade. Outcome: UK–EU goods trade volumes relative to non-EU. It would not be working if: Trade does not recover relative to other partners after barriers are removed.
The options side by side
OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
Linking UK and EU carbon marketsNegotiation and market regulation; no large public spending.Depends on negotiation; the EU levy’s definitive phase began in 2026.limitedEU carbon levy payments by UK exporters.
A youth experience scheme and Erasmus+ associationA financial contribution to Erasmus+; visa processing capacity.Erasmus+ from 2027; youth scheme dependent on negotiation.not evaluatedTwo-way youth mobility compared with before 2021.
Mutual recognition of professional qualifications and services accessRegulator time to negotiate profession-by-profession arrangements.Years, profession by profession.not evaluatedServices exports to the EU (current prices) relative to non-EU.
Rejoining a customs union or the single marketTreaty negotiation; for the single market, a budget contribution.Years to negotiate.moderateUK–EU goods trade volumes relative to non-EU.

Plan reviewed 2026-10-11. How we judge evidence.