Operational
Meet today’s commitments
People, equipment and support available for a defined task, at the required notice.
Headline evidence · Defence · United Kingdom · spending 2010–11 to 2024–25 · personnel 2010 to 1 July 2026
Britain’s regular forces are 28% smaller than in 2010. Real defence spending is 5% higher.
Britain's regular forces are 28% smaller than in 2010, while real defence spending is 5% higher. Fewer people for similar money is not a verdict on capability. Whether the forces could fight and sustain a major conflict is not published.
Proposed outcome: Keep the Armed Forces ready and able to sustain operations against the threats Britain faces. What could change →
- Geography
- United Kingdom
- Evidence period
- 1 April 2010 and 2026
- Evidence status
- Published statistics
- Editorial review
- Reviewed 10 October 2026
The short version
Three key measures
How much smaller are the regular forces than in 2010?
28% smaller
There are about 138,000 regular service personnel, down from about 192,000 in 2010. Real defence spending over the same years is about 5% higher. This counts people, not how ready or capable the forces are.
The forces then and now →United Kingdom · 1 April 2010 and 2026 · Published statistics
Definition, limits and source: How much smaller are the regular forces than in 2010?
137,966 UK regular service personnel on 1 April 2026, against 191,710 on 1 April 2010. Excludes Gurkhas and reserves. The Army is 32% smaller and the Royal Air Force 29% smaller. Real defence spending over the same years is 5% higher (£57.1bn in 2010–11 to £60.2bn in 2024–25, 2024–25 prices). The latest quarterly count is 137,482 (1 July 2026). This is a count of people, not a measure of readiness or of NATO capability targets, which are classified.
Published statistics · MOD, Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics 1 July 2026 (Table 1); UK Defence Statistics 2012 (Table 2.5), Table 1 (2026); Table 2.5 of UK Defence Statistics 2012 (2010)
Are major equipment programmes on track?
16 of 39rated Red
Equipment programmes facing serious delivery risk. A red rating does not mean a programme has already failed.
Equipment: programme delivery →United Kingdom · as at 31 March 2026
Definition, limits and source: Are major equipment programmes on track?
MOD major projects rated Red (41%), against 14% elsewhere in government. 5 MOD ratings are withheld. Red means delivery is at serious risk, not that a programme has failed.
Published statistics · NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26
Has defence spending recovered since 2010–11, after inflation?
£60.2bnafter inflation
Spending after allowing for inflation. More money does not by itself show that equipment, staff or ammunition are ready.
Money: real, annual and planned →United Kingdom · 2010–11 and 2024–25
Definition, limits and source: Has defence spending recovered since 2010–11, after inflation?
2024–25, against £57.1bn in 2010–11 — both in 2024–25 prices. Low of £46.2bn in 2016–17. Planned to reach £79.1bn (cash, a different basis) in 2029–30. Spending is an input, not a readiness measure.
Published statistics · MOD, Defence Departmental Resources 2025 (Worksheet 1: Defence Expenditure Outturn)
What it means day to day
Readiness depends on the task, the notice required and how long forces must sustain it. The public record shows investment, personnel and delivery risks, with important gaps. More resources can help, but equipment, training, support and industrial capacity take time to deliver.
Budget 2026 · 28 October 2026
What the Budget means for defence
5
Budget measures on this topic
£2.1bn
Net cost, 2026–27
£300m
Net saving or gain, 2029–30
Biggest single-year effect of each measure · red costs money, teal saves or raises it
- Defence Investment Plan2027–28+£2.1bn
- Defence Investment Plan (DIP)2026–27−£1.8bn
- Ukraine2026–27−£500m
- UK Export Finance2027–28+£200m
- Defence2029–30−£95m
+£2.1bn
saving or gain in 2027–28
Defence Investment Plan
−£1.8bn
cost in 2026–27
Defence Investment Plan (DIP)
−£500m
cost in 2026–27
Ukraine
All 5 measures on this topic
+£200m
saving or gain in 2027–28
UK Export Finance
−£95m
cost in 2029–30
Defence
The Budget in 2 minutes →Is it being delivered? →
Treasury costings certified by the OBR, not measured results. Topic links are UK Facts’ classification.
The evidence
The forces then and now
The regular forces are about 30% smaller than in 2006. Money has not fallen: in real terms the defence budget is about 12% higher. Part of the answer is that equipment, pensions, nuclear and support now take a larger share of each pound than they did. Part is by design, with technology doing some of what people did. This page does not claim that fewer people means weaker forces, or that more money means stronger ones; it shows that the two have moved apart.
Regular forces, 1 April
29.6% fewer in 20 years. UK Regular Forces, trained and untrained, excluding Gurkhas and reserves, at 1 April.
- 2006195,850
- 2026137,966
By Service: change over the same years
Percentage fall in regular strength, 2006 to 2026.
- Royal Navy and Royal Marines−17%39k to 33k
- Army−31%108k to 74k
- Royal Air Force−36%49k to 31k
Real defence spending, £bn
MOD “Defence Spending”, 2024-25 prices. The money is not lower; the number of people is.
- 2006-07£53.7bn
- 2010-11£57.1bn
- 2024-25£60.2bn
Share of national income (NATO basis)
Core defence spending as a share of GDP. 2025 and 2026 are estimates. NATO’s pledge is 3.5% by 2035.
- 20142.13%
- 20162.07%
- 20182.08%
- 20202.33%
- 20222.22%
- 20242.28%
- 2025e2.32%
- 2026e2.56%
Counts are not readiness. MOD says 'in service' varies by equipment type and is not an availability rate.
- Frigates and destroyers, 200625
- Frigates and destroyers, 202613
- Attack and ballistic submarines, 200614
- Attack and ballistic submarines, 20269
- Challenger 2 tanks, 2006313
- Challenger 2 tanks, 2026285NATO treaty count in 2006; MOD holdings in 2026
Are the forces ready? No one publishes the answer.
No official figure says how ready the forces are to fight. The Strategic Defence Review recommended publishing availability data each year and a Defence Readiness Bill; the Bill had not been introduced when this was checked. NATO’s capability targets for each country are classified, so no public source can say whether the UK’s smaller forces meet its obligations. What is public is that the pledge on spending is 3.5% of national income by 2035; the UK is at about 2.3% to 2.6% now.
- Defence Committee, 2024: Warfighting readiness is in doubt.
- Strategic Defence Review, June 2025: Stockpiles are inadequate; the forces have been hollowed out.
- National Audit Office, July 2025: The F-35 mission-capable rate was about half the MOD target in 2024; the figures themselves were withheld.
How much equipment money is spent abroad?
Most defence money stays in the UK: 85% of the £38bn spent with industry in 2024–25 was for work done here. About 15% was for work done overseas, and about 6% went to the US government, mainly for F-35 jets and the Trident missile. The £38bn is a different measure from total defence spending, so these shares are not shares of the £60bn budget. The MOD does not publish equipment bought from US companies as a figure. The 'location of work' basis counts a UK-based foreign-owned supplier as UK. The F-35 and Trident split of the US Government payments is not published.
£38.0bn spent with industry, 2024-25
15% of the spending was for work done overseas, down from 19% in 2020-21. North America was 6.9%.
- Work done in the UK£32.3bn
- Work done overseas£5.7bn15%
Overseas, by region
Direct payments to the US government (Foreign Military Sales £623m, other US government payments £1731m, mainly F-35 and Trident) total £2,354m, 6.2% of the total.
- Europe£2.7bn
- North America£2.6bn
- Asia£0.2bn
- South America£0.2bn
What would it take to spend it in the UK?
For several items there is no UK-built alternative today. Where there is, UK-built does not mean on time: Challenger 3 and Ajax are rated Red. No source we found gives the price difference between a UK-built and an imported version, so none is shown. These are not costed.
| Bought abroad | What a UK route involves | Caveat | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| F-35 fighter jets (US) | No UK-built stealth fighter exists. The UK route is the GCAP fighter with Italy and Japan; the Defence Investment Plan puts £8.6bn into it for 2026-30. | The F-35 is in service to 2069. The National Audit Office puts its whole-life cost at £71bn. | Not costed as a switch |
| P-8 Poseidon, Apache, Chinook (US) | No UK alternative identified. Plan funds sustainment and upgrades; the Stingray torpedo is restarted in the UK. | Foreign Military Sales were £623m in 2024-25. | Not costed as a switch |
| Missiles and ammunition | Plan: £11.1bn for 2026-30, at least six energetics factories by 2030, and 'always on' orders for UK-made missiles. | Some is cooperative with Germany, France and Italy. | £11.1bn in the plan |
| Army vehicles | Already built or rebuilt in the UK: Challenger 3, Ajax, Boxer. | These are rated Red or Amber for delivery: buying British does not by itself deliver on time or cost. | As stated per programme |
| Offsets | The Defence Industrial Strategy proposes requiring UK jobs and technology in return when the UK buys abroad, subject to consultation. | Not in force. | Not costed |
Sources: MOD regional expenditure with industry 2024/25; Defence Investment Plan (June 2026); National Audit Office, The UK’s F-35 capability (July 2025); Defence Industrial Strategy 2025.
Concern about international conflict does not measure public support for a particular defence policy or the Armed Forces’ readiness.
The question behind the numbers
Three meanings of readiness
Warfighting
Fight and keep fighting
Sustain high-intensity operations, replace losses and replenish supplies over time.
Strategic
Mobilise the nation
Government, industry, infrastructure, reserves and society supporting the effort.
These are different questions. Spending, headcount and project ratings help explain the resources and delivery risks. They cannot establish an overall readiness percentage. Missing public information is an uncertainty, not proof of failure. Defence Committee framework, February 2024.
Public commitments and what they require
- NATO collective defence: interoperable forces, sustainment and allied support.
- Homeland and overseas responsibilities: resilient infrastructure, air and maritime protection, and civil coordination.
- Nuclear deterrence: a long-term enterprise of submarines, people, infrastructure and support.
- Transformation: integrating drones, cyber and space while sustaining existing forces.
Defence Investment Plan · 30 June 2026. These are policy commitments; this diagram does not disclose operational plans.
What do the people responsible identify as the challenges?
Government commitments
Turn investment into forces ready to fight
Spending plans are promises. Delivery means equipment arrives, works and has trained people to use and maintain it.
MOD and HM Treasury · 30 June 2026
Military leadership
Readiness, people and transformation
Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton argued for industrial capacity, skills and wider national resilience as well as stronger forces. This is his published assessment, not a measured readiness return or a claim that all commanders agree.
Chief of the Defence Staff, RUSI speech · 15 December 2025
Serving personnel
45% satisfied with service life
The survey asks trained regular personnel about service life. Their experiences help explain why people may leave, but do not measure readiness to fight.
MOD, Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey · 28 May 2026
Independent scrutiny
Equipment needs people, spares and support
The NAO’s F-35 audit recognised operational capability while finding delivery, staffing and support gaps against the intended programme. Its conclusions are specific to that programme and date.
National Audit Office · 11 July 2025
People: joining, staying and being trained
People joining and leaving, years ending March
UK regular forces · people · annual figures
Recruitment and outflow data
| Period ending | Intake | Outflow | Net |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-03-31 | 14,370 | 23,531 | -9,161 |
| 2014-03-31 | 11,885 | 23,013 | -11,128 |
| 2015-03-31 | 12,980 | 18,912 | -5,932 |
| 2016-03-31 | 13,796 | 16,545 | -2,749 |
| 2017-03-31 | 13,383 | 15,047 | -1,664 |
| 2018-03-31 | 12,359 | 15,172 | -2,813 |
| 2019-03-31 | 12,485 | 14,633 | -2,148 |
| 2020-03-31 | 16,344 | 15,455 | 889 |
| 2021-03-31 | 16,245 | 12,299 | 3,946 |
| 2022-03-31 | 13,351 | 14,633 | -1,282 |
| 2023-03-31 | 11,088 | 16,511 | -5,423 |
| 2024-03-31 | 11,298 | 15,729 | -4,431 |
| 2025-03-31 | 13,452 | 14,587 | -1,135 |
| 2026-03-31 | 14,370 | 13,393 | 977 |
2026-07-01
Source and update history
Ministry of Defence: Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics: 2026 · period 2026-07-01 · released 23 September 2026 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · Within refresh window. Official data download.
What personnel report
AFCAS 2026 · weighted percentages · different questions and bases
- Service life: satisfied45%
Published margin ±1.8 percentage points · responding base 7,459
- Basic pay: satisfied37%
Published margin ±1.7 percentage points · responding base 7,600
- Service morale: low55%
Published margin ±1.8 percentage points · responding base 7,470
- Family and personal life: increases intention to leave60%
Published margin ±1.9 percentage points · responding base 6,714
- Family accommodation repairs: satisfied39%
Published margin ±3.4 percentage points · responding base 1,900
Survey history, questions and uncertainty
Published margins are retained rather than inventing confidence intervals. MOD flags comparisons at the 99% significance level. Sampling excludes deployed personnel and those on training courses. Quality report.
Table B2.1: How satisfied are you with [Service] life in general?
| Year | Satisfied (%) | Margin (pp) | Base |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 47 | 2.0 | Not supplied |
| 2008 | 51 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2009 | 61 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2010 | 60 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2011 | 57 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2012 | 51 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2013 | 49 | 1.9 | Not supplied |
| 2014 | 48 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2015 | 47 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2016 | 46 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2017 | 42 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2018 | 41 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2019 | 46 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2020 | 45 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2021 | 50 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2022 | 45 | 1.9 | Not supplied |
| 2023 | 42 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2024 | 40 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2025 | 42 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2026 | 45 | 1.8 | 7,459 |
Table B1.3: How satisfied are you with the following? My rate of basic pay (basic pay includes X-Factor, but excludes Recruitment and Retention Pay [RRP] and any allowances).
| Year | Satisfied (%) | Margin (pp) | Base |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 40 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2008 | 41 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2009 | 50 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2010 | 52 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2011 | 43 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2012 | 40 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2013 | 39 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2014 | 39 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2015 | 36 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2016 | 35 | 1.3 | Not supplied |
| 2017 | 33 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2018 | 31 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2019 | 35 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2020 | 39 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2021 | 45 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2022 | 40 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2023 | 31 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2024 | 32 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2025 | 34 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2026 | 37 | 1.7 | 7,600 |
Table B2.4: How would you rate the level of morale of… The [Service] as a whole?
| Year | Low (%) | Margin (pp) | Base |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 63 | 2.0 | Not supplied |
| 2008 | 55 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2009 | 38 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2010 | 33 | 1.3 | Not supplied |
| 2011 | 44 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2012 | 50 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2013 | 55 | 1.9 | Not supplied |
| 2014 | 52 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2015 | 49 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2016 | 52 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2017 | 61 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2018 | 67 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2019 | 60 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2020 | 53 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2021 | 42 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2022 | 45 | 1.9 | Not supplied |
| 2023 | 50 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2024 | 58 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2025 | 59 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2026 | 55 | 1.8 | 7,470 |
Table B12.8: How do the following factors impact on your intention to stay or leave the [Service]? Impact of [Service] life on family and personal life.
| Year | Increases my intentions to leave (%) | Margin (pp) | Base |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 62 | 2.0 | Not supplied |
| 2008 | 60 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2009 | 54 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2010 | 54 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2011 | 53 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2012 | 55 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2013 | 58 | 2.0 | Not supplied |
| 2014 | 59 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2015 | 61 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2016 | 61 | 1.4 | Not supplied |
| 2017 | 62 | 1.5 | Not supplied |
| 2018 | 64 | 1.7 | Not supplied |
| 2019 | 62 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2020 | 62 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2021 | 57 | 1.6 | Not supplied |
| 2022 | 59 | 1.9 | Not supplied |
| 2023 | 63 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2024 | 62 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2025 | 64 | 1.8 | Not supplied |
| 2026 | 60 | 1.9 | 6,714 |
Table B19.9: With regard to your current Service Family Accommodation, how satisfied are you with the following? The response to requests for maintenance/repair to my current accommodation.
| Year | Satisfied (%) | Margin (pp) | Base |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2007 | Not available | Not available | Not supplied |
| 2008 | Not available | Not available | Not supplied |
| 2009 | Not available | Not available | Not supplied |
| 2010 | Not available | Not available | Not supplied |
| 2011 | Not available | Not available | Not supplied |
| 2012 | 46 | 3.3 | Not supplied |
| 2013 | 46 | 3.4 | Not supplied |
| 2014 | 46 | 2.8 | Not supplied |
| 2015 | 42 | 3.0 | Not supplied |
| 2016 | 32 | 2.5 | Not supplied |
| 2017 | 28 | 2.8 | Not supplied |
| 2018 | 29 | 2.9 | Not supplied |
| 2019 | 33 | 2.7 | Not supplied |
| 2020 | 37 | 3.3 | Not supplied |
| 2021 | 38 | 2.9 | Not supplied |
| 2022 | 32 | 3.3 | Not supplied |
| 2023 | 19 | 2.6 | Not supplied |
| 2024 | 28 | 3.2 | Not supplied |
| 2025 | 34 | 3.1 | Not supplied |
| 2026 | 39 | 3.4 | 1,900 |
2026
Source and update history
Ministry of Defence: Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey: 2026 · period 2026 · released 28 May 2026 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · Within refresh window. Official data download.
Trained strength records completion of the relevant training definition. It does not tell us whether every person is medically fit, available or part of a deployable unit. Explore strength, training and workforce plans →
Annual data: Regular forces: historical source versions
The 2000 parliamentary table rounds to 100 people; UK Defence Statistics 2012 rounds to 10; the current quarterly source gives unrounded counts. Separate columns preserve these versions, including their overlap differences. These archives do not supply verified 2001–2005 figures. No exact percentage change is calculated across versions. A dash means no comparable observation is supplied; it is not zero. Total UK regular forces at 1 April; trained and untrained. Excludes Gurkhas and locally entered personnel. Not a measure of deployability.
1996–2026; people at 1 April. No change is calculated across definition or assessment breaks.
| Year | 2000 archive | 2012 archive | MOD series |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1996 | 221,900 | — | — |
| 1997 | 210,800 | — | — |
| 1998 | 210,100 | — | — |
| 1999 | 208,600 | — | — |
| 2000 | 207,600 | 207,610 | — |
| 2001–2005 | No comparable observations supplied | ||
| 2006 | — | 195,850 | — |
| 2007 | — | 190,670 | — |
| 2008 | — | 186,910 | — |
| 2009 | — | 188,600 | — |
| 2010 | — | 191,710 | — |
| 2011 | — | 186,360 | — |
| 2012 | — | 179,800 | 179,804 |
| 2013 | — | — | 170,712 |
| 2014 | — | — | 159,627 |
| 2015 | — | — | 153,724 |
| 2016 | — | — | 150,996 |
| 2017 | — | — | 149,366 |
| 2018 | — | — | 146,556 |
| 2019 | — | — | 144,428 |
| 2020 | — | — | 145,317 |
| 2021 | — | — | 149,280 |
| 2022 | — | — | 147,978 |
| 2023 | — | — | 142,556 |
| 2024 | — | — | 138,121 |
| 2025 | — | — | 136,998 |
| 2026 | — | — | 137,966 |
Original sources: House of Commons, Defence Statistics 2000 (Table 6, printed page 16 (PDF page 14)) · MOD, UK Defence Statistics 2012 (Table 2.5, PDF page 86). Current MOD quarterly tables. Annual snapshots differ from the latest quarterly headline.
An allocation is the start of a delivery chain
- 01 →
Funding
A defined budget and scope
- 02 →
Programme approval
An affordable, testable requirement
- 03 →
Contract
Agreed obligations and milestones
- 04 →
Production
Capacity, skills and supply chains
- 05 →
Delivery
Equipment arrives
- 06 →
Acceptance
Standards and safety demonstrated
- 07 →
Training and support
People, spares and maintenance
- 08 →
Operational capability
A defined capability demonstrated
Illustrative process, not a claim that every programme follows a single sequence. Stages overlap, and a delivered platform still needs people and support. Programme costs, schedules and delivery confidence →
Keeping forces supplied and supported
Munitions
Public plans and study contracts show investment activity. They do not reveal current stockpile adequacy or how long forces could fight.
Maintenance and logistics
The F-35 audit shows why engineers, spare parts and global support arrangements belong alongside equipment counts. Its findings are programme-specific.
Industrial resilience
Multi-year orders can support skills and capacity. They also commit budgets and can reduce flexibility as technology or requirements change.
Defence Committee · February 2024 · DIP · June 2026 · Dated evidence and public unknowns →
What delivery means in practice
F-35: the aircraft and the capability around it
The NAO’s July 2025 audit recognised a significant capability while documenting support and staffing problems. A later RAF update reports completion of initial aircraft deliveries. Both belong in the record: later delivery is progress, but does not establish that every earlier gap has closed.
Factories require orders, skills and time
The July 2026 energetics announcement awards feasibility-study contracts. Those studies precede decisions about engineering and construction. Funding a study is a documented step; it is not evidence of munitions leaving a new factory.
Retention is also about life outside the job
In AFCAS 2026, 60% said the impact of service life on family and personal life increased their intention to leave. This is a survey response, not a count of people who left or an invented personal story. It makes predictable working patterns and family support relevant options to test.
2026
Source and update history
Ministry of Defence: Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey: 2026 · period 2026 · released 28 May 2026 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · Within refresh window. Official data download.
The money: resources behind the commitments
2024/25
Source and update history
Ministry of Defence: Defence departmental resources: 2025 · period 2024/25 · released 15 January 2026 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · Within refresh window. Official data download.
More money, fewer people?
More money and fewer people are different signals
MOD spending, £bn at 2024/25 prices
1996–2026 · recorded figures. Shading marks years without figures: this series starts in 2010.
UK regular forces, thousands
1996–2026 · recorded figures. Shading marks years without figures: this series starts in 2010.
Defence spending has recovered above its earlier level, while the regular forces are smaller. Neither spending nor headcount alone tells us how ready the armed forces are.
United Kingdom · Spending 2010–11–2024–25; personnel 2010–2026 · Official statistics
Show the workings — More money and fewer people are different signals
Left: MOD defence expenditure outturn in constant 2024–25 prices, £bn. Right: total strength of UK regular forces (trained and untrained) at 1 April, thousands.
Real spending fell from £57.1bn to £46.2bn by 2016–17 and only clearly passed its 2010–11 level in 2024–25, at £60.2bn. Regular forces shrank from 191,710 to 137,966 at 1 April 2026. The two lines answer different questions: contracts, production, training and support have distinct lead times. A 28% smaller headcount is not a 28% loss of capability.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom
- Measure:
- £bn (real); thousands of personnel
- Period:
- Spending 2010–11–2024–25; personnel 2010–2026
- Status:
- Official statistics
- Calculation:
- As published. Real terms use the HM Treasury GDP deflator (constant 2024/25 prices, HM Treasury GDP deflator of 30 September 2025).
- Compare with:
- 2010–11 spending and 2010 strength
- Not included / breaks:
- MOD spending differs from NATO-qualifying spending (NATO adds military pensions and some non-MOD spending). Series break at 2010/11, so spending starts there. Personnel excludes Gurkhas, reservists and full-time reserve service. The cash Defence Investment Plan is not drawn here because it is on a different price basis.
View the data as a table
| Financial year | Spending (£bn, real) | Regulars at 1 April after year end |
|---|---|---|
| 2010–11 | 57.1 | 186,360 |
| 2011–12 | 52.7 | 179,804 |
| 2012–13 | 47.7 | 170,712 |
| 2013–14 | 47.2 | 159,627 |
| 2014–15 | 46.2 | 153,724 |
| 2015–16 | 46.9 | 150,996 |
| 2016–17 | 46.2 | 149,366 |
| 2017–18 | 47.4 | 146,556 |
| 2018–19 | 48.1 | 144,428 |
| 2019–20 | 49.1 | 145,317 |
| 2020–21 | 49.6 | 149,280 |
| 2021–22 | 53.7 | 147,978 |
| 2022–23 | 57.6 | 142,556 |
| 2023–24 | 55.9 | 138,121 |
| 2024–25 | 60.2 | 136,998 |
Where does the defence budget go?
People cost 26% of defence spending; buying and maintaining equipment 33%
- Service personnel£13.2bn (22%)
- Equipment purchase£10.7bn (18%)
- Equipment support£9.4bn (16%)
- Other capital£8.9bn (15%)
- Other running costs£6.5bn (11%)
- Infrastructure£5.7bn (9%)
- Research and development£3.2bn (5%)
- Civilian personnel£2.7bn (4%)
Staff and equipment take large shares of the defence budget. Future plans put more weight on equipment, ammunition and infrastructure; spending plans do not prove these will arrive on time.
United Kingdom · 2024–25 · Site calculation from published data
Show the workings — People cost 26% of defence spending; buying and maintaining equipment 33%
MOD defence spending by type, 2024–25, £bn cash (total £60.2bn).
Service and civilian pay together are the largest single block, at about £15.8bn. Buying military equipment and keeping it working costs about £20.1bn. Research and development has grown to £3.2bn. The plan to 2029–30 tilts further towards capital: equipment, munitions and infrastructure rather than headcount.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom
- Measure:
- £bn, cash
- Period:
- 2024–25
- Status:
- Site calculation from published data
- Calculation:
- UK Facts grouping of MOD commodity blocks: equipment purchase = single-use military equipment; R&D = resource plus capital R&D; other running costs = net residual after named blocks, including receipts and adjustments. Components are rounded; the residual reconciles to published Defence Spending. Capital R&D marked not applicable is excluded from the R&D sum; missing values are never treated as zero.
- Compare with:
- 2011–12: people 35%, equipment 31%
- Not included / breaks:
- MOD does not publish this breakdown by service (Army, Navy, RAF) in this release, so none is shown. Intelligence agencies are funded outside the MOD and are not included. Depreciation (a non-cash cost) is excluded, as in MOD’s own “defence spending” total.
Source: MOD, Defence Departmental Resources 2025, Worksheet 3: Defence expenditure by commodity block (released 15 January 2026).
View the data as a table
| Category | 2024–25 (£bn) | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Service personnel | 13.2 | 22% |
| Equipment purchase | 10.7 | 18% |
| Equipment support | 9.4 | 16% |
| Other capital | 8.9 | 15% |
| Other running costs | 6.5 | 11% |
| Infrastructure | 5.7 | 9% |
| Research and development | 3.2 | 5% |
| Civilian personnel | 2.7 | 4% |
How has the mix changed as threats changed?
Comparable equipment spending is 13% higher than in 2019–20, after inflation
Equipment spending, £bn at 2024/25 prices
1996–2026 · recorded figures. Shading marks years without figures: this series starts in 2019.
Share of defence spending
1996–2026 · recorded figures. Shading marks years without figures: this series starts in 2011.
Equipment spending has risen after inflation over the comparable period shown. This shows a change in spending priorities, not which threats the equipment can meet.
United Kingdom · 2019–20 to 2024–25 · Official statistics; shares are a site calculation
Show the workings — Comparable equipment spending is 13% higher than in 2019–20, after inflation
Left: estimated MOD equipment expenditure (equipment purchase, support and R&D), £bn at 2024–25 prices, 2019–20 to 2024–25. Right: shares of defence spending on personnel and on equipment purchase and support, 2011–12 to 2024–25.
On the comparable segment shown, estimated equipment expenditure reaches £27.4bn. Over the same period personnel costs fell as a share of spending while equipment rose — a clear shift in the mix, though the data cannot show which threats drove which decision.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom
- Measure:
- £bn (real); per cent of defence spending
- Period:
- 2019–20 to 2024–25
- Status:
- Official statistics; shares are a site calculation
- Calculation:
- Left as published (constant prices). Right: UK Facts shares of the Worksheet 3 total.
- Compare with:
- 2019–20: £24.2bn (real)
- Not included / breaks:
- Series breaks in 2008/09, 2010/11, 2017/18 and 2018/19 (accounting and classification changes); R&D was reclassified in 2016/17. Read the trend, not single-year steps.
Source: MOD, Defence Departmental Resources 2025, Worksheet 4: Estimated MOD equipment expenditure (released 15 January 2026).
View the data as a table
| Year | Equipment spending (£bn, real) |
|---|---|
| 2019–20 | 24.2 |
| 2020–21 | 22.0 |
| 2021–22 | 24.8 |
| 2022–23 | 26.2 |
| 2023–24 | 26.1 |
| 2024–25 | 27.4 |
The plan, year by year (cash)
| Year | Total | Of which capital | Capital share |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026–27 | £68.3bn | £26.6bn | 39% |
| 2027–28 | £73.8bn | £31.2bn | 42% |
| 2028–29 | £76.5bn | £32.7bn | 43% |
| 2029–30 | £79.1bn | £34.5bn | 44% |
Cash plan from the MOD and HM Treasury, The Defence Investment Plan (30 June 2026), so not comparable with the real-terms line above. The often-quoted £297.7bn is these four years added together. NATO-qualifying spending is planned to reach 2.7% of GDP in 2027–28; the UK has committed to 3.5% for core defence by 2035.
Britain and its allies: comparable inputs
Core defence expenditure as a share of GDP, 2026
NATO estimates · common NATO definition · Core defence expenditure as a share of real GDP, 2021 prices. 2025 and 2026 are NATO estimates.
- United States3.17%
- Germany2.69%
- United Kingdom2.56%
- France2.22%
- Italy2.10%
- Poland4.68%
Comparison data and source
| Country | 2026 estimate (% GDP) |
|---|---|
| United States | 3.17 |
| Germany | 2.69 |
| United Kingdom | 2.56 |
| France | 2.22 |
| Canada | 2.13 |
| Italy | 2.10 |
| Poland | 4.68 |
NATO, Defence Investment of NATO Countries (2014–2026), Table 3 · cutoff 3 July 2026 · controlled PDF extraction reviewed 10 October 2026. NATO and MOD accounting are not interchangeable.
Check the delivery milestones
Government delivery
From promise to a verified milestone
Each entry shows what its source establishes. Unknown stages stay unknown, including when a planned date has passed. This is a selected public record, not a complete inventory or completion score.
Energetics manufacturing: feasibility studies
Feasibility-study contracts awarded
£0.3m · Up to this amount per feasibility study; not factory construction cost
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- MOD / National Armaments Director Group
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 29 July 2026 · Studies due September 2026; construction planned to begin by end 2026
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedNot publicly verified.
- Funding allocatedNot publicly verified.
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedFeasibility-study contracts awarded · 29 July 2026
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
Study contracts only. Construction, commissioning and production have not been verified here.
Source · 29 July 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
Drones and autonomous systems
Investment allocation in DIP
£5.0bn · Four-year planned investment, not wholly additional money
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- MOD and single services
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 30 June 2026 · 2026/27–2029/30
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedNot publicly verified.
- Funding allocatedInvestment allocation in DIP · 30 June 2026
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
Portfolio allocation; no single fleet-wide delivery or operational milestone is established.
Source · 30 June 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
Naval transformation and shipbuilding
Published maritime programme commitments
No single comparable financial value recorded.
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- Royal Navy / MOD
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 30 June 2026 · Programme-specific dates in DIP
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedPublished maritime programme commitments · 30 June 2026
- Funding allocatedNot publicly verified.
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
Different ship programmes have different contract and delivery stages. No combined completion percentage.
Source · 30 June 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
Integrated air and missile defence
Investment allocation in DIP
£790m · Four-year homeland and overseas-base enhancement allocation
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- RAF / MOD
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 30 June 2026 · 2026/27–2029/30
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedNot publicly verified.
- Funding allocatedInvestment allocation in DIP · 30 June 2026
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
This allocation does not prove that all planned protection or radar capability is operational.
Source · 30 June 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
F-35B initial procurement delivery
Final initial-procurement aircraft delivered, RAF reports
No single comparable financial value recorded.
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- MOD / RAF and Royal Navy
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 28 May 2026 · Initial procurement final aircraft arrived May 2026
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedNot publicly verified.
- Funding allocatedNot publicly verified.
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredFinal initial-procurement aircraft delivered, RAF reports · 28 May 2026
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
Delivery does not establish every aircraft’s mission availability. The RAF also reports an earlier capability declaration; no independent current availability measurement is inferred.
Source · 28 May 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
Army regular workforce ambition
Published workforce ambition
No single comparable financial value recorded.
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- MOD / Army
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 30 June 2026 · Investment horizon 2030–2035; no precise achievement deadline
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedPublished workforce ambition · 30 June 2026
- Funding allocatedNot publicly verified.
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
Headcount, trained strength, specialist skills and deployability are different measures.
Source · 30 June 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
Cyber and electromagnetic force investment
Investment allocation in DIP
£2.5bn · Four-year sustainment and development allocation
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- MOD / Cyber & Specialist Operations Command
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 30 June 2026 · 2026/27–2029/30
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedNot publicly verified.
- Funding allocatedInvestment allocation in DIP · 30 June 2026
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
An established organisation and an allocation do not independently evidence future cyber outcomes.
Source · 30 June 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
Space capability investment
Investment allocation in DIP
£3.2bn · Four-year planned investment
Stages, dates and limitations
- Responsible organisation
- MOD / UK Space Command
- Original published date / delivery plan
- 30 June 2026 · 2026/27–2029/30
- Revised delivery date
- Not publicly verified.
- AnnouncedNot publicly verified.
- Funding allocatedInvestment allocation in DIP · 30 June 2026
- Programme approvedNot publicly verified.
- Contract signedNot publicly verified.
- Production underwayNot publicly verified.
- DeliveredNot publicly verified.
- Accepted into serviceNot publicly verified.
- Operational capability achievedNot publicly verified.
- Outcome independently evidencedNot publicly verified.
Programme scope changed in the DIP. Operational outcomes of the new allocation remain unverified here.
Source · 30 June 2026
Reviewed 10 October 2026 · next review 10 November 2026 · Controlled source extraction; independent review outstanding
How much can the evidence tell us?
Official statistics
Count resources or record survey answers. They do not provide a complete readiness score.
Policy and delivery records
Show what was promised or reported. Announcing a result is different from independently checking it.
Audits and scrutiny
Check particular projects at a given time. Later progress can change the picture.
Sources, updates and review
Tables are checked automatically and published together only after validation. Failed refreshes retain the previous snapshot; overdue checks are labelled. New evidence flags policy review rather than rewriting recommendations. Automated verification is not independent assurance. The owner has authorised documented agent review. Source verification and intended-use validation remain required; independent human assurance is not claimed.
- Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics: 2026 · 2026-07-01 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · within refresh window · Open Government Licence v3.0
- Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey: 2026 · 2026 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · within refresh window · Open Government Licence v3.0
- Defence departmental resources: 2025 · 2024/25 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · within refresh window · Open Government Licence v3.0
- NISTA Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26 · 2026-03-31 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · within refresh window · Open Government Licence v3.0
- MOD regional expenditure statistics with industry: 2024/25 · 2024/25 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · within refresh window · Open Government Licence v3.0
- MOD trade, industry and contracts: 2025 · 2024/25 · last successful refresh 10 October 2026 · within refresh window · Open Government Licence v3.0
Controlled document records and review dates
- Dip Profile · MOD / HM Treasury · Financial years 2026/27–2029/30; later policy ambitions · next review 2026-11-10. Policy plans, not outturn; funding definitions and conditional ambitions separated Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Gdp Commitments · MOD / HM Treasury · Financial years 2026/27–2029/30; later policy ambitions · next review 2026-11-10. Policy plans, not outturn; funding definitions and conditional ambitions separated Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Nato Gdp Share · NATO · 2014–2026 · next review 2026-11-10. Table 3 visually checked; 2025/26 estimates; financial input, not capability Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Civilians · MOD · April 2016–2026 · next review 2026-11-10. Inherited extraction; organisational transfers affect comparisons Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Programmes · NISTA · 31 March 2026 · next review 2026-11-10. NISTA ratings are delivery confidence, not readiness. Workbook date fields and commentary conflict for Armour MBT, OpNET and Collective Training; no single completion date is asserted. Costs use 2024/25 real prices. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Portfolio Context · NISTA · 31 March 2026 · next review 2026-11-10. Programme descriptions and baseline dates are controlled narrative extraction; aggregate ratings now automated separately Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Domestic Share · MOD · 2024/25 · next review 2026-11-10. Global share includes FMS and foreign-government channels; direct UK spending uses a different denominator. See original sections 3 and 9. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Concentration · MOD · 2024/25 · next review 2026-11-10. Rounded total over 39%; do not display an exact residual for the other nine suppliers. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Sme · MOD · 2024/25 · next review 2026-11-10. Direct UK-industry expenditure only; no ratio to BAE procurement share and no inferred subcontracting share. See original section 7. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Nuclear Share · Public Accounts Committee · 2024/25 outturn and dated expectations · next review 2026-11-10. Historical scrutiny, not current actual outturn; programme envelope includes contingency Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Dreadnought · Public Accounts Committee · 2024/25 outturn and dated expectations · next review 2026-11-10. Historical scrutiny, not current actual outturn; programme envelope includes contingency Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Eu Aggregate · European Defence Agency · 2005–2026 selected points · next review 2026-11-10. Inherited controlled extraction; estimates and selected chart points; EU27 excludes UK Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Eu Spend Series · European Defence Agency · 2005–2026 selected points · next review 2026-11-10. Inherited controlled extraction; estimates and selected chart points; EU27 excludes UK Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Eu Trough Finding · European Defence Agency · 2005–2026 selected points · next review 2026-11-10. Inherited controlled extraction; estimates and selected chart points; EU27 excludes UK Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Eu Composition · European Defence Agency · 2005–2026 selected points · next review 2026-11-10. Inherited controlled extraction; estimates and selected chart points; EU27 excludes UK Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- F35 · National Audit Office · 2024 availability; June 2025 fleet · next review 2026-11-10. Historic audit case. NAO and MOD cost scopes differ. RAF May 2026 delivery update also linked. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Dne Scale · Public Accounts Committee · June 2026 audit · next review 2026-11-10. Dated policy or document claim; not live operational strength. Source-value and reuse review outstanding. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Dual Capable · Ministry of Defence · June 2026 policy commitment · next review 2026-11-10. Dated policy or document claim; not live operational strength. Source-value and reuse review outstanding. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Eastern Flank · NATO · Inherited August 2026 review; source release date unverified · next review 2026-11-10. Dated policy or document claim; not live operational strength. Source-value and reuse review outstanding. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
- Safe · Council of the European Union · May 2025 instrument; negotiation account dated August 2026 · next review 2026-11-10. Dated policy or document claim; not live operational strength. Source-value and reuse review outstanding. Controlled source record; independent assurance is not claimed.
AQuA Book, July 2025: verification, intended-use validation and independent review are distinct steps.
Readiness scrutiny timeline: February 2024 → November 2025 → PAC, June 2026 → Government plan, June 2026. These sources answer different questions; they are not a readiness time series.
Why it is happening
Our analysis
Equipment takes time to build, people take time to train, and existing forces need maintenance and ammunition. Higher budgets cannot remove these delays overnight.
Who is affected most
Turning money into capability
Is the equipment arriving?
Defence budgets must deliver equipment ready to use
- Armour MBT (Challenger 3)Red
Rebuilds 148 Challenger 2 tanks into Challenger 3, with a new gun, armour and sights. It is the entirety of Britain’s future main battle tank fleet.
Independent assessment · baseline end n/a · current end Conflicting source dates
- Armoured Cavalry (Ajax)Red
A family of tracked reconnaissance vehicles for the Army, first contracted in 2014.
Independent assessment · baseline end March 2030 · current end March 2030
- New Style of IT (Deployed) — OpNETRed
The deployed military IT network: the computing and communications that go with forces on operations, rather than sitting in offices.
Independent assessment · baseline end n/a · current end Conflicting source dates
- SPEAR Capability 3Red
A precision air-launched missile intended to be carried by the F-35B.
Departmental self-assessment · baseline end n/a · current end December 2047
- E-7 WedgetailRed
Airborne early warning aircraft — the radar picture that lets the RAF see and direct air operations. The order was cut from five aircraft to three.
Departmental self-assessment · baseline end n/a · current end July 2030
- ProtectorRed
Replaces the Reaper drone fleet with an aircraft certified to fly in ordinary civilian airspace.
Departmental self-assessment · baseline end n/a · current end June 2030
Many major defence programmes face serious problems with cost, timing or scope. A warning rating means delivery is at risk, not that the programme has already failed.
United Kingdom · Ratings as at 31 March 2026 · Official statistics
Show the workings — Defence budgets must deliver equipment ready to use
Delivery confidence ratings and baseline versus current end dates for a selection of MOD major programmes, as at 31 March 2026.
A Red rating means successful delivery appears at serious risk unless problems with scope, schedule or budget are resolved — not that a programme has failed. Defence has three times the share of Red projects of the rest of government (41% against 14%). Several programmes have moved their end dates; others keep the original date while being rated at risk, which is why both columns matter.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom
- Measure:
- Delivery confidence rating; dates
- Period:
- Ratings as at 31 March 2026
- Status:
- Official statistics
- Calculation:
- As published. These six examples are all rated Red and illustrate projects at serious delivery risk. They are not a representative sample of all ratings. The proof-card counts cover all 44 MOD programmes.
- Compare with:
- 14% of rated projects elsewhere in government are Red
- Not included / breaks:
- 5 MOD ratings are withheld under freedom-of-information exemptions. 7 of the 16 Red ratings are the department’s own (senior responsible owner) assessments rather than independent ones.
Source: NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26 (released 13 July 2026).
View the data as a table
| Programme | Rating | Rated by | Baseline end | Current end |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Armour MBT (Challenger 3) | Red | Independent assessment | n/a | Conflicting source dates |
| Armoured Cavalry (Ajax) | Red | Independent assessment | March 2030 | March 2030 |
| New Style of IT (Deployed) — OpNET | Red | Independent assessment | n/a | Conflicting source dates |
| SPEAR Capability 3 | Red | Departmental self-assessment | n/a | December 2047 |
| E-7 Wedgetail | Red | Departmental self-assessment | n/a | July 2030 |
| Protector | Red | Departmental self-assessment | n/a | June 2030 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Readiness: No overall readiness percentage appears on this page because no suitable official aggregate figure has been identified. Detailed readiness information is not fully public. What follows is the public evidence, with how much weight each piece can bear stated alongside it.
What could change
Proposals to consider. The bodies named below would need to agree to deliver them; responsibility is not a recorded commitment. Follow the links for costs and evidence.
Protect defence sustainment and retention through risk appraisal
Identify the most urgent gaps in equipment maintenance, stocks and keeping specialist defence staff, while protecting sensitive information.
Who could deliver it: the Ministry of Defence, Treasury and parliamentary scrutiny bodies..
Main trade-off and delivery needs
Opportunity cost to other capability; classified data cannot be fabricated to complete a public score.
Require a costed sustainment assessment alongside procurement commitments; publish only safe aggregate assurance. Low public evidence does not imply defence is unimportant or exempt from scrutiny.
Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →Deliver what is already funded
Focus on completing work that already has funding.
Who could deliver it: Contracting authorities and Cabinet Office.
Main trade-off and delivery needs
Legal disputes; supplier exits; pushing costs elsewhere.
Name contracts, renewal dates and weaknesses; recruit commercial expertise; publish baselines, performance and remedies.
Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →
See all options and what is still unknown →
Some problems have no assessed solution yet: see coverage and gaps.
Domain SWOT
Recorded
Budget 2026 bears on one of these findings
Show the findings
Strengths · 2 findings
Real MOD spending has recovered: £60.2bn in 2024–25 against £57.1bn in 2010–11, both in 2024–25 prices.
United Kingdom · 2010–11 and 2024–25 (2024–25 prices)
A funded four-year plan gives industry visibility: defence spending of £68.3bn in 2026–27 rising to £79.1bn in 2029–30, with capital up from £26.6bn to £34.5bn.
United Kingdom · 2026–27 to 2029–30 (cash plan)
Weaknesses · 6 findings
No official figure says how ready the armed forces are to fight. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review describes stockpiles as inadequate and recommends publishing availability data each year; regular forces are about 30% smaller than in 2006 while real spending is about 12% higher.
United Kingdom · 2025 review; 2026 position
PAC found insufficient detail to scrutinise the costs and scope of nuclear programmes beyond Dreadnought, despite nine programmes exceeding £10bn in whole-life costs. July accounts received a clean audit opinion; that does not establish programme value for money or readiness.
United Kingdom · June 2026 scrutiny
60% of trained regular personnel reported that the impact of service life on family/personal life increased their intention to leave. This is a weighted survey response, not observed exits or a causal estimate.
United Kingdom · 2026
Regular forces numbered 137,966 in April 2026, 28% fewer than in 2010; 122,556 were fully trained at 1 July 2026. A smaller headcount is not a proportionate loss of capability.
United Kingdom · 1 April 2010 and 1 April 2026
16 of 39 rated MOD major projects were Red, against 34 of 172 rated across government; 5 MOD ratings were withheld.
United Kingdom · Ratings at 31 March 2026
The February 2024 Defence Committee assessment found warfighting readiness in doubt: every service had capability shortfalls and stockpile shortages and was losing personnel faster than it recruited. Readiness data once published are now withheld.
United Kingdom · January 2024
Opportunities · 1 finding
Setting requirements with budget and technical authority together, and funding stocks, maintenance and training first, could turn the rising budget into usable readiness faster.
Depends on: The MOD identifies binding readiness gaps and stages new equipment against what industry can deliver.
our synthesis
Threats · 1 finding
Cost growth and long lead times can outrun plans: the NAO found the 2023–2033 equipment plan £16.9bn over budget, with deficits growing in the nuclear deterrent and naval and air programmes.
risk
Budget 2026 bears on this
Capital is reallocated to fully fund the Defence Investment Plan alongside further savings; whether that covers programmes already over budget is the test.
Defence Investment Plan (DIP)Defence Investment PlanTrack delivery →
Domain action plan
Proposed
Possible steps for government and the bodies responsible. These describe the order of work, not promised dates: starting an action and seeing results take different amounts of time.
Short term · prepare
Separate equipment, staffing and readiness gaps.
Medium term · deliver
Assess procurement and support needs against available people and funding.
Long term · judge results
Judge readiness and usable capability, not spending alone.
Delivery steps and owners (4)
- Prerequisite: Identify binding readiness gaps against agreed commitments · MOD (Chief of Defence Staff and Permanent Secretary) · proposed
- Decision: Match gaps to funded lines in the investment plan; stage new equipment decisions · MOD and HM Treasury · proposed
- Delivery: Multi-year munitions, maintenance and training contracts managed to milestones · Defence Equipment and Support; suppliers · proposed
- Result: Trained strength, published readiness proxies and project ratings · MOD statistics; NISTA; Defence Committee · proposed
Sources, method and changes
Shareable visual summary
Visual summary
Britain’s regular forces are 28% smaller than in 2010. Real defence spending is 5% higher.
There were 137,966 UK Regular Forces personnel (excluding Gurkhas and reserves) on 1 April 2026, against 191,710 on 1 April 2010: 28.0% fewer. MOD’s defence spending, in 2024–25 prices, was £60.2bn in 2024–25 against £57.1bn in 2010–11: 5.4% higher. Both comparisons start in 2010 and end on the latest published data (personnel April 2026, spending 2024–25); the spending series starts in 2010–11 because the basis changed that year. Fewer people for similar money is not a verdict on capability. Readiness is not published: official statements describe stockpiles as inadequate and one major aircraft's availability as about half its target. About 15% of spending with industry is for work done overseas, 6% of it paid to the US government. For a longer view, the 1 April 2006 count was 195,850 (30% fewer by 2026). A smaller headcount is not a proportionate loss of capability.
Money: MOD spending in real terms, £bn, 2024–25 prices (same 0–70 scale)
- 2010–11£57.1bn
- 2024–25£60.2bn
People: UK regular forces (same 0–200,000 scale; a separate measure)
- 2010191,710
- April 2026137,966
Headcount rose slightly in the latest year; it is not a measure of capability.
MOD major programmes rated Red, of those with a published rating, 2025–26
16 of 39 of rated programmes are Red41.0% of the circle
44 programmes in the portfolio; five ratings are withheld.
Text and data version
Britain’s regular forces are 28% smaller than in 2010. Real defence spending is 5% higher. There were 137,966 UK Regular Forces personnel (excluding Gurkhas and reserves) on 1 April 2026, against 191,710 on 1 April 2010: 28.0% fewer. MOD’s defence spending, in 2024–25 prices, was £60.2bn in 2024–25 against £57.1bn in 2010–11: 5.4% higher. Both comparisons start in 2010 and end on the latest published data (personnel April 2026, spending 2024–25); the spending series starts in 2010–11 because the basis changed that year. Fewer people for similar money is not a verdict on capability. Readiness is not published: official statements describe stockpiles as inadequate and one major aircraft's availability as about half its target. About 15% of spending with industry is for work done overseas, 6% of it paid to the US government. For a longer view, the 1 April 2006 count was 195,850 (30% fewer by 2026). A smaller headcount is not a proportionate loss of capability.
| Measure | Value | Period | Geography | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MOD expenditure in real terms, 2010–11 (2024–25 prices) | £57.1bn | 2010–11 | United Kingdom | derived calculation | MOD, Defence Departmental Resources 2025 |
| MOD expenditure in real terms, 2024–25 (2024–25 prices) | £60.2bn | 2024–25 | United Kingdom | derived calculation | MOD, Defence Departmental Resources 2025 |
| UK regular forces, 2010 | 191,710 | 2010 | United Kingdom | administrative count | MOD, Quarterly service personnel statistics |
| UK regular forces, 2026 | 137,966 | 2026 | United Kingdom | administrative count | MOD, Quarterly service personnel statistics |
| Fall in UK regular forces since 2010Calculation: (1 − latest ÷ 2010) × 100 | 28% smaller | 2026 | United Kingdom | derived calculation | MOD, Quarterly service personnel statistics |
| MOD major programmes rated Red | 16 | 2025–26 | United Kingdom | administrative count | NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26, data CSV |
| MOD major programmes with a published delivery-confidence ratingCalculation: 44 programmes − 5 withheld ratings | 39 | 2025–26 | United Kingdom | administrative count | NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26, data CSV |
| MOD major programmes in the portfolio | 44 | 2025–26 | United Kingdom | administrative count | NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26, data CSV |
| Share of rated MOD major programmes rated RedCalculation: Red ÷ rated programmes × 100 | 41% | 2025–26 | United Kingdom | derived calculation | NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025–26, data CSV |
Available images and their source records are listed on Shareable visuals.
Sources and methods (6)
- MOD, Defence Departmental Resources 2025 (Worksheet 1: Defence Expenditure Outturn) (released 15 January 2026) — defence spending outturn, real terms
- MOD and HM Treasury, The Defence Investment Plan, Table 1: Defence Spending Profile Over the Next Four Years (released 30 June 2026) — planned spending 2026–27 to 2029–30
- MOD, Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics, 1 July 2026 (released 23 September 2026) — regular forces and trained strength
- NISTA, Major Projects Annual Report 2025-26 (released 13 July 2026) — major programme delivery confidence
- National Audit Office, The Equipment Plan 2023 to 2033 (December 2023) — equipment plan affordability
- House of Commons Defence Committee, Ready for War? (released 4 February 2024) — readiness assessment (January 2024)
Method notes
- MOD spending is the department’s own measure; NATO’s defence spending definition is wider.
- Personnel are UK regular forces, trained and untrained, at 1 April.
Corrections and changes
- 2026-10-11: Made both quarterly personnel dates explicit: the July headline count and the April annual-series comparison describe different dates.