Headline evidence · Political funding · Great Britain and Northern Ireland · calendar year 2025
One donor supplied 64% of Reform’s reported private donations in 2025.
Reform’s largest donor gave £12.0m of its £18.7m private donations in 2025. The top-donor shares were 21% for the Conservatives, 18% for Labour and 4% for the Liberal Democrats. These figures can change with late reports; each union counts as one donor.
Proposed outcome: Make political money easy to trace and enforce the rules. This does not endorse donation caps, public funding or any party. What could change →
- Geography
- Parties with at least £1m in private donations
- Evidence period
- Calendar year 2025
- Evidence status
- Site calculation from published data
- Editorial review
- Reviewed 11 October 2026
The short version
Three key measures
How much of Reform’s 2025 private money came from one donor?
64%from one donor
One donor supplied most of Reform UK’s reported private donations in 2025. This is lawful and does not prove influence.
Concentration by party →Parties with at least £1m in private donations · Calendar year 2025 · Site calculation from published data
Definition, limits and source: How much of Reform’s 2025 private money came from one donor?
£12.0m of Reform UK’s £18.7m in reported private donations came from its largest single donor (its money came only from individuals and companies). Same measure, each party’s own private total as the denominator: Conservative 21%, Labour 18%, Liberal Democrats 4%. A trade union is one donor in the register though its money pools many members’ fees (55% of Labour’s 2025 private money). Donor records are matched conservatively, so shares are lower bounds. Concentration is lawful and is not evidence of influence.
Site calculation from published data · Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties
How much of the reported private money in 2025 went to four parties?
94%of £50.0m
Four parties received almost all reported private donations. Loans and public funding are counted separately.
Who gives, how much and to whom →All parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland · Calendar year 2025
Definition, limits and source: How much of the reported private money in 2025 went to four parties?
Reform UK £18.7m; Conservative £14.0m; Labour £9.0m; Liberal Democrats £5.0m — out of £50.0m in private donations (cash and non-cash, as reported, excluding returned or forfeited gifts) to all registered parties. Public funds of £15.3m are counted separately and loans are not included. A share of donations is not evidence of bought policy.
Site calculation from published data · Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties
How much party income in the register is public money?
23%of 2025 receipts
Public support for parliamentary work and policy development. It is not a private donation.
What the register omits →All registered parties · Calendar year 2025
Definition, limits and source: How much party income in the register is public money?
£15.3m of Short money, Cranborne money and policy development grants, paid to parties with MPs or peers. It is reported in the same returns as private gifts but is not a donation.
Administrative data · Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties
Who feels this most?
Concentration matters most to the parties themselves: a party that draws most of its private money from a handful of donors is more exposed if one stops giving, and more open to the perception of obligation — whether or not any influence exists. It matters to voters because the register is the only systematic way to see who funds the people asking for their votes, and it publishes in arrears: a quarter’s donations appear around two months after the quarter ends.
The evidence
The longer record, and what the public thinks
Annual data: Reported party funding: private gifts and public funds
The register supplies 2001–2025 annual observations. Missing 1996–2000 values are not zero; incomplete 2026 is shown separately in the latest-quarter section. Values are reported amounts, not a complete account of party income or the Commission’s accepted-value press-release totals. They exclude returned/forfeited gifts and duplicate pre-poll returns. Northern Ireland publication begins with donations from July 2017, and reporting thresholds increased in 2024. These coverage changes, inflation and election cycles prevent a simple like-for-like growth interpretation. Loans are unavailable in this export, not assumed to be zero. A dash means no comparable observation is supplied; it is not zero. Published returns for registered parties; public funding is separate from private gifts.
1996–2026; £ million, nominal. No change is calculated across definition or assessment breaks.
| Year | Private gifts (£m) | Public funds (£m) |
|---|---|---|
| 1996–2000 | No comparable observations supplied | |
| 2001 | 28.3 | 3.9 |
| 2002 | 17.2 | 4.6 |
| 2003 | 22.7 | 6 |
| 2004 | 32.1 | 5.7 |
| 2005 | 44.4 | 6.7 |
| 2006 | 36.9 | 8 |
| 2007 | 48.1 | 8.6 |
| 2008 | 42.4 | 9.1 |
| 2009 | 50.7 | 9.3 |
| 2010 | 61.4 | 8.2 |
| 2011 | 34.8 | 9.1 |
| 2012 | 31.3 | 8.8 |
| 2013 | 35.9 | 9.4 |
| 2014 | 66.1 | 8.9 |
| 2015 | 67.5 | 10.2 |
| 2016 | 41.9 | 10.9 |
| 2017 | 62.9 | 11.6 |
| 2018 | 35 | 13.6 |
| 2019 | 104.8 | 12.6 |
| 2020 | 28.3 | 13.9 |
| 2021 | 38.1 | 13.2 |
| 2022 | 38.5 | 13.8 |
| 2023 | 79.4 | 15 |
| 2024 | 84.2 | 13.9 |
| 2025 | 50 | 15.3 |
| 2026 | No comparable observations supplied | |
14% agree that election funding and spending are transparent
Electoral Commission / YouGov, UK adults aged 16+. The 2026 publication’s new-weight tables cover fieldwork from 14 October to 1 December 2025. Agreement is a perception measure; disagreement is not evidence of a breach or a donation buying influence.
% strongly or tending to agree
- Funding and spending are transparent13.9%
- Authorities will take appropriate action35.5%
- I could find funding and spending information18.3%
Public confidence: exact questions, bases and limitations
Q17 asks how far people agree or disagree with statements about rules on campaign money, explicitly excluding politicians’ expenses. The response choices are agree strongly, tend to agree, neither, tend to disagree, disagree strongly and don’t know. Published combined agreement retains all respondents in its denominator.
| Exact statement | Agree | Disagree |
|---|---|---|
| Q17_A. The spending and funding of political parties, candidates and other campaigning organisations at elections are open and transparent | 13.85% | 49.08% |
| Q17_B. If a political party or campaigner is caught breaking the rules, the authorities will take appropriate action | 35.48% | 33.29% |
| Q17_C. If I wanted to, I could easily find out how much political parties, candidates and other organisations spent on campaigning and how they were funded | 18.29% | 40.97% |
Each question has 5,945 unweighted respondents; the published effective base is 3,003.71. YouGov invited members of its opt-in online panel and used quotas and weighting. Random invitations within a panel do not make this a probability sample of all UK adults. The 2026 sampling and weighting approach additionally aligns political attention with the face-to-face British Election Study. Quotas and weights cannot eliminate panel selection or non-response bias. No response rate or question-specific confidence interval is supplied in these tables; no simple random-sample margin of error or significant year-on-year change is asserted.
The official web summary’s historical chart displays different 2026 comparison figures (17%, 38%, 22%). We use the explicitly labelled new-weight workbook (13.85%, 35.48%, 18.29%) and do not combine the two bases. The workbook gives the exact October–December fieldwork dates, whereas the web introduction describes the study as December 2025.
Electoral Commission report, current workbook and historical tables
Annual data: Perceived funding transparency, by publication year
Published workbook coverage is 2018–2026 within the fixed 1996–2026 window. Earlier years are missing, not zero. The 2026 sampling/weighting change is shown in a separate column; no before-and-after change is calculated. These are reported perceptions, not observed compliance or corruption. Sample composition and bases vary by wave; the 2026 population is UK adults aged 16+, its base is 5,945 and the new-weight estimate is 13.85%. A dash means no comparable observation is supplied; it is not zero. UK survey respondents; Q17_A. Publication years are not fieldwork years.
1996–2026; % agreeing. No change is calculated across definition or assessment breaks.
| Year | Earlier weighting (2018–2025) | New weighting (2026) |
|---|---|---|
| 1996–2017 | No comparable observations supplied | |
| 2018 | 23.6 | — |
| 2019 | 19.4 | — |
| 2020 | 19.9 | — |
| 2021 | 13.8 | — |
| 2022 | 12.8 | — |
| 2023 | 12.6 | — |
| 2024 | 14.8 | — |
| 2025 | 18.4 | — |
| 2026 | — | 13.9 |
What deliberative research adds — and cannot establish
In February 2026, an Electoral Commission-commissioned study brought 72 participants into nine online workshops. After information and discussion, participants considered donation limits, public funding, closing gaps and stronger penalties together. This helps explain trade-offs; it is not a representative national vote for a policy package or evidence that those changes would deliver the expected results.
Nesta and the New Citizen Project used recruited groups with demographic and political balancing, including a 16–17-year-old group. Workshops ran 3–13 February and lasted 3.5 hours; participants received £90. The report records overrepresentation of Green voters, underrepresentation of Reform voters and deliberate oversampling outside England. Small deliberative groups and their post-discussion responses should not be substituted for the national tracker.
Study and original report, including recruitment limitationsWho gives, how much and to whom?
Every party must report donations above the thresholds to the Electoral Commission each quarter, naming the donor. In 2025, the latest complete year in our copy of the register, 17 parties reported private donations.
Who funds the parties, and how much did each receive?
Reform UK reported the most private donations in 2025; four parties received 94% of the total.
- Reform UK£18.7m
- Conservative£14.0m
- Labour£9.0m
- Liberal Democrats£5.0m
- Co-operative Party£0.9m
- Your Party£0.7m
- Sinn Féin£0.4m
- Green Party (England and Wales)£0.3m
- The Socialist Party of Great Britain£0.2m
- The Reclaim Party£0.2m
Public funds received in 2025, £ million (not donations)
- Conservative£7.3m
- Liberal Democrats£3.3m
- Labour£1.0m
- Reform UK£0.7m
- Green Party (England and Wales)£0.6m
- DUP£0.6m
- Sinn Féin£0.5m
- SDLP£0.5m
Four parties received most reported private donations in 2025. Donations vary around elections. The amounts show who received money, not whether it bought influence.
Parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland · 1 January – 31 December 2025 · Administrative data (party returns); totals are a site calculation
Show the workings — Reform UK reported the most private donations in 2025; four parties received 94% of the total.
Private donations reported to the Electoral Commission by recipient party, calendar year 2025, £ million (cash and non-cash, as reported). Ten largest recipients shown.
The bars show who received money, not what it bought. Reform UK’s £18.7m was 37% of all private donations reported in 2025, a year with no general election. Totals rise and fall with the electoral cycle, so one year is not a trend. Trade union donations (mostly to Labour) are aggregates of members’ affiliation money; individual and company gifts are single decisions. Both count the same here.
- Geography:
- Parties registered in Great Britain and Northern Ireland — donations above the reporting thresholds, accepted and reported by the party’s central organisation or accounting units
- Measure:
- £ million, cash terms
- Period:
- 1 January – 31 December 2025
- Status:
- Administrative data (party returns); totals are a site calculation
- Calculation:
- Sum of reported values by recipient party, excluding records marked returned or forfeited. Public funds excluded (shown separately). Loans are not in the export and are not added.
- Compare with:
- Total private donations to all parties: £50.0m.
- Not included / breaks:
- Donations below the thresholds are never itemised. Reported value differs slightly from the Commission’s accepted-value headline (0.6% for 2025). Late-reported donations can still be added to a past year. This is money received, not money spent at elections.
Source: Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties (released 4 October 2026 (date of our export)).
View the data as a table
| Party | Private donations | Public funds | Total reported |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reform UK | £18.71m | £0.68m | £19.39m |
| Conservative | £14.02m | £7.26m | £21.28m |
| Labour | £8.99m | £0.96m | £9.95m |
| Liberal Democrats | £5.04m | £3.25m | £8.29m |
| Co-operative Party | £0.93m | £0.00m | £0.93m |
| Your Party | £0.67m | £0.00m | £0.67m |
| Sinn Féin | £0.38m | £0.47m | £0.85m |
| Green Party (England and Wales) | £0.35m | £0.60m | £0.95m |
| The Socialist Party of Great Britain | £0.22m | £0.00m | £0.22m |
| The Reclaim Party | £0.18m | £0.00m | £0.18m |
| Open Party | £0.18m | £0.00m | £0.18m |
| Plaid Cymru | £0.08m | £0.26m | £0.34m |
| Alliance (NI) | £0.07m | £0.16m | £0.23m |
| SNP | £0.05m | £0.45m | £0.50m |
| Social Democratic Party | £0.05m | £0.00m | £0.05m |
| SDLP | £0.03m | £0.46m | £0.49m |
| UK Independence Party (UKIP) | £0.02m | £0.00m | £0.02m |
| DUP | £0.00m | £0.56m | £0.56m |
| Ulster Unionist Party | £0.00m | £0.07m | £0.07m |
| Traditional Unionist Voice - TUV | £0.00m | £0.03m | £0.03m |
| Scottish Green Party | £0.00m | £0.04m | £0.04m |
| People Before Profit | £0.00m | £0.03m | £0.03m |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
The most recent quarter in the Commission’s register, Q2 2026 (April to June 2026), had £17,532,964 in donations and public funds filed in its returns, against £11,946,577 in Q2 2025 (value as reported; the Commission’s press release headlines value accepted, which differs slightly). Largest recipients: Reform UK £5,552,359, Conservative £4,174,098, Labour £3,638,692, Liberal Democrats £2,306,356. Commission register
Money received is not money spent. At the 2024 general election parties reported campaign spending of £30.1m (Labour), £23.9m (Conservative), £5.6m (Liberal Democrats), £5.5m (Reform UK). There is no single national spending limit that applies to every party. The limit is £54,010 for each seat a party contests, calculated separately for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland — so a party standing everywhere has a much higher limit than one standing in a single nation. A party contesting all 650 seats would have a limit of £35.1m. The limits were raised in November 2023, so 2024 spending is not comparable with earlier elections.
How concentrated is party funding?
How concentrated is party funding?
Concentration varies widely: Reform UK relied most on a few donors in 2025.
Top ten donors’ share, 2025Top ten donors’ share, since 2001
- Reform UK83%
- Conservative47%
- Labour67%
- Liberal Democrats25%
Some parties depend much more heavily on a few donors. That is lawful and does not prove influence. Different spellings of donor names can make concentration look lower than it is.
Registered parties, Great Britain and Northern Ireland · 2025; and 2001–2025 · Site calculation from the register
Show the workings — Concentration varies widely: Reform UK relied most on a few donors in 2025.
Share of each party’s private donations that came from its ten largest donors, 2025 (filled) and since 2001 (open). Parties with at least £1m of private donations in 2025.
Reform UK’s largest single donor accounted for 64% of its 2025 private donations, and its ten largest for 83%. A concentrated funding model is lawful and is not evidence of improper influence; it describes how exposed a party is to a few funders. Because matching is deliberately conservative, a donor giving through name variants can be split, which understates concentration rather than overstating it.
- Geography:
- Registered parties, Great Britain and Northern Ireland — private donations only; public funds excluded
- Measure:
- % of the party’s private donations by value
- Period:
- 2025; and 2001–2025
- Status:
- Site calculation from the register
- Calculation:
- Donor records grouped only when they share a Companies House number, or an identical normalised name and the same donor type. Looser matches are excluded, so the shares are lower bounds.
- Compare with:
- A share near 100% means almost all money came from ten donors; a low share means many donors.
- Not included / breaks:
- No common control between separate companies is inferred. A trade union is one donor even though its money comes from many members. Reform UK’s “since 2001” period starts with its registration.
Source: Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties (released 4 October 2026 (date of our export)).
View the data as a table
| Party | Private 2025 | Largest donor | Top 5 | Top 10 | Top 10 since 2001 | Donations 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reform UK | £18.7m | 64.2% | 76.4% | 82.9% | 80.9% | 197 |
| Conservative | £14.0m | 21.4% | 36.3% | 46.6% | 15.1% | 613 |
| Labour | £9.0m | 17.6% | 52.4% | 67.3% | 56.3% | 421 |
| Liberal Democrats | £5.0m | 4.0% | 15.9% | 25.4% | 24.3% | 1,169 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Funding models differ in kind as well as degree. Reform UK relied on a small number of large individual gifts in 2025; the Liberal Democrats drew on many more donors. Labour’s private income includes trade union money, which the register records as one donor per union even though it comes from many members’ affiliation fees.
What the legal register leaves out
- Donations below the reporting thresholds are never itemised, so money arriving in many small amounts is invisible at donor level.
- Loans are reported separately from donations and under different rules. Summing them would double-count a party’s obligations, and this page never does.
- Unincorporated associations have a separate register of reportable gifts. Thresholds and reporting windows leave gaps; the party-donations export alone does not join those underlying gifts to each contribution.
- The register records what parties report. The Commission itself notes that reported and accepted values differ, and that late reporting is common.
- UK-registered companies may donate. A company incorporated in the UK and carrying on business here may donate, regardless of who owns it. The permissibility test is about the company’s registration and trading, not the nationality of its shareholders.
- What beneficial ownership does and does not reveal. Companies House holds persons-with-significant-control records, so ultimate control is often visible. But control can sit with a foreign parent, a trust, or a chain terminating outside the UK register, and a company’s profits may originate anywhere. The register shows who controls the company, not where the money came from.
Lobbying is a separate register. The statutory register captures a narrow slice of lobbying: paid intermediaries contacting the two most senior levels of a department. For an industry that mostly lobbies for itself, at levels below permanent secretary, it records very little. That is a feature of how the 2014 Act was drawn, not a failure of the registrar.
Proposed changes, not yet law. The Representation of the People Bill completed its Commons stages on 2 September 2026 and was at committee stage, house of lords when checked on 11 October 2026 (no Royal Assent). Its political-finance measures include:
- A cap on donations from overseas electors. An annual limit — announced at £100,000 — on donations and loans from individuals registered as overseas electors. Announced as applying retrospectively from 25 March 2026 if the Bill is enacted.
- Know-your-donor checks. A requirement for parties to carry out additional checks on the source of donations before accepting them, rather than relying on the permissibility test alone.
- Company donation reform. Restricting company donations to companies that pass a significant-control test and have sufficient remaining UK profits (the Bill as introduced used a revenue test; the Lords print, HL Bill 47, uses profits).
- Closing unincorporated association loopholes. Tightening the rules under which unincorporated associations may make political contributions without disclosing their own funders.
Source: UK Parliament, Representation of the People Bill (HL Bill 47), checked 11 October 2026.
Access and decisions: a documented case chain
The register establishes the first link in any chain. Each later link needs a different kind of record, and the bar for the last is high:
Level 1
Donation
Money changed hands, and it is on the Electoral Commission register.
Needs: An Electoral Commission record.
Level 2
Access
A documented meeting, hospitality or contact.
Needs: A GOV.UK transparency release or an official gifts and hospitality register entry.
Level 3
Relevant decision
Government subsequently made a decision affecting the donor’s interests. A temporal association only — the sequence is documented, the connection is not.
Needs: A procurement record, policy instrument or other official document.
Level 4
Demonstrated influence
Evidence connecting the donor or their lobbying to the decision. This is the only level that asserts a link rather than a sequence.
Needs: An official investigation, select committee report, court finding, regulator ruling, or an admission by the party or government. Media investigations do not qualify.
What does the documentary trail establish?
The donation and the access are documented. No decision or influence is.
The Downing Street flat refurbishment, 2020–22
- Donation
- Access / contact
- Decision record
- Official finding
- Gap in the record
- Other event
19 October 2020 · Donation
Huntswood Associates Ltd, a company controlled by Lord Brownlow, paid the Conservative Party £67,801.72. The party reported £15,000 of it as a donation; £52,801.72, which covered refurbishment invoices first paid by the Cabinet Office, was not reported.
Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (9 December 2021)
29 November 2020 · Access / contact
In a WhatsApp exchange about approving further works, the then Prime Minister told Lord Brownlow he was “on the great exhibition plan”. The exchange was not disclosed to the Independent Adviser before his May 2021 report.
Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 (6 January 2022)
18 January 2021 · Access / contact
The then Culture Secretary met the Royal Albert Hall and Lord Brownlow to discuss plans for “Great Exhibition 2.0”, as recorded in the department’s ministerial meetings return.
DCMS ministerial gifts, hospitality, travel and meetings, January to March 2021 (15 July 2021)
March 2021 · Other event
The Prime Minister settled the refurbishment costs personally; the supplier, Cabinet Office, party and Lord Brownlow’s company were repaid between 9 and 23 March.
Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests (28 May 2021)
28 May 2021 · Official finding
The Independent Adviser found an interest but no conflict under the Ministerial Code, said the Prime Minister had acted “unwisely”, and found no evidence that Lord Brownlow acted other than altruistically. No breach.
Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests (28 May 2021)
9 December 2021 · Official finding
The Electoral Commission found the whole £67,801.72 was a donation and fined the party £17,800 (£16,250 for an inaccurate donation report; £1,550 for inaccurate accounting records). Lord Brownlow’s direct payments to the supplier were found not to be party donations.
Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (9 December 2021)
17 and 23 December 2021 · Official finding
After the WhatsApp exchange came to light, the Independent Adviser said it did not change his no-conflict finding but would have prompted further questions, and criticised the failure to disclose it.
Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 (6 January 2022)
13 January 2022 · Decision record
No government decision found: DCMS stated that government was not involved in planning Great Exhibition 2.0 and had provided no funding for it.
House of Commons written answer 100695 (DCMS) (13 January 2022)
July 2022 · Gap in the record
DCMS confirmed it holds a minute of the January 2021 meeting but has not published it, so what was discussed is not on the public record.
House of Commons written answer 33794 (DCMS) (14 July 2022)
The vertical line shows order in time. It does not mean one event caused the next.
The records establish a donation, a reporting penalty and contacts. They do not establish a favourable government decision or improper influence.
United Kingdom (central government and a GB-registered party) · October 2020 – July 2022 · Official records and findings
Show the workings — The donation and the access are documented. No decision or influence is.
Dated events in one case, by type of evidence: donation, access, decision, official finding and gaps. Lines show chronology only.
This chain shows how far official records can go. They establish a donation that was partly misreported and later penalised, and contacts in which a separate project of interest to the donor came up. They do not establish any government decision in the donor’s favour — the department says it gave no funding — or any influence. An absence of an official finding is not proof that no influence occurred; it is the limit of what the record shows.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom (central government and a GB-registered party)
- Measure:
- dated events
- Period:
- October 2020 – July 2022
- Status:
- Official records and findings
- Calculation:
- Events taken only from official records: the Commission’s investigation report, the Independent Adviser’s published reports and letters, a departmental transparency return and written parliamentary answers. Short quotations are from those documents.
- Compare with:
- The four-level evidence ladder: donation → access → relevant decision → demonstrated influence.
- Not included / breaks:
- Media reporting, allegations and unpublished material are excluded. Two sources date one Cabinet Office meeting differently (20 and 22 October 2020); neither date changes the chain.
Source: Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (released 9 December 2021).
View the data as a table
| Date | Type | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19 October 2020 | donation | Huntswood Associates Ltd, a company controlled by Lord Brownlow, paid the Conservative Party £67,801.72. The party reported £15,000 of it as a donation; £52,801.72, which covered refurbishment invoices first paid by the Cabinet Office, was not reported. | Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments |
| 29 November 2020 | access | In a WhatsApp exchange about approving further works, the then Prime Minister told Lord Brownlow he was “on the great exhibition plan”. The exchange was not disclosed to the Independent Adviser before his May 2021 report. | Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 |
| 18 January 2021 | access | The then Culture Secretary met the Royal Albert Hall and Lord Brownlow to discuss plans for “Great Exhibition 2.0”, as recorded in the department’s ministerial meetings return. | DCMS ministerial gifts, hospitality, travel and meetings, January to March 2021 |
| March 2021 | other | The Prime Minister settled the refurbishment costs personally; the supplier, Cabinet Office, party and Lord Brownlow’s company were repaid between 9 and 23 March. | Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests |
| 28 May 2021 | finding | The Independent Adviser found an interest but no conflict under the Ministerial Code, said the Prime Minister had acted “unwisely”, and found no evidence that Lord Brownlow acted other than altruistically. No breach. | Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests |
| 9 December 2021 | finding | The Electoral Commission found the whole £67,801.72 was a donation and fined the party £17,800 (£16,250 for an inaccurate donation report; £1,550 for inaccurate accounting records). Lord Brownlow’s direct payments to the supplier were found not to be party donations. | Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments |
| 17 and 23 December 2021 | finding | After the WhatsApp exchange came to light, the Independent Adviser said it did not change his no-conflict finding but would have prompted further questions, and criticised the failure to disclose it. | Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 |
| 13 January 2022 | decision | No government decision found: DCMS stated that government was not involved in planning Great Exhibition 2.0 and had provided no funding for it. | House of Commons written answer 100695 (DCMS) |
| July 2022 | gap | DCMS confirmed it holds a minute of the January 2021 meeting but has not published it, so what was discussed is not on the public record. | House of Commons written answer 33794 (DCMS) |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
What this chain establishes
- Level 1 — donation: documented, including the part that was not reported at the time.
- Level 2 — access: two documented contacts in which a separate project of interest to the donor was raised.
- Level 3 — relevant decision: not reached. The only official statement is that government provided no funding for the project.
- Level 4 — demonstrated influence: not reached. The official findings concern reporting failures and ministerial interests, not influence over a decision.
Counter-evidence: The Independent Adviser found no conflict of interest in either review, and all sums were repaid. The Commission found the reporting offence arose from the party’s systems; the donor had described the payment as a donation.
This case is shown because official bodies investigated it and published their findings, so every link can be checked. It is not a sample of donor behaviour, and no comparison with other donors is implied. Sources checked 11 October 2026.
Why it is happening
Our analysis
Parties need money to operate, but heavy reliance on a few donors raises questions about access and accountability. Tighter limits would also require a decision about replacement funding.
Who is affected most
Who feels this most?
Smaller parties without MPs receive no Short money and must fund campaigns privately, while public funds were 23% of all reported receipts in 2025. A donation is a financial relationship. It is not, by itself, evidence of access, influence, or wrongdoing.
What could change
Proposals to consider. The bodies named below would need to agree to deliver them; responsibility is not a recorded commitment. Follow the links for costs and evidence.
Trust in political money
Examine how to improve trust in political funding.
Who could deliver it: Parliament, government and Electoral Commission.
Main trade-off and delivery needs
Displacement of funding, legal challenge and unequal burdens; no guaranteed trust gain.
Separate disclosure, enforcement and donation limits; define regulator powers, legal safeguards and consultation.
Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →
See all options and what is still unknown →
Some problems have no assessed solution yet: see coverage and gaps.
Domain SWOT
Recorded
Show the findings
Strengths · 1 finding
A public register records donations to parties: 17 parties reported private donations in 2025, and every entry can be checked by donor and date.
United Kingdom (published register coverage) · 2025
Weaknesses · 4 findings
In the Electoral Commission’s newly weighted 2026 survey tables, 13.85% agreed that election funding and spending are open and transparent, while 49.08% disagreed. This measures public confidence, not proven misconduct, and the weighting change prevents a simple comparison with older estimates.
UK adults aged 16+ · 2026 publication; October–December 2025 fieldwork
Some parties depend on very few donors: among parties with at least £1m of private donations, the top ten donors gave between 25% (Liberal Democrats) and 83% (Reform UK) of the total.
United Kingdom (published register coverage) · 2025
The current maximum Electoral Commission civil fine is £20,000 per offence. Government intends a £500,000 limit through secondary legislation; that intention is not the present penalty.
United Kingdom · Current guidance checked October 2026
Disclosure shows who gave, not whether money bought influence; routes such as unincorporated associations and loans are harder to trace.
our synthesis
Opportunities · 1 finding
Faster, linked reporting with proportionate penalties could be weighed against fully costed options for capping donations and replacing the lost income.
Depends on: Each option is specified with who pays and how small parties are treated, and Parliament legislates.
our synthesis
Threats · 1 finding
Money can move to loans, connected companies or third-party campaigners; tighter rules can burden small volunteer-run parties and favour incumbents.
risk
Domain action plan
Proposed
Possible steps for government and the bodies responsible. These describe the order of work, not promised dates: starting an action and seeing results take different amounts of time.
Short term · prepare
Make comparable funding records easy to inspect.
Medium term · deliver
Assess the linked disclosure and accountability proposals.
Long term · judge results
Check transparency and enforcement without assuming donations prove influence.
Delivery steps and owners (4)
- Prerequisite: Identify reporting gaps and the authority each change needs · Electoral Commission with the government · proposed
- Decision: Legislate on reporting, penalties and any cap · Parliament · proposed
- Delivery: Build linked donations-and-loans systems; publish cap scenarios · Electoral Commission; independent review · proposed
- Result: Shorter disclosure delay and fewer breaches, with concentration tracked separately · Electoral Commission · proposed
Sources, method and changes
Shareable visual summary
Visual summary
One donor supplied 64% of Reform’s reported private donations in 2025.
Reform reported £18.7m in private donations in 2025, all from individuals and companies; £12.0m came from its largest donor. On the same measure the figure was 21% for the Conservatives, 18% for Labour and 4% for the Liberal Democrats; trade unions, each counted as one donor though pooling many members’ fees, gave 55% of Labour’s private money. Each quarter is published about two months after it ends, so late reports can still change these totals. A UK Facts calculation from the Electoral Commission register. A donation alone does not show influence or wrongdoing.
Calendar year 2025
- 64%of Reform UK’s reported private donations from one donor
- 94%of reported private donations went to four parties
- £50.0mreported private donations, all parties
- £15.3mpublic funds, counted separately
Register calculation: cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited gifts excluded; loans not included.
Evidence levels (each needs its own evidence)
- Step 1DonationRecorded by the Electoral Commission
- Step 2Documented accessMeetings, roles or events on the record
- Step 3Relevant decisionA later decision in the donor’s interest
- Step 4Demonstrated influenceEvidence the donation changed the decision
Text and data version
One donor supplied 64% of Reform’s reported private donations in 2025. Reform reported £18.7m in private donations in 2025, all from individuals and companies; £12.0m came from its largest donor. On the same measure the figure was 21% for the Conservatives, 18% for Labour and 4% for the Liberal Democrats; trade unions, each counted as one donor though pooling many members’ fees, gave 55% of Labour’s private money. Each quarter is published about two months after it ends, so late reports can still change these totals. A UK Facts calculation from the Electoral Commission register. A donation alone does not show influence or wrongdoing.
| Measure | Value | Period | Geography | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Share of Reform UK’s reported private donations from its largest single donorCalculation: largest matched donor £12.00m ÷ Reform UK private donations £18.71m × 100 (conservative donor matching; a lower bound) | 64% | Calendar year 2025 | Great Britain and Northern Ireland | derived calculation | Electoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded |
| Share of private donations received by the four largest recipientsCalculation: (Reform UK £18.71m + Conservative and Unionist Party £14.02m + Labour Party £8.99m + Liberal Democrats £5.04m) ÷ £49.96m × 100 | 94% | Calendar year 2025 | Great Britain and Northern Ireland | derived calculation | Electoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded |
| Reported private donations to all registered parties | £50.0m | Calendar year 2025 | Great Britain and Northern Ireland | administrative count | Electoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded |
| Public funds reported in the same returns (Short, Cranborne, policy development grants) | £15.3m | Calendar year 2025 | Great Britain and Northern Ireland | administrative count | Electoral Commission donations export; private = cash and non-cash as reported, returned or forfeited excluded |
Available images and their source records are listed on Shareable visuals.
Sources and methods (17)
- Electoral Commission, gifts reported by registered unincorporated associations — Current gift-reporting thresholds and windows; correcting the claim that association funders are never reported.
- Electoral Commission, political finance database: donations to political parties, donations export, all registered parties (released 4 October 2026 (date of our export)) — Every donation and public-funds figure: 81,503 records, 81,105 used.
- Electoral Commission, Political parties accept almost £65m in donations in 2025 — The Commission’s accepted-value headline for 2025, used to reconcile the reported-value total.
- Electoral Commission, Political party donations and loans in Great Britain — Permissibility, reporting thresholds and reporting frequency.
- Electoral Commission, UK Parliamentary general election spending limit (released guidance updated 11 June 2024) — General election spending limits.
- Office of the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists — What the statutory lobbying register covers.
- UK Parliament, Representation of the People Bill — Status of the proposed political-finance measures (checked 11 October 2026).
- Electoral Commission political finance database, returns for Q2 2026 (released retrieved 4 October 2026) — The most recent quarter’s donations and public funds, value as reported in the returns.
- Committee on Standards in Public Life, Regulating Election Finance (released 7 July 2021) — Independent recommendations on election finance.
- Electoral Commission, Parliamentary briefing: political finance rules (released 2 April 2025) — The Commission’s own reform recommendations.
- Electoral Commission, Report of an investigation in respect of the Conservative and Unionist Party: recording and reporting of payments (released 9 December 2021) — Case chain (DON-02): donation, reporting offence and penalties.
- Annual Report of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests (released 28 May 2021) — Case chain: Independent Adviser’s first finding.
- Advice from the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, December 2021 (released 6 January 2022) — Case chain: Independent Adviser’s further advice.
- DCMS ministerial gifts, hospitality, travel and meetings, January to March 2021 (released 15 July 2021) — Case chain: ministerial meeting record.
- House of Commons written answer 100695 (DCMS) (released 13 January 2022) — Case chain: no government funding for the project.
- Avis, Ferraz, Finan & Varjão, Money and Politics: the effects of campaign spending limits (NBER w23508) (released 2017) — Evaluated effect of spending limits (Brazil).
- Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo & Snyder, Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? (JEP 17(1)) (released 2003) — Evidence on contributions and legislative votes (United States).
Method notes
- Amounts are integer pence from the register export, formatted at the edge. “Reported value” is what parties reported; the Commission headlines the value accepted, which is slightly lower.
- Donor matching is deliberately conservative: records merge only on an identical Companies House number, or an identical normalised name with the same Commission donor type. Wrongly merging two people would attribute one person’s giving to another; wrongly splitting one donor only understates a total.
- Public funds are identified from the Commission’s donor-status and donation-type fields and are excluded from all donor rankings and concentration measures.
- Each donation is counted once. During a general election parties also file weekly pre-poll reports, and the same donations are reported again in the quarterly returns; the export still carries 692 pre-poll rows (£52.8m) that the Commission’s own de-duplication filter does not catch, and they are removed.
- Concentration shares are shown only for parties with at least £1m of private donations in the year, because shares of very small totals are unstable.
- No donor is profiled on this page. Naming in the case chain (chapter 4) is limited to what official findings themselves state.