Six ways of taxing wealth more heavily, each with the revenue that has been modelled for it, who would pay, and the objection its critics make. These are contested policy options, not settled answers, and the site takes no position on which is right.
Annual tax on wealth above £10m
Widely quoted, unverifiedA charge of 1–2% each year on individual net wealth above a £10m threshold, applying only to wealth above the line — someone with £11m pays on £1m, not £11m. Base would include property, pensions, investments and private business assets, less debts.
Advanced by: Most prominently argued by Gary Stevenson (Gary’s Economics), who proposes 2% above £10m. The Green Party proposes 1% above £10m and 2% above £1bn.
Modelled revenue
£24bn a year (as commonly quoted)
We could NOT verify the £24bn against its underlying modelling. It is usually attributed to Wealth Tax Commission work led by Arun Advani at Warwick, but the Commission’s published illustrations use different parameters — for example 0.6% above £2m raising about £10bn. The £24bn may well be a defensible extrapolation; we simply could not confirm it, and doubling a rate does not reliably double a yield once behaviour changes. Treat it as a campaign figure pending verification.
Who pays
Roughly 20,000–22,000 individuals, on the figures usually quoted.
Case for: Targets net wealth directly rather than the transactions or income that existing taxes reach, and shifts the balance of taxation from earnings towards assets.
Case against: Valuing private businesses, land and unlisted assets annually; asset-rich but cash-poor taxpayers; changes of tax residence; trusts and offshore structures; and the administrative cost of running a valuation exercise every year.
Gary’s Economics — the argument in his own words
Minimum tax on wealth above £100m
Independently modelledA 2% minimum effective annual tax, applying only to the very largest fortunes, designed so that those already paying that much in other taxes pay nothing extra.
Advanced by: Proposed in academic analysis at King’s College London.
Modelled revenue
About £10bn a year
A different design from the £10m proposal and not additive to it. The narrower base means far fewer valuation disputes but also far fewer taxpayers, so the yield is more exposed to the decisions of a small number of households.
Who pays
Fewer than 1,000 households.
Case for: Concentrates on extreme wealth where the case for undertaxation is strongest, and the small number of taxpayers makes administration more tractable.
Case against: Highly mobile taxpayers; requires international coordination to be durable; and the yield depends heavily on a handful of individuals’ choices.
King’s College London analysis
One-off wealth levy
Independently modelledA single charge on wealth above a threshold, assessed once on a past date and payable over several years, rather than an annual tax.
Advanced by: The Wealth Tax Commission’s own preferred option — it concluded a one-off tax is easier to justify and administer than an annual one, and that the economic case for an annual tax is much less straightforward.
Modelled revenue
Depends entirely on threshold and rate
Because it is assessed on a past date, there is far less scope to rearrange affairs to avoid it. That is its central advantage and also why it cannot be repeated — a "one-off" tax people expect to recur behaves like an annual one.
Who pays
A larger group than the annual proposals, depending on where the threshold is set.
Case for: Much harder to avoid, and does not require an annual valuation machine.
Case against: Politically difficult; raises money once; and credibility depends on it genuinely not recurring.
Wealth Tax Commission, final report
Property and land tax reform
Independently modelledReplacing council tax, stamp duty and business rates with a proportional property tax or land value tax based on current values, rather than 1991 valuations.
Advanced by: Advanced by the tax lawyer Dan Neidle as a better alternative to an annual wealth tax, and by others across the political spectrum. Burnham has separately advocated a land value tax.
Modelled revenue
Design-dependent
Council tax in England is still based on 1991 property values, which is the clearest case of an existing tax failing to track wealth. Reform is revenue-neutral or revenue-raising depending on design.
Who pays
Property owners and landowners, weighted towards higher-value property.
Case for: Land cannot move or hide, so avoidance and emigration are far less of a problem than with a wealth tax.
Case against: Creates visible winners and losers by region; hits asset-rich, cash-poor households, particularly pensioners; and revaluation is politically painful.
Tax Policy Associates
Capital gains tax reform
Modelled, but disputedRaising CGT rates towards income tax rates, so that income from selling assets is taxed comparably to income from work.
Advanced by: Liberal Democrat policy (20%, 40% and 45% bands, costed at £5.2bn a year by 2028-29 and hypothecated to the NHS). Green policy proposes full alignment with income tax. Also discussed within Labour.
Modelled revenue
£5.2bn (Lib Dem design); £16–20bn claimed for full alignment
The higher figures for full alignment are disputed. Raising the rate changes when people choose to realise gains, so a static calculation overstates the yield; the tax lawyer Dan Neidle has argued the £16bn figure is substantially wrong.
Who pays
People realising gains on assets — concentrated among higher-wealth households, but including business sales and second properties.
Case for: Uses an existing tax with existing administration; no new valuation regime required.
Case against: Taxpayers control the timing of disposals, so behavioural response is large and the yield uncertain.
Chartered Institute of Taxation, election analysis
Inheritance tax reform
Independently modelledNarrowing reliefs — particularly business and agricultural property relief — and closing gifting routes.
Advanced by: Advanced by Dan Neidle among others as part of reforming existing taxes rather than creating new ones. Ed Davey has said the better-off should pay more inheritance tax.
Modelled revenue
Design-dependent
Reliefs are where most of the foregone revenue sits. IHT raises comparatively little relative to the wealth it nominally covers, largely because of the reliefs and gifting rules.
Who pays
Larger estates, at the point of death.
Case for: Existing administrative machinery, and taxes wealth at the point it transfers rather than annually.
Case against: Extensive avoidance through lifetime gifting and trusts; and reliefs exist partly to protect family farms and businesses from forced sale.
Institute for Government explainer on wealth taxes
The argument behind the £10m proposal
Gary Stevenson — A former Citibank trader turned campaigner, whose channel Gary’s Economics has made the case for an annual wealth tax to a large audience. His argument runs: Wealth concentrates → wealthy households buy more assets → asset prices rise faster than wages → people dependent on wages fall further behind → concentration compounds. His stated aim is not primarily to raise a sum to spend. It is to slow the concentration of wealth and shift taxation away from work and towards assets, which he argues would eventually allow taxes on earnings to fall.
| The claim | What the evidence supports |
|---|
| A tax of this kind would raise substantial revenue | Independently modelled, though the specific £24bn figure is unverified |
| It would reduce measured post-tax wealth concentration | Almost by construction |
| It would slow asset accumulation at the top | Plausible; magnitude unquantified |
| It would make housing more affordable | Proposed mechanism; no reliable quantified effect |
| It would raise wages | Proposed mechanism; no reliable quantified effect |
| It would allow taxes on work to be cut | A political choice, not an automatic consequence |
The main counter-argument: The tax lawyer Dan Neidle is the most prominent critic, challenging the proposal on valuation of private assets, tax residence and capital mobility, liquidity for asset-rich taxpayers, and international experience — most countries that tried annual wealth taxes have abandoned them. He argues reforming property tax, capital gains tax and inheritance tax would raise more with fewer problems.
This is a campaign proposal, not government policy. Stevenson has said publicly "I’m not advising Andy Burnham, but I’d love to" — he should not be described as a government adviser.
Gary’s Economics — the argument in his own words