Headline evidence · Inequality · UK · 2024–25 · below 60% of median income, after housing costs · DWP survey estimate
More than one in four UK children, 4.0 million, live in low-income households after housing costs.
About 4.0 million children in the UK, 27.4%, live in households below 60% of typical income After housing costsIncome after the housing costs specified by that statistical series have been deducted. Different measures can treat mortgage costs differently; read the stated definition.DWP: definition and context →. This is a survey estimate, and the line moves with typical incomes. Separately, men in England's most deprived areas can expect 19.4 fewer years in good health than in the least deprived areas.
Proposed outcome: Reduce avoidable gaps in health, money, opportunities and access to services. What could change →
- Geography
- United Kingdom
- Evidence period
- 2024–25
- Evidence status
- Survey-based
- Editorial review
- Reviewed 3 October 2026
The short version
Three key measures
Survey-based evidence
Family Resources SurveyHousehold survey estimate with sampling error; the 2021–22 benefit-linking change lowers rates by about three points.How many children live in relative poverty after housing costs?
27.4%
Children in households below 60% of typical income After housing costsIncome after the housing costs specified by that statistical series have been deducted. Different measures can treat mortgage costs differently; read the stated definition.DWP: definition and context →.
Who cannot afford essentials →United Kingdom · 2024–25 · Survey-based
Definition, limits and source: How many children live in relative poverty after housing costs?
4.0 million children, 2024–25: below 60% of median income after housing costs. 13% of children were in deep material poverty (lacking at least four of thirteen essentials).
Survey-based · DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025
Survey-based evidence
ONS Annual Population Survey + population/mortality dataIncludes self-reported health; this is a combined population estimate, not a clinical diagnosis.How many fewer years in good health in the most deprived areas?
19.4 / 20.3years (men / women)
The gap in expected healthy years between the poorest and richest areas. It is not a prediction for any one person.
Health and place →England, area deprivation deciles · 2022–2024
Definition, limits and source: How many fewer years in good health in the most deprived areas?
Healthy life expectancy at birth, most deprived tenth of areas against least deprived: men 49.8 against 69.2 years; women 48.2 against 68.5. Area estimates — an association with deprivation, not proof that income alone causes the gap, and not a prediction for any one person.
Published statistics · ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024
Survey-based evidence
ONS Wealth and Assets SurveySurvey-based wealth estimate; coverage and valuation limits apply.How much of the wealth do the richest tenth hold?
40.7%
The richest tenth hold far more wealth than the poorer half combined. The survey has recognised quality limitations.
Who owns the wealth →Great Britain · 2020–22
Definition, limits and source: How much of the wealth do the richest tenth hold?
The poorer half of households hold about 10%. UK Facts calculation from ONS aggregates (April 2020 to March 2022 (Round 8)). The survey’s accreditation was suspended on 13 June 2025.
Site calculation from published data · ONS, Household total wealth in Great Britain
Who feels this most?
Deep material poverty means lacking at least four of thirteen everyday essentials. In FYE 2025 (year ending March 2025), 1.9 million children (13%) were in deep material poverty, against 14% the year before — a change DWP says is not statistically significant.
Budget 2026 · 28 October 2026
What the Budget means for inequality
3
Budget measures on this topic
£20m
Net saving or gain, 2026–27
£1.2bn
Net saving or gain, 2029–30
Biggest single-year effect of each measure · red costs money, teal saves or raises it
- Savings Income2031–32+£590m
- Property Income2028–29+£575m
- Business Asset Disposal Relief (BADR)2031–32+£305m
+£590m
saving or gain in 2031–32
Savings Income
+£575m
saving or gain in 2028–29
Property Income
+£305m
saving or gain in 2031–32
Business Asset Disposal Relief (BADR)
The Budget in 2 minutes →Is it being delivered? →
Treasury costings certified by the OBR, not measured results. Topic links are UK Facts’ classification.
The evidence
Concern about living costs is context for hardship, not a measure of income inequality or support for a particular tax policy.
Annual data: Income inequality across published methods
The 1996–2026 window contains published values through March 2025. Administrative benefit linking starts in 2021–22 in this vintage. The pandemic affected 2020–21. Do not calculate change across those breaks; 2026 is unavailable. A dash means no comparable observation is supplied; it is not zero. Equivalised disposable income in private households. Great Britain before 2002–03; United Kingdom thereafter. Year is the financial-year end.
1996–2026; Gini index, before housing costs. No change is calculated across definition or assessment breaks.
| Year | Gini |
|---|---|
| 1996 | 33.3 |
| 1997 | 33.3 |
| 1998 | 34 |
| 1999 | 34.8 |
| 2000 | 34.6 |
| 2001 | 35.3 |
| 2002 | 34.8 |
| 2003 | 34.2 |
| 2004 | 33.8 |
| 2005 | 33.9 |
| 2006 | 34.4 |
| 2007 | 35 |
| 2008 | 35.7 |
| 2009 | 35.5 |
| 2010 | 35.6 |
| 2011 | 33.6 |
| 2012 | 33.9 |
| 2013 | 33.5 |
| 2014 | 34.2 |
| 2015 | 33.9 |
| 2016 | 34.5 |
| 2017 | 33.5 |
| 2018 | 34 |
| 2019 | 34.9 |
| 2020 | 35 |
| 2021 | 34 |
| 2022 | 33.2 |
| 2023 | 33.9 |
| 2024 | 33.5 |
| 2025 | 32.7 |
| 2026 | No comparable observations supplied |
What has changed over time
Survey-based evidence
Family Resources SurveyHousehold survey estimate with sampling error; the 2021–22 benefit-linking change lowers rates by about three points.
Has relative poverty changed over thirty years?
Children are more likely than pensioners to be in relative low income
1996–2026 · recorded figures.
Children are more likely than pensioners to live on a low income after housing costs. The threshold moves with typical income, so a lower poverty rate need not mean people can buy more.
United Kingdom · 1994–95 to 2024–25 · Survey-based
Show the workings — Children are more likely than pensioners to be in relative low income
Children and pensioners in relative low income after housing costs (below 60% of contemporary median), United Kingdom, financial years.
In 2024–25, 27.4% of children and 13.9% of pensioners were in relative low income after housing costs. Earlier observations provide historical context, but geography, pandemic collection and administrative-linking changes prevent a precise like-for-like comparison across the full period. A relative threshold also moves with median income; falling relative poverty does not by itself show rising living standards.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom
- Measure:
- Per cent of each group
- Period:
- 1994–95 to 2024–25
- Status:
- Survey-based
- Calculation:
- As published (Tables 1.4a and 1.6a).
- Compare with:
- 1994–95: children 32.4%, pensioners 28.1%
- Not included / breaks:
- Relative measure: it moves with median income, so it can fall when everyone gets poorer. Northern Ireland included from 2002–03. The pandemic affected 2020–21; administrative benefit linking introduces a break at 2021–22 in this published vintage. Lines are separated at these points; do not infer an exact thirty-year change.
Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025 (released 26 March 2026).
View the data as a table
| Year | Children | Pensioners |
|---|---|---|
| 1994–95 | 32.4% | 28.1% |
| 1995–96 | 32.7% | 27.9% |
| 1996–97 | 33.8% | 29.1% |
| 1997–98 | 32.9% | 29.2% |
| 1998–99 | 33.7% | 28.6% |
| 1999–00 | 32.5% | 27.7% |
| 2000–01 | 30.8% | 26% |
| 2001–02 | 30.6% | 25.7% |
| 2002–03 | 29.2% | 23.9% |
| 2003–04 | 28.4% | 20.4% |
| 2004–05 | 28.1% | 17.3% |
| 2005–06 | 29.3% | 16.4% |
| 2006–07 | 30.7% | 18.8% |
| 2007–08 | 31.3% | 17.7% |
| 2008–09 | 30.4% | 15.7% |
| 2009–10 | 29.4% | 15.2% |
| 2010–11 | 27.2% | 14% |
| 2011–12 | 27% | 13.4% |
| 2012–13 | 27.2% | 13.3% |
| 2013–14 | 27.5% | 13.7% |
| 2014–15 | 28.5% | 13.8% |
| 2015–16 | 29.4% | 15.7% |
| 2016–17 | 30% | 15.9% |
| 2017–18 | 29.3% | 16.5% |
| 2018–19 | 29.4% | 15.9% |
| 2019–20 | 30.7% | 18.1% |
| 2020–21 | 27.1% | 14.7% |
| 2021–22 | 27.3% | 15% |
| 2022–23 | 28.8% | 12.7% |
| 2023–24 | 27.7% | 12.3% |
| 2024–25 | 27.4% | 13.9% |
Survey-based evidence
DWP Family Resources Survey / HBAISurvey-based household income estimates; definitions and housing-cost treatment matter.
Is income or wealth becoming more unequal?
What people receive and what they own show different gaps between rich and poor
Income inequality (Gini, UK)
1996–2026 · recorded figures.
Shares of household wealth (Great Britain)
1996–2026 · recorded figures. Shading marks years without figures: this series starts in 2007.
Wealth is much more concentrated than income. Income measures alone miss differences in savings, property and pensions. Changes in measurement limit comparisons with older figures.
United Kingdom (income); Great Britain (wealth) · Income 1994–95 to 2024–25; wealth 2006–08 to 2020–22 · Official statistics (wealth accreditation suspended June 2025)
Show the workings — What people receive and what they own show different gaps between rich and poor
Left: Gini coefficient of household disposable income before housing costs, UK (0 = equal, 100 = one household has everything). Right: share of total household wealth held by the richest tenth and the poorer half of households, Great Britain.
The income Gini is 32.7 in 2024–25; method changes limit comparisons with older estimates. Wealth is concentrated: the richest tenth held about 40.7% of household wealth in 2020–22 and the poorer half about 9.8%. A stable Gini can hide everyone getting poorer, and says nothing about wealth.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom (income); Great Britain (wealth)
- Measure:
- Gini index; per cent of total wealth
- Period:
- Income 1994–95 to 2024–25; wealth 2006–08 to 2020–22
- Status:
- Official statistics (wealth accreditation suspended June 2025)
- Calculation:
- As published. The two panels use different surveys, populations and years and are not combined.
- Compare with:
- Their own earlier values
- Not included / breaks:
- Wealth: the Wealth and Assets Survey lost its accredited status on 13 June 2025; the pension-valuation method changed between 2018–20 and 2020–22, so the apparent fall is not a clean economic change. Income also breaks at 2021–22 with administrative linking. Lines stop at these breaks; earlier wealth collection windows also change in 2014–16.
Source: DWP HBAI (income); ONS Wealth in Great Britain (wealth).
View the data as a table
| Period | Richest tenth | Poorer half |
|---|---|---|
| 2006–08 | 44.1% | 9.5% |
| 2008–10 | 43.6% | 9.9% |
| 2010–12 | 43.6% | 9.6% |
| 2012–14 | 44.7% | 8.6% |
| 2014–16 | 44.6% | 8.7% |
| 2016–18 | 44.6% | 8.5% |
| 2018–20 | 43.5% | 8.7% |
| 2020–22 | 40.7% | 9.8% |
What this data cannot tell you
- Did wealth inequality cause food bank use to rise?
- No official analysis establishes this, and the series cannot answer it. Wealth is measured every two years in a survey that has lost its accredited status; food bank parcels are administrative counts from one charity network. Two lines moving together over a decade in which incomes, housing costs, benefit rules and referral practice all changed cannot isolate one cause. We show both and say plainly that this is an association.
- How many individual people used a food bank?
- Nobody knows. Trussell counts PARCELS, not people, covers only its own network, and cannot identify repeat use across the year. It is a real measure of emergency demand and a poor measure of how many households are in difficulty. The official food-security question in the Family Resources Survey is the better measure of that, and is used here as the primary evidence.
- Is a stable Gini coefficient good news?
- Not necessarily. The Gini can hold steady while everybody gets poorer, or while the bottom and top both move. It measures the shape of the income distribution, not its level, and says nothing at all about wealth — which is far more unequally held than income.
- Does area deprivation tell you about individual wealth?
- No. Deprivation deciles describe neighbourhoods. Most people in a deprived area are not the poorest people in the country, and wealthy individuals live in deprived areas. Treating an area statistic as a personal one is one of the commonest errors in this field.
Six specific proposals for taxing wealth, with modelled revenue and who would pay, are compared in taxing wealth: six proposals. Health gaps in this section use the ONS 2022 to 2024 release.
Why it is happening
Our analysis
Low pay, expensive housing, poor health and unequal access to opportunities overlap. Improving one can help, but no single change closes every gap.
Who is affected most
Health and place
Survey-based evidence
ONS Annual Population Survey + population/mortality dataIncludes self-reported health; this is a combined population estimate, not a clinical diagnosis.
How long can people expect to live in good health, by area?
Years in good health vary sharply between richer and poorer areas
Least deprived tenth of areasMost deprived tenth
- Men69.2 yrs
- Women68.5 yrs
Axis runs from 40 to 80 years to show the gap; it does not start at zero.
People in poorer areas can expect far fewer years in good health. The gap in healthy years is larger than the gap in lifespan. Income alone does not explain the whole difference.
England · 2022 to 2024 · Official statistics
Show the workings — Years in good health vary sharply between richer and poorer areas
Healthy life expectancy at birth in the least deprived tenth of areas (filled dot) and the most deprived tenth (open dot), England, 2022 to 2024.
People in the least deprived areas can expect about 69.2 (men) and 68.5 (women) years in good health; in the most deprived, about 49.8 and 48.2. Total life expectancy differs by about 10 years for men and 8 for women, so the gap in healthy years is roughly twice the gap in lifespan. ONS describes the change since 2019–21 as a modest, uncertain increase. These are associations, not proof that income alone causes the gap.
- Geography:
- England — Residents, by Index of Multiple Deprivation decile of their small area
- Measure:
- Years in good health
- Period:
- 2022 to 2024
- Status:
- Official statistics
- Calculation:
- As published. Gap = least deprived minus most deprived decile.
- Compare with:
- Slope index of inequality across all ten deciles: 19.3 years (men), 20.1 (women)
- Not included / breaks:
- Compares areas, not individuals: a person on a low income in a wealthy area counts in the least deprived decile. Deprivation covers income, employment, education, health, crime, housing and environment.
Source: ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 (released 15 April 2026).
View the data as a table
| Group | Least deprived | Most deprived | Gap (years) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Men | 69.2 | 49.8 | 19.4 |
| Women | 68.5 | 48.2 | 20.3 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Who feels this most?
Who cannot afford essentials
Survey-based evidence
Family Resources SurveyHousehold survey estimate with sampling error; the 2021–22 benefit-linking change lowers rates by about three points.
Who goes without enough food?
About 24% of children in low-income households lack reliable access to enough food
1996–2026 · recorded figures. Shading marks years without figures: this series starts in 2019.
Children in low-income households are much more likely to face unreliable access to food. The problem eased in the latest year. Changes in measurement limit comparisons with the earliest figures.
United Kingdom · 2019–20 to 2024–25 · Survey-based
Show the workings — About 24% of children in low-income households lack reliable access to enough food
People in households with low or very low food security, by group, United Kingdom, financial years. Low income = below 60% of median after housing costs.
Food insecurity is two to three times as common among people on low incomes as in the population as a whole. It rose sharply in 2022–23 and 2023–24, when food and energy prices jumped, and fell back in 2024–25 to 9% of everyone and 24.2% of children in low-income households. The series began in 2019–20 and has a break at 2021–22, so it cannot show a long-run trend.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom — People in private households (Family Resources Survey)
- Measure:
- Per cent of each group
- Period:
- 2019–20 to 2024–25
- Status:
- Survey-based
- Calculation:
- As published by DWP.
- Compare with:
- Everyone in the UK
- Not included / breaks:
- Break in series: from 2021/22 DWP integrates benefit administrative records into the survey. Figures either side are not directly comparable.
Source: DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025 (released 26 March 2026).
View the data as a table
| Year | Everyone | Low income | Children in low income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019–20 | 7.8% | 20.2% | 25.7% |
| 2020–21 | 6.4% | 18.1% | 22.3% |
| 2021–22 | 7% | 17.2% | 22.3% |
| 2022–23 | 10.9% | 24.4% | 29.6% |
| 2023–24 | 11.3% | 23.8% | 30.3% |
| 2024–25 | 9% | 19.4% | 24.2% |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Tenure matters more than almost anything else: 28.2% of children in social rented homes, 18.6% of children in private rented homes, 9.1% of children in owned outright homes, 3.7% of children in buying with a mortgage homes. And while children in workless families are far more likely to be in deep material poverty (38.1% of those affected, against 13.1% of all children), most children in deep material poverty live in working families.
How the pieces connect
Mechanisms to investigate, not measured effects
- 1
Income and work
Pay, hours and benefits set income before housing costs. Source: DWP HBAI.
- 2
Housing costs
Rent or mortgage comes off the top; renters on low incomes are hit hardest. Source: DWP HBAI after-housing-cost measures.
More on this step - 3
Savings and assets
A financial buffer decides whether a shock becomes hardship. Source: ONS Wealth in Great Britain.
More on this step - 4
Health
Hardship, stress, housing quality and work all relate to health; the direction runs both ways. Source: ONS healthy life expectancy by deprivation.
More on this step
Each link is supported by the source named; the diagram does not imply how strong each effect is, and causes run in both directions.
What could change
Proposals to consider. The bodies named below would need to agree to deliver them; responsibility is not a recorded commitment. Follow the links for costs and evidence.
Give families in temporary accommodation a settled home
Use social-housing funding to provide settled homes for families in temporary accommodation.
Who could deliver it: Councils and housing providers; relevant national housing bodies.
Main trade-off and delivery needs
Competition with other buyers; displacement; unsuitable location/condition.
Define families and locations; compare acquisition, lease and new build; inspect standards; secure lettings and tenancy support.
Cost: Only part of the cost has been estimated.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →A child-poverty target and essentials test
Set a child-poverty target and test whether families can afford essentials.
Who could deliver it: Treasury, the Department for Work and Pensions and relevant service departments/devolved governments.
Main trade-off and delivery needs
Unfunded targets; narrow metrics; inadequate treatment of disability and housing costs.
Define poverty/essentials measures, then compare specific benefit, housing-cost and service changes; assign accountability.
Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →Property and land tax reform
Examine changes to taxes on property and land.
Who could deliver it: Treasury, valuation bodies and relevant governments.
Main trade-off and delivery needs
Concentrated losers and valuation disputes; revenue-neutral change funds no extra spending.
Separate council-tax revaluation, land/property tax and transaction-tax changes; model losers and deferral options.
Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →Make effective smoking treatment reach more people
Help adults missing out on effective stop-smoking support get suitable treatment and advice.
Who could deliver it: public-health commissioners and health providers.
Main trade-off and delivery needs
The main risks still need to be assessed.
Verify service gap and current funding; cost adviser time, treatment, referral and follow-up. Measure sustained quits and inequalities, with adverse effects monitored. Proposed owners: public-health commissioners and health providers.
Cost: The extra cost is not yet known.
Costs, drawbacks and evidence →
See all options and what is still unknown →
Some problems have no assessed solution yet: see coverage and gaps.
Domain SWOT
Recorded
Show the findings
Strengths · 2 findings
The two-child limit was removed from 6 April 2026; the Child Poverty Strategy (December 2025, Starmer government; still published and updated on 18 August 2026) projects its measures will lift 550,000 children out of relative low income by the final year of the Parliament, 450,000 of them from removing the limit — modelled, not yet observed.
Great Britain · From 6 April 2026; projections to 2030–31
There is strong UK evidence on early-years services: access to a 2000s Sure Start centre raised GCSE results and cut hospital admissions by age 15.
England · Cohorts born about 1990–2007; outcomes to age 16
Weaknesses · 4 findings
The NAO credited improved wealthy-taxpayer compliance yield but found substantial uncertainty in the tax gap, especially offshore. HMRC later moved publication of its compliance plan from spring to the end of 2026; a plan or extra staffing is not evidence of recovered revenue.
United Kingdom · NAO May 2025; HMRC follow-up May 2026
Healthy life expectancy in England’s most deprived areas is 19.4 years lower for men and 20.3 years lower for women than in the least deprived.
England · 2022–2024
27.4% of children (4.0 million) were in relative poverty after housing costs, and 13% were in deep material poverty, lacking at least four of thirteen essentials.
United Kingdom · 2024–25
Where people live matters, and the gap at the bottom has widened: output per hour in Wales was 13% below the UK average in 1998 and 15% below in 2023, and in the North East 12% and 15% below, while London was 33% above in 1998 and 29% above in 2023.
UK nations and English regions (ITL1) · 1998 and 2023
Opportunities · 1 finding
Early-years help where access is weakest, a transparent test of whether benefits cover essentials and warmer homes for low-income households act on different parts of hardship, at different speeds.
Depends on: Each is funded, aimed at the groups the gaps fall on, and judged on distributional outcomes rather than national averages.
our synthesis
Threats · 2 findings
Wealth-policy decisions rely on a survey whose accreditation was suspended after quality concerns. Lower response and a changed pension valuation weaken comparisons; revised guidance and planned improvements do not themselves restore accreditation or validate a revenue estimate.
Great Britain · OSR review June 2025; ONS method guide March 2026 · risk
Gains in health and opportunity accrue slowly and averages can hide groups that lose out, so a programme can look successful while the gaps it targets persist.
risk
Domain action plan
Proposed
Possible steps for government and the bodies responsible. These describe the order of work, not promised dates: starting an action and seeing results take different amounts of time.
Short term · prepare
Identify who loses out and distinguish income from wealth.
Medium term · deliver
Assess the linked tax, housing and support options and who would pay.
Long term · judge results
Track whether gaps narrow without overlooking costs or unintended effects.
Delivery steps and owners (4)
- Prerequisite: Map early-years access and specify the service offer before choosing buildings · Councils with DfE · proposed
- Prerequisite: Specify an essentials basket and the options to cost · DWP with HM Treasury · proposed
- Delivery: Survey and treat the least efficient low-income homes, with checks after installation · Councils, accredited installers and DESNZ · proposed
- Result: Child poverty and deep material poverty falling; the healthy-life gap narrowing over the long run · DWP and ONS statistics · proposed
Sources, method and changes
Shareable visual summary
Visual summary
More than one in four UK children, 4.0 million, live in low-income households after housing costs.
Healthy life expectancy at birth, 2022 to 2024: men 49.8 years vs 69.2 years; women 48.2 years vs 68.5 years, most vs least deprived area deciles. Endpoint gaps, not the slope index of inequality.
Healthy life expectancy at birth, England, 2022 to 2024
| Group | Most deprived 10% | Least deprived 10% | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Men | 49.8 years | 69.2 years | 19.4 years |
| Women | 48.2 years | 68.5 years | 20.3 years |
Area deciles, not individuals; not a prediction of when any one person becomes ill.
Text and data version
More than one in four UK children, 4.0 million, live in low-income households after housing costs. Healthy life expectancy at birth, 2022 to 2024: men 49.8 years vs 69.2 years; women 48.2 years vs 68.5 years, most vs least deprived area deciles. Endpoint gaps, not the slope index of inequality.
| Measure | Value | Period | Geography | Type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Men, most deprived decile | 49.8 years | 2022 to 2024 | England | survey estimate | ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 |
| Men, least deprived decile | 69.2 years | 2022 to 2024 | England | survey estimate | ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 |
| Women, most deprived decile | 48.2 years | 2022 to 2024 | England | survey estimate | ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 |
| Women, least deprived decile | 68.5 years | 2022 to 2024 | England | survey estimate | ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 |
| Endpoint gap, men (least − most deprived decile)Calculation: least deprived decile − most deprived decile (rounded published values); not the slope index of inequality | 19.4 years | 2022 to 2024 | England | derived calculation | ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 |
| Endpoint gap, women (least − most deprived decile)Calculation: least deprived decile − most deprived decile (rounded published values); not the slope index of inequality | 20.3 years | 2022 to 2024 | England | derived calculation | ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 |
Available images and their source records are listed on Shareable visuals.
Sources and methods (4)
- ONS, Healthy life expectancy by national area deprivation, England and Wales: between 2013 to 2015 and 2022 to 2024 (released 15 April 2026) — healthy and total life expectancy by deprivation
- DWP, Households Below Average Income: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025 (released 26 March 2026) — poverty, income inequality, food security and deep material poverty
- ONS, Household total wealth in Great Britain — wealth distribution (accreditation suspended June 2025)
- IFS, The health impacts of Sure Start (Cattan, Conti, Farquharson, Ginja, Pecher, 2021) — early years evaluation
Method notes
- Health figures are for England; income and poverty for the UK; wealth for Great Britain. Each chart states its own scope.
- Relative poverty is below 60% of the contemporary median household income, after housing costs unless stated.
- Area deprivation describes neighbourhoods, not individuals.
Corrections and changes
- 2026-10-11: Restored the missing financial year beside the deep-material-poverty estimate: FYE 2025. The number and uncertainty statement are unchanged.