Of eleven selected 2024 Labour pledges, three are on track, six are mixed and one is off track.

The problem

Several tracked commitments lack a dated, costed plan. The NAO identified a publication gap in 2024; Treasury subsequently proposed annual strategic plans for 2026. Each commitment still needs a matching baseline, budget and outcome to judge delivery.

Who is affected, and where

Voters, Parliament and the people who use the services each commitment affects. Territory: UK. UK government departments; many commitments apply to England only. Devolved governments publish their own programmes and are not covered here.

Policy status

Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Recommended by the National Audit Office (October 2024). Its historical finding was that plans had not been republished since July 2021. Treasury’s November 2025 framework proposed annual strategic plans for 2026; the older audit does not establish current publication across all departments. UK Facts’ own registry tracks plan, authority, delivery and outcome for each tracked commitment — a site-editorial complement, not a substitute.

The evidence

What the research found:

The NAO recommends publishing departmental outcome delivery plans and cross-cutting mission plans at least annually, plus a summary of spending choices after each spending review. It finds government “prone to under-estimate on costs and over-promise on outcomes”.

Evaluated on:

UK central government planning and spending, 1998–2024; UK central government

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Fill the missing owner, baseline, outcome, budget and milestone fields for every tracked commitment, publish them in the next planning cycle, and report plan completeness and service outcomes separately.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Plans continued inside government after 2021 without visible effect; published targets can be gamed and add workload, and publication is not delivery.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

• Departmental analytical, finance and delivery staff time for published plans (administration; paid by central government): Not yet costed. No grant programme, but existing staff time has an opportunity cost; it is not zero. The NAO does not cost its recommendation.

Who pays:

Departments, from administrative budgets: analytical, finance and delivery staff time. There is no grant programme, but the staff time is a real cost.

Financing proposed:

A named departmental or Cabinet Office allocation, or an explicit statement of which existing work gives way.

Gap remaining:

Staff time not costed — not zero.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Analysts, finance and delivery staff.

Operational capacity:

Departmental performance data matched to each commitment.

Infrastructure:

A public register of commitments with revision history.

Permissions:

None.

Law:

None: an administrative decision.

Public consent:

Ministers accepting public milestones that may be missed.

First step and stages

First step: Complete the missing owner, baseline, outcome, budget and milestone fields for each tracked commitment. (owner: Cabinet Office with each department (UK Facts for its own registry))

1. Complete the missing fields — Departments; UK Facts for its registry (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Publish in the next planning cycle — Cabinet Office and HM Treasury (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Report against stable milestones — Departments, scrutinised by Parliament and the NAO (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: A matching official statistic for each commitment; Funding decisions at fiscal events

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Voters and Parliament gain information; the cost falls on departmental staff time.

What else the money or effort could do:

Analyst and finance time not spent on delivery itself.

Strongest counterargument:

Fixed public targets can distort priorities and invite gaming; plans existed internally without improving outcomes.

Risks:

Target gaming, bureaucratic workload, and treating publication as delivery.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Share of tracked commitments with a dated, costed plan (this site’s delivery board).

Leading indicator:

Plans published with owner, baseline, budget and milestones for each commitment.

Outcome:

Timely service outcomes for each commitment, reported separately from plan completeness.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Treat plan completeness as an input only; judge success on measured outcomes, and flag any commitment whose milestones slip without a published explanation.

Earlier option on this page

This card replaces the option “Publish a delivery plan for every commitment” (external option: Recommended by the NAO; this site has not found current published plans for the commitments tracked here.). Its evidence: The NAO’s 2024 audit found outcome delivery plans had not been republished since 2021. Treasury subsequently proposed annual strategic plans for 2026; the historic audit does not establish every department’s current publication status. Publication supports accountability but is not evidence of improved outcomes. National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (October 2024)

Sources

• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Summary paragraph 11, recommendation (a) (printed p.9) (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Paragraph 1.17 (printed p.18): historical finding in October 2024 (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• HM Treasury, Reforming the spending control and accountability framework, Table 0.1: planning and performance (November 2025; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Paragraph 2.52 (printed p.40) (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)
• National Audit Office, Lessons learned: a planning and spending framework that enables long-term value for money (HC 234, Session 2024-25), Paragraph 2.16 (printed p.26): plans kept internally; some metrics poorly aligned to outcomes (2024-10-27; relevant passages checked)

Source published 27 October 2024 (NAO); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: The government publishes outcome delivery plans; The Budget confirms or changes funding for tracked commitments; A further NAO report on planning and spending.

The problem

Party costings use different years, bases and coverage, and independent scrutiny in 2024 found the main manifestos silent on the largest fiscal choices.

Who is affected, and where

Voters comparing party programmes. Territory: UK. Devolved parties often propose changes to devolved powers, so the template must show the scope of each proposal. Northern Ireland parties are not yet covered on this site.

Policy status

UK Facts proposal. The party comparison already shows each 2024 proposal on identical fields. Official costing of manifestos by the OBR is a separate option kept on the parties page; the OBR does not currently cost manifestos.

The evidence

What the research found:

The IFS said neither main manifesto faced up to the fiscal choices: plausible settlements for the NHS, childcare and defence would likely leave other services facing cuts of £10–20 billion a year, with £18 billion a year of real-terms cuts to investment by 2030 under existing plans. Almost all parties relied on raising £5 billion or more from tackling evasion and avoidance.

Evaluated on:

The 2024 general election manifestos, mainly Conservative and Labour; United Kingdom, June 2024

Our recommendation (separate from the research):

Publish a fixed comparison template, apply it to every party on the same evidence standard, date each assessment and keep a correction history; treat a missing costing as missing, never as zero.

Strongest counter-evidence:

Manifestos are statements of intent, not budgets. A common template can create false precision and favours parties with costing capacity; devolved parties’ powers differ, which limits like-for-like comparison.

Cost and funding

Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not a direct public-spending programme.

• Common comparison template and dated assessments of every manifesto (private contribution; paid by UK Facts): Not yet costed. Editorial cost only. The parties’ own policy packages are not costs of this action.

Who pays:

UK Facts and independent analysts (research time). Parties’ policy packages carry their own costs, which stay uncommitted unless adopted and funded through the proper process.

Financing proposed:

UK Facts’ research budget.

Gap remaining:

Staff time not costed.

What delivery needs

Skills:

Fiscal analysts.

Operational capacity:

Review time during an election period.

Infrastructure:

The party-comparison data.

Permissions:

None.

Law:

None (a statutory OBR role would need legislation).

Public consent:

Parties publishing enough detail to assess.

First step and stages

First step: Publish a fixed comparison template, and seek clarification from parties only through an authorised editorial process. (owner: UK Facts editors)

1. Publish the template — UK Facts editors (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
2. Source review of every party — UK Facts with independent analysts (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
3. Dated assessments with a correction history — UK Facts editors (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

Depends on: Parties publishing costings; A37: delivery evidence for the party in office

Trade-offs

Who gains and who loses:

Informs all voters; parties with complete costings are easier to scrutinise, which may disadvantage small parties with little costing capacity.

What else the money or effort could do:

Editorial time.

Strongest counterargument:

Detailed costing rewards parties with civil-service-style capacity and can crowd out debate about values and priorities.

Risks:

False precision, different devolved powers, and confusing a missing costing with a deliberately zero-cost policy.

How we would judge it

Baseline:

Party–issue cells covered and parties with published costings (party comparison page).

Leading indicator:

Share of proposals assessed on the template with a dated source.

Outcome:

Unresolved costing gaps visible for every party; reproducible judgements.

Continue, adapt or stop:

Revise the template if two reviewers reach different results on the same proposal.

Sources

• Institute for Fiscal Studies, manifesto analysis: Paul Johnson’s opening remarks (cross-party), Opening remarks, PDF pp.2–3 (2024-06-24; full text checked)
• Institute for Fiscal Studies, General Election 2024: IFS manifesto analysis (event page; opening remarks by Paul Johnson published as a PDF), Event page summarising the same analysis (2024-06-24; relevant passages checked)

Source published 24 June 2024 (IFS); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: A general election is called; A party publishes a new programme; Legislation gives the OBR a manifesto-costing role.