Headline evidence · Growth & productivity · UK · output per hour worked · 1997 to 2025

Britain’s workers produce only 7% more per hour than in 2007, after a 24% rise in the ten years before.

Each hour of work in Britain now produces about 7% more than in 2007. In the ten years before 2007 the rise was about 24%. Productivity is the main long-run source of higher pay. Investment is lower than in other big economies, but it is only one input.

Proposed outcome: Increase useful investment and help Britain produce more from its work and resources. What could change →

Geography
United Kingdom
Evidence period
1997–2025
Evidence status
Published statistics
Editorial review
Reviewed 3 October 2026

The short version

Three key measures

  • How much does an hour of work produce, compared with before 2007?

    +7% since 2007

    Output per hour worked is up about 7% since 2007, after a rise of about 24% from 1997 to 2007. Both changes are on one official series. It counts output per hour, not how hard people work.

    United Kingdom · 1997–2025 · Published statistics

    Definition, limits and source: How much does an hour of work produce, compared with before 2007?

    UK output per hour worked, whole economy, calendar-year index (2023 = 100): 93 in 2007, 99.3 in 2025. In the ten years before, 1997 to 2007, it rose 24% (75.3 to 93). Relative changes on one series.

    Published statistics · ONS, Labour productivity: output per hour worked, whole economy, seasonally adjusted (series LZVB), LZVB, calendar-year index (2023 = 100)

    Output per hour over time →

  • How much of its income does the UK invest?

    18.7% of the economy

    Investment as a share of the whole economy. Britain has long invested less than comparable major economies.

    UK and G7 · 2024

    Definition, limits and source: How much of its income does the UK invest?

    Whole-economy investment (business, government and housing) as a share of GDP in 2024, not a cash total. The other G7 economies’ median was 21.8%: Germany 20.5%, United States 21.3%, Italy 21.5%, France 22.1%, Canada 22.9%, Japan 27.8%. The UK was the lowest of the seven in 23 of the 33 years from 1992 and second-lowest in the rest.

    Estimate · World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS

    Investment over the long run →

  • What does electricity cost a medium-sized industrial user?

    25.1p/kWh

    Electricity prices for medium-sized industrial users. Household bills and very large businesses use different rates.

    UK, Germany, France · 2025 H2

    Definition, limits and source: What does electricity cost a medium-sized industrial user?

    UK, 2025 H2, including levies but not VAT, for users of 2,000–19,999 MWh a year. Germany 16.7p and France 10.6p in the same band and period. Very large users and household tariffs are different measures.

    Published statistics · DESNZ, International non-domestic energy prices, QEP Table 5.4.2 (Medium band, incl. taxes excl. VAT)

    Power, grid and industrial costs →
Who feels this most?

Weak productivity is not spread evenly. Output per hour is above the UK average only in London and South East; in 10 of the 12 nations and regions it is below, by up to 15%. Over time, output per hour is what allows pay to rise — see what happened to pay and productivity.

Budget 2026 · 28 October 2026

What the Budget means for growth & productivity

22

Budget measures on this topic

£355m

Net cost, 2026–27

£45m

Net saving or gain, 2029–30

Biggest single-year effect of each measure · red costs money, teal saves or raises it

  • Industrial Electricity2027–28−£1.2bn
  • Writing-down Allowances2031–32+£1.1bn
  • Investment for Growth2031–32−£535m
  • National Wealth Fund2031–32+£470m
  • UK-India2031–32−£400m
  • Good Growth Funds2027–28−£340m
All 22 measures on this topic
The Budget in 2 minutes →Is it being delivered? →

Treasury costings certified by the OBR, not measured results. Topic links are UK Facts’ classification.

The evidence

Public concern about the economy does not measure support for a particular growth policy or establish its effectiveness.

Annual data: UK investment over 30 years

The 1996–2026 window uses ONS annual totals calculated from four matched quarters. Incomplete years are unavailable. This is a share of nominal GDP, not real investment growth. The World Bank comparison below is a separate international vintage; the two series are not spliced. A dash means no comparable observation is supplied; it is not zero. United Kingdom, whole-economy gross fixed capital formation: business, government and dwellings. Calendar years.

1996–2026; % of GDP, current prices. No change is calculated across definition or assessment breaks.

UK investment over 30 years; % of GDP, current prices
YearInvestment
199618.9
199717.6
199818
199918
200018.3
200118.2
200218.2
200317.9
200417.9
200518.2
200618.4
200718.9
200818.4
200917
201016.7
201116.3
201216.4
201316.8
201417.4
201518.2
201618.8
201719.2
201818.9
201919
202018.5
202118.8
202219.3
202319
202418.7
202518.8
2026No comparable observations supplied

How much does the average hour of work produce, compared with before 2007?

Output per hour rose 24% from 1997 to 2007, then 7% from 2007 to 2025

United Kingdom · 1997 to 2025

1996–2026 · recorded figures.

Output per hour, 2023 = 100708090100110axis does not start at 020002010202099.3

Each hour of work now produces about 7% more than in 2007. In the ten years before, the rise was about 24%. The chart shows the change in pace, not its causes.

United Kingdom · 1997 to 2025 · Accredited official statistic; recent years are revised

Show the workings — Output per hour rose 24% from 1997 to 2007, then 7% from 2007 to 2025

UK whole-economy output per hour worked, calendar-year index (2023 = 100), 1997–2025.

Each hour worked now produces about 7% more than in 2007. In the ten years before, the rise was 24%. That is roughly 2.1% a year before 2007 and 0.4% a year since. The two windows are measured on one ONS series; the page does not splice sources. The change in pace is observed; its causes are debated and are not shown by this chart.

Geography:
United Kingdom — Whole economy
Measure:
Index, 2023 = 100
Period:
1997 to 2025
Status:
Accredited official statistic; recent years are revised
Calculation:
As published, with two derived changes on the same series: 75.3 (1997) to 93 (2007) is +23.5%; 93 to 99.3 (2025) is +6.8%. Relative change of an index level, not percentage points.
Compare with:
2007, the year before the financial crisis
Not included / breaks:
Output per hour is not output per worker or per job, and it is not a measure of how hard anyone works. Hours worked come from the Labour Force Survey and ONS revises the series when the survey is reweighted. Productivity is not the same as pay: the link between them is an average over time, not a guarantee.

Source: ONS, Labour productivity: output per hour worked, whole economy, seasonally adjusted (series LZVB), LZVB, calendar-year index (2023 = 100) (released 18 August 2026).

View the data as a table
YearOutput per hour (2023 = 100)
199775.3
199877.2
199978.8
200082.2
200183.4
200284.8
200387.1
200488.1
200589.6
200691.2
200793
200892.6
200991.1
201092.8
201193.3
201292.9
201392.7
201493.1
201593.4
201694.3
201796.3
201896.9
201996.7
202098.2
202199.5
2022100.4
2023100
202499.2
202599.3

How does UK investment compare with its peers?

The UK has invested a smaller share of its income than the typical G7 economy every year since 1991

United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada · 1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data)

1996–2026 · recorded figures.

Investment, % of GDP0%10%20%20002010202018.7%21.8%

Britain has invested a smaller share of its economy than its peers for decades. Investment can improve equipment, buildings and infrastructure, but the quality of what gets built matters too.

United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada · 1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data) · Official estimates compiled by the World Bank from national accounts; recent years are revised

Show the workings — The UK has invested a smaller share of its income than the typical G7 economy every year since 1991

Gross fixed capital formation (business, government and dwellings) as a percentage of GDP, current prices: the UK and the median of the other six G7 economies, 1990–2024.

The gap opened in 1991 and has not closed since: in 2024 the UK invested 18.7% of GDP against a peer median of 21.8%, a difference of 3.1 percentage points of national income each year. A ranking alone says nothing about the quality of what is built, and a higher share is not automatically better — but persistently low investment means less capital per worker, which is one of the main explanations economists give for weak UK productivity growth since 2008.

Geography:
United Kingdom; United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada — Whole economy
Measure:
% of GDP
Period:
1990 to 2024 (years in which all seven countries have data)
Status:
Official estimates compiled by the World Bank from national accounts; recent years are revised
Calculation:
One international source and definition for every country. The grey line is the median of the six other G7 countries in each year — a UK Facts calculation; every country is listed in the data table.
Compare with:
Median of the other six G7 economies
Not included / breaks:
Investment is an input, not an outcome: this chart does not estimate how much growth the gap has cost. Japan’s high ratio partly reflects its economic structure. Intangible investment (software, R&D, brands) is only partly captured in GFCF.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026).

View the data as a table
YearUnited KingdomUnited StatesGermanyFranceItalyJapanCanadaMedian of other six
199024.021.324.423.422.936.721.723.1
199121.120.124.823.222.536.120.322.8
199219.719.825.021.921.934.619.421.9
199318.820.124.020.519.633.518.720.3
199419.320.424.020.119.332.319.420.3
199518.320.923.519.719.932.018.320.4
199618.921.322.919.519.733.118.820.5
199717.521.622.619.019.632.120.320.9
199818.022.322.719.320.030.420.621.4
199917.922.822.820.220.430.020.221.6
200018.223.122.920.921.229.719.622.1
200118.122.521.520.921.229.020.221.4
200218.121.519.920.321.827.620.020.9
200317.921.619.320.521.326.820.020.9
200417.822.118.820.821.426.420.921.1
200518.122.918.821.321.726.921.821.8
200618.423.019.521.921.927.122.922.4
200718.822.319.722.622.026.523.322.5
200818.421.220.022.921.626.423.522.2
200917.018.818.821.420.324.722.320.9
201016.618.319.221.520.223.623.520.9
201116.218.720.021.719.924.323.520.9
201216.319.520.021.718.524.824.520.8
201316.619.819.621.317.325.524.220.5
201417.220.419.821.016.826.424.420.7
201517.920.619.720.617.126.423.920.6
201618.620.720.020.917.326.122.820.8
201719.021.020.121.417.626.422.721.2
201818.721.320.821.918.026.722.721.6
201918.821.321.222.418.127.222.621.9
202018.221.621.322.418.227.123.222.0
202118.521.321.223.520.827.123.822.4
202219.021.321.623.521.827.823.122.4
202318.921.421.222.822.727.823.022.7
202418.721.320.522.121.527.822.921.8

Scroll the table sideways to see every column.

Investment over the long run

“Underinvests” here means one thing: the UK spends a smaller share of its national income on new buildings, machinery, networks, homes and software than comparable economies. It does not mean every project is underfunded, and a higher share is not automatically better — what matters is whether the investment becomes something productive in use.

The UK’s low share is not one bad year. It has been at or near the bottom of the G7 for three decades, and its own share has not been near the 1989 peak of 24.7% of GDP since. Business investment is the largest part. Public sector net investment roughly halved from 3.1% of GDP in 2009–10 to 1.5% in 2013–14; the OBR forecasts it between 2.5% and 2.8% a year to 2030–31.

Where does the UK sit among the G7 now?

In 2024 the UK invested the smallest share of GDP in the G7

G7 economies · 2007 and 2024
20242007
  • Japan27.8%
  • Canada22.9%
  • France22.1%
  • Italy21.5%
  • United States21.3%
  • Germany20.5%
  • United Kingdom18.7%

Britain invested the smallest share among these seven economies in 2024. This is a longstanding pattern, not just one weak year.

G7 economies · 2007 and 2024 · Official estimates; latest year subject to revision

Show the workings — In 2024 the UK invested the smallest share of GDP in the G7

Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 2024 (filled dot) and 2007 (open dot), G7 economies.

Every G7 economy invested a different share in 2024 than before the financial crisis, but the order barely changed: Japan highest, the UK at or near the bottom. The UK’s position is not explained by one bad year — it holds across the cycle. The comparison is of shares of each country’s own GDP, so it is not affected by exchange rates.

Geography:
G7 economies
Measure:
% of GDP
Period:
2007 and 2024
Status:
Official estimates; latest year subject to revision
Calculation:
As published by the World Bank (NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS).
Compare with:
2007, the last year before the financial crisis

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP), NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS (released WDI update, 13 July 2026).

View the data as a table
Country20242007
Japan27.826.5
Canada22.923.3
France22.122.6
Italy21.522.0
United States21.322.3
Germany20.519.7
United Kingdom18.718.8

Has UK investment always been this low?

UK investment has not been near its 1989 peak since

United Kingdom · 1955 to 2025 (complete years only)

1996–2026 · recorded figures.

Investment, % of GDP0%10%20%20002010202018.8%

Investment takes a smaller share of the economy than it did in the 1970s and 1980s. Business investment is only part of the total.

United Kingdom · 1955 to 2025 (complete years only) · Official statistics; revised back in time with each Blue Book

Show the workings — UK investment has not been near its 1989 peak since

UK gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, current prices, ratio of calendar-year totals, 1955–2025.

UK investment averaged 21.3% of GDP in the 1970s and 20.6% in the 1980s, peaking at 24.7% in 1989. The 2010s averaged 17.8%, after investment fell sharply in the financial crisis and public investment was cut. The latest full year, 2025, was 18.8%. Business investment alone was 10.9% of GDP in 2026 Q2.

Geography:
United Kingdom — Whole economy
Measure:
% of GDP
Period:
1955 to 2025 (complete years only)
Status:
Official statistics; revised back in time with each Blue Book
Calculation:
UK Facts calculation: sum of four quarterly current-price GFCF observations divided by the corresponding sum of current-price GDP, multiplied by 100. Only complete matched calendar years are shown.
Compare with:
Decade averages: 1970s 21.3%, 1980s 20.6%, 2010s 17.8%
Not included / breaks:
ONS’s ratio differs slightly from the World Bank figure used for the G7 comparison because of vintage and annualisation. Use this chart for the UK’s own history only.

Source: ONS, Quarterly national accounts: gross fixed capital formation and GDP at current prices, NPQS (GFCF) ÷ YBHA (GDP).

View the data as a table
Year% of GDP
195514.4
195615.3
195716.0
195816.4
195916.1
196017.3
196118.3
196218.0
196318.2
196419.6
196519.6
196619.6
196720.1
196821.0
196920.6
197022.1
197122.2
197222.1
197323.0
197423.0
197520.7
197619.9
197719.5
197820.1
197921.0
198020.2
198118.9
198218.9
198318.9
198420.0
198520.2
198620.1
198721.4
198823.2
198924.7
199023.8
199121.4
199219.8
199319.0
199418.6
199518.4
199618.9
199717.6
199818.0
199918.0
200018.3
200118.2
200218.2
200317.9
200417.9
200518.2
200618.4
200718.9
200818.4
200917.0
201016.7
201116.3
201216.4
201316.8
201417.4
201518.2
201618.8
201719.2
201818.9
201919.0
202018.5
202118.8
202219.3
202319.0
202418.7
202518.8

Why it is happening

Finance only works when projects can be delivered

More money does not by itself produce more output. A wind farm needs a grid connection, a factory needs power at a price it can pay, a housing estate needs permission and builders, and all of them need people to run them. When one of these binds, extra finance mostly raises prices or sits waiting. Each box below names what you can measure to see whether that step is the bottleneck.

Which constraints bind together?

Money, a project, power, permission and people are needed at the same time

Equal-sized steps: a mechanism, not a model. The diagram does not say which constraint matters most, and the effects of easing each one overlap — they cannot be added up.

Mechanism diagram — arrows show how one step depends on another, not measured effects

  1. Finance

    Business, pension and public money willing to fund long-lived projects.

    Observable: business investment 10.9% of GDP (2026 Q2); 17 pension providers’ 5%-in-UK private-markets pledge by 2030.

    Capital markets and pension finance

  2. A viable project

    Finance only flows to projects that can be built and earn a return; projects only start if finance is available. Each depends on the other.

    Observable: planning decisions, final investment decisions, project pipelines.

    Why doesn’t Britain invest in Britain?

  • Power and grid

    A connection date and an affordable electricity price.

    Observable: 283 GW retained in NESO’s reformed connections pipeline (8 December 2025); industrial price 25.1p/kWh.

    Britain’s grid queue

  • Planning and infrastructure

    Permission to build, and the roads, water and connections a site needs.

    Observable: 208,600 net additional homes in England in 2024–25; decision times on major applications.

    Housing and planning

  • Workforce and skills

    People to build, run and maintain the asset.

    Observable: apprenticeship starts and achievements (England), vacancies in construction and engineering.

    Skills and apprenticeships

  • Management and adoption

    Firms able to use new equipment and technology well.

    Observable: business use of AI and other technologies (survey-based), R&D spending.

    Innovation: diffusion

  1. A completed productive asset

    A factory, wind farm, home, network or software system actually in use.

    Observable: completions, connections energised, capital stock per worker.

    Investment over the long run

  2. Output and pay

    More output per hour worked, which is what allows real pay to rise over time.

    Observable: output per hour worked; real pay.

    What happened to pay and productivity?

Who is affected most

Who feels this most?

Where is output per hour lowest?

Output per hour is below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions

UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 1998 and 2023
20231998UK = 100
  • London129
  • South East108
  • Scotland99
  • North West95
  • East of England95
  • South West92
  • Yorkshire and the Humber88
  • Northern Ireland88
  • North East85
  • East Midlands85
  • West Midlands85
  • Wales85

Most regions produce less per hour than the national average, which London and the South East pull up. Differences in industries and commuting affect the comparison.

UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 1998 and 2023 · Official statistics; next release 5 November 2026

Show the workings — Output per hour is below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions

Gross value added per hour worked, current prices, index UK = 100, ITL1 regions and nations, 2023 (filled dot) and 1998 (open dot).

London produces about 29% more per hour than the UK average and Wales about 15% less. Most of the UK sits below the average because London and the South East pull it up. Part of London’s lead reflects high-value industries such as finance concentrated there, and commuting from neighbouring regions. Weak investment, skills and transport links are the usual explanations offered for the rest of the gap; this chart does not test them.

Geography:
UK nations and English regions (ITL1) — Workplace-based output and hours
Measure:
Index, UK = 100
Period:
1998 and 2023
Status:
Official statistics; next release 5 November 2026
Calculation:
As published by ONS (Table 2).
Compare with:
UK = 100 in each year
Not included / breaks:
Relative position only: a region can grow while its index falls if the UK grows faster. Current prices, so price differences between regions are not removed.

Source: ONS, Annual regional labour productivity, PRODBYREG Table 2 (output per hour, current prices, UK = 100) (released 19 June 2025).

View the data as a table
Area20231998
London128.5132.6
South East107.7110.8
Scotland98.991.9
North West94.892.4
East of England94.799.0
South West92.592.3
Yorkshire and the Humber87.988.3
Northern Ireland87.680.6
North East85.488.4
East Midlands85.388.6
West Midlands85.288.4
Wales84.987.0

The dot plot axis runs from 70 to 140 (index points, not a zero-based quantity) so the regional differences are legible.

What could change

Proposals to consider. The bodies named below would need to agree to deliver them; responsibility is not a recorded commitment. Follow the links for costs and evidence.

  • Turn investment promises into a deliverable pipeline

    Publish which investment projects are funded, when they should finish and what has actually been built.

    Who could deliver it: Treasury, infrastructure bodies, departments and devolved governments.

    Main trade-off and delivery needs

    Double-counting housing/grid benefits; shared workforce bottlenecks.

    Distinguish funded projects from aspirations; sequence resources; name owners and independent assurance; protect maintenance.

    Cost: Only part of the cost has been estimated.

    Costs, drawbacks and evidence →

  • Test local powers to improve jobs and pay

    Examine local growth powers against their effect on access to jobs, output, pay and who benefits.

    Who could deliver it: Central government, mayors/local authorities; nation-specific arrangements.

    Main trade-off and delivery needs

    Institutional change and capacity gaps; gains may relocate activity.

    Specify powers, stable budgets and accountability; integrate transport, housing and skills; assess local capacity.

    Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.

    Costs, drawbacks and evidence →

  • Transport access to jobs

    Test a transport change where unreliable, costly or limited services prevent people reaching jobs.

    Who could deliver it: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies.

    Main trade-off and delivery needs

    The main risks still need to be assessed.

    Name route/mode, baseline users, service hours and comparator; cost operation, capital, subsidy and maintenance. Assess accessibility and displacement, not gross local job counts. Proposed owners: transport authorities/operators and relevant national bodies.

    Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.

    Costs, drawbacks and evidence →

  • Skills in the building trades

    Develop the skills needed to build homes.

    Who could deliver it: education departments, skills bodies, colleges and employers; nation-specific systems.

    Main trade-off and delivery needs

    Displacement of existing trainees; low completion; insufficient trainers.

    Identify trades and locations; secure paid placements, trainers, facilities and employer demand; measure completion and retention.

    Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.

    Costs, drawbacks and evidence →

See all options and what is still unknown →

Some problems have no assessed solution yet: see coverage and gaps.

Domain SWOT

Recorded

Budget 2026 bears on one of these findings

Show the findings
Strengths · 4 findings

  • The UK has real assets to build on: it is one of the world’s largest services exporters and has research-intensive universities.

    United Kingdom · 2023 (report data to 2023)

  • A ten-year infrastructure plan is in place: at least £725bn of government funding over the decade and an online pipeline of projects with their funding status, updated at least every six months.

    United Kingdom · June 2025 onwards

  • Public net investment is forecast at 2.5–2.8% of GDP to 2030–31, well above its post-2010 low of 1.5% in 2013–14.

    United Kingdom · 2013–14 outturn; 2026–27 to 2030–31 forecast

  • The UK has the world’s second-largest offshore wind fleet, after China, and offshore wind generated 52.0 TWh of UK electricity in 2025, more than any other low-carbon source.

    United Kingdom (ranking: global) · End of 2025 (ranking); 2025 (generation)

Weaknesses · 6 findings

  • The NAO found stronger research-infrastructure investment cases and clearer strategic priorities, but UKRI still needs to balance new capabilities with maintenance and renewal. Some existing facilities cannot serve their intended purpose, and early project optimism remains a value-for-money risk.

    United Kingdom · 13 March 2026

  • Regulators are responding to the growth duty, but the NAO found that HM Treasury and DBT lacked the data to establish a material growth impact. Clear risk trade-offs, outcome monitoring and an implementation plan are needed; reducing administrative burdens is not itself evidence of higher output.

    United Kingdom · 21 January 2026

  • Total investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, the lowest in the G7 (the other six had a median of 21.8%); the UK was lowest in 23 of the 33 years since 1992.

    United Kingdom and G7 · 2024 (G7 comparison since 1992)

  • The government reports flat on-site labour productivity in construction and a significant construction workforce deficit.

    United Kingdom · 2025 (citing 2024 analysis)

  • Output per hour was below the UK average in 10 of 12 nations and regions in 2023: London produced about 29% more per hour than the UK average and Wales about 15% less.

    UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 2023

  • Bus use in England was still below its pre-pandemic level in the year to March 2025 — 3.7 billion journeys, 90% of 2019–20 — and local bus fares rose 7% in the year against 3% for consumer prices. There is no current official measure of travel times to jobs: the journey time statistics stopped in 2025, with 2019 the last year.

    England · Year ending March 2025

    Budget 2026 responds to this

    A one-year £2 single fare cap outside London from January 2027, and free bus travel for children aged 5–15 in England.

    Bus FaresBus TravelTrack delivery →

Opportunities · 1 finding

  • Using pipeline data to sequence projects against the workforce, grid and planning capacity they share could turn committed funding into completed assets sooner.

    Depends on: Pipeline projects are classified by approval and funding status, and prerequisites (consents, connections, skills) are scheduled before dependent projects.

    our synthesis

Threats · 3 findings

  • Construction capacity, financing costs and stop-start decisions can block delivery; the NAO finds spending decisions have been short-term and reactive.

    risk

  • Water could limit growth: without action England faces a public water supply deficit of up to 5 billion litres a day by 2055, and in late September 2026 ten of the fourteen Environment Agency areas were in drought, with temporary use (hosepipe) bans affecting around 30 million people.

    England · Projection to 2055; drought status September 2026 · risk

  • Infrastructure and services are not being adapted to the climate already arriving: the Climate Change Committee judged the UK’s preparations inadequate and found no adaptation outcome, of the 46 it assessed, with evidence of good delivery.

    United Kingdom · Assessment published April 2025 · risk

See the whole-UK SWOT →

Domain action plan

Proposed

Possible steps for government and the bodies responsible. These describe the order of work, not promised dates: starting an action and seeing results take different amounts of time.

  1. Short term · prepare

    Identify the investment, skills and infrastructure obstacles.

  2. Medium term · deliver

    Deliver the linked projects with funding and people in place.

  3. Long term · judge results

    Track output and living standards rather than announcements.

Delivery steps and owners (5)
  1. Prerequisite: Classify pipeline projects by approval and funding status; map shared workforce and grid needs · NISTA with HM Treasury · proposed
  2. Decision: Sequence consents, connections and funding before dependent projects · HM Treasury, MHCLG, DESNZ and departments · proposed
  3. Delivery: Build to published milestones; unblock priority housing sites · Delivery bodies; councils; developers · proposed
  4. Result: Assets completed and used; investment share; homes added · ONS; MHCLG; NISTA · proposed
  5. Prerequisite: Select one bus corridor and a comparison using the Transport Connectivity Metric · A mayoral combined authority with DfT · proposed

Sources, method and changes

Shareable visual summary

Visual summary

Britain’s workers produce only 7% more per hour than in 2007, after a 24% rise in the ten years before.

Output per hour worked, the main long-run source of higher pay, was 99.3 in 2025 on ONS’s whole-economy index (2023 = 100), against 93 in 2007 (+6.8%) and 75.3 in 1997 (+23.5% from 1997 to 2007). That is about 2.1% a year before 2007 and 0.4% a year since. ONS revises hours worked when the Labour Force Survey is reweighted. Investment is one input: UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median, and the lowest or second-lowest of the seven since 1992. Delivery also depends on skills, power and planning. Whole-economy investment as a share of GDP (World Bank), not a cash total or business investment alone.

Investment (GFCF), % of GDP, 2024 (same 0–30% scale)

  • United Kingdom18.7%
  • Median of the other six G7 economies21.8%

World Bank annual series for all seven economies; the ONS quarterly UK ratio is a different vintage and is not used for this comparison.

Industrial electricity price, 2025 H2 (pence per kWh, same scale)

  • UK25.1p/kWh
  • Germany16.7p/kWh
  • France10.6p/kWh

DESNZ international comparison; one consumption band and tax basis for all three countries.

Text and data version

Britain’s workers produce only 7% more per hour than in 2007, after a 24% rise in the ten years before. Output per hour worked, the main long-run source of higher pay, was 99.3 in 2025 on ONS’s whole-economy index (2023 = 100), against 93 in 2007 (+6.8%) and 75.3 in 1997 (+23.5% from 1997 to 2007). That is about 2.1% a year before 2007 and 0.4% a year since. ONS revises hours worked when the Labour Force Survey is reweighted. Investment is one input: UK investment was 18.7% of GDP in 2024, compared with 21.8% for the other G7 economies’ median, and the lowest or second-lowest of the seven since 1992. Delivery also depends on skills, power and planning. Whole-economy investment as a share of GDP (World Bank), not a cash total or business investment alone.

Records behind this visual summary
MeasureValuePeriodGeographyTypeSource
UK gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP (World Bank)18.7%2024United Kingdomobserved countWorld Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation
Median of the other six G7 economies, GFCF % of GDP (World Bank)Calculation: Median of the US, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Canada21.8%2024G7 excluding the UKderived calculationWorld Bank, World Development Indicators: Gross fixed capital formation
Business and public investment (GFCF) as a share of GDP, current pricesCalculation: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (total, current prices) (£m, current prices) ÷ Nominal GDP (£m, current prices) × 10019.0%2026 Q2United Kingdomderived calculationUK Facts
Industrial electricity price, UK25.1p/kWh2025 H2United Kingdomobserved countDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero
Industrial electricity price, France10.6p/kWh2025 H2Franceobserved countDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero
Industrial electricity price, Germany16.7p/kWh2025 H2Germanyobserved countDepartment for Energy Security and Net Zero

Available images and their source records are listed on Shareable visuals.

Sources and methods (9)

Method notes

  • Investment means gross fixed capital formation: spending on buildings, machinery, transport equipment, dwellings, software and other intellectual property by businesses, government and households. It is gross of depreciation.
  • The G7 comparison uses World Bank WDI data for every country so definitions and vintages match; ONS’s own UK ratio is used only for the UK’s history.
  • Investment is an input. No chart on this page estimates the growth lost to low investment, and the options’ estimated effects overlap and must not be summed.