Brexit · Trade · United Kingdom · 2019–2025
Did goods and services trade follow different paths?
Yes. By volume, goods exports to the EU in 2025 were 14% below 2019 and to the rest of the world 8% below; services exports to all partners were 26% higher. Studies attribute part of the goods gap to Brexit frictions; how much is estimated, not measured.
Evidence last reviewed 11 October 2026
Exports: goods down, services up
Did goods and services trade follow the same path?
Goods exports to the EU are 14% below 2019; services exports are 26% above
Goods exports, by destination
1996–2026 · recorded figures.
Services, all partners
1996–2026 · recorded figures.
The gap in the EU goods line marks the January 2021 change from survey returns to customs declarations.
Goods exports to the European Union are below 2019, while services exports are higher. New border checks are part of the context, but these changes do not isolate Brexit from other shocks.
United Kingdom · 1997 to 2025, calendar years · Accredited official statistics; recent years are revised as new data arrive
Show the workings — Goods exports to the EU are 14% below 2019; services exports are 26% above
Two panels, each indexed to 2019 = 100. First panel: UK goods exports by destination, excluding precious metals. Second panel: UK services exports and imports, all partners (ONS publishes services volumes only for the world total).
By volume, goods exports to the EU in 2025 were 14% below 2019; to the rest of the world, 8% below. That gap is consistent with new border frictions, but it is not a clean measure of Brexit: the measurement break and other shocks sit in the same years. Services exports grew 26% over the same period. Neither line shows what trade would have been inside the EU.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom — UK trade in goods and services, balance-of-payments basis
- Measure:
- Volume index, 2019 = 100 (chained volume measures, seasonally adjusted)
- Period:
- 1997 to 2025, calendar years
- Status:
- Accredited official statistics; recent years are revised as new data arrive
- Calculation:
- Site calculation: each ONS chained-volume series divided by its own 2019 value × 100. Volumes remove price changes, so nominal and real values are not mixed.
- Compare with:
- Each series’ own 2019 level; goods exports to non-EU countries (−8%) as a partial control for shocks that hit all trade
- Not included / breaks:
- A structural break in EU goods trade from January 2021 (customs declarations replaced the Intrastat survey), shown as a gap in the EU line. The pandemic and the 2022 energy shock fall inside the same window. Precious metals are excluded because gold flows through London swamp the non-EU figures. A services split by EU and non-EU exists only in current prices, so it is not compared here.
Source: ONS, UK trade time series (MRET), chained volume measures, CDIDs JIM8, JIN3, JIM7, JIN2 (goods excluding precious metals); IKBE, IKBF (services) (released 11 September 2026).
View the data as a table
| Year | Goods exports to EU | Goods exports to non-EU | Services exports (all) | Services imports (all) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 74.1 | 54.1 | 36.0 | 38.3 |
| 1998 | 77.1 | 50.7 | 39.1 | 41.0 |
| 1999 | 80.1 | 51.1 | 41.1 | 44.7 |
| 2000 | 87.0 | 57.2 | 45.0 | 47.6 |
| 2001 | 90.1 | 56.9 | 46.2 | 48.8 |
| 2002 | 92.7 | 56.0 | 46.2 | 50.8 |
| 2003 | 86.8 | 59.8 | 49.6 | 52.8 |
| 2004 | 86.7 | 61.8 | 54.8 | 56.6 |
| 2005 | 90.7 | 69.3 | 58.7 | 59.1 |
| 2006 | 112.8 | 67.7 | 64.3 | 61.3 |
| 2007 | 95.2 | 68.9 | 70.9 | 63.0 |
| 2008 | 91.6 | 72.8 | 74.8 | 62.4 |
| 2009 | 84.1 | 66.6 | 69.7 | 59.4 |
| 2010 | 89.5 | 75.3 | 71.1 | 62.4 |
| 2011 | 93.0 | 81.9 | 76.2 | 63.0 |
| 2012 | 88.1 | 85.0 | 78.5 | 65.1 |
| 2013 | 87.1 | 85.2 | 79.4 | 67.2 |
| 2014 | 89.7 | 85.1 | 79.9 | 72.7 |
| 2015 | 91.4 | 89.5 | 83.2 | 79.8 |
| 2016 | 95.3 | 90.4 | 87.2 | 83.3 |
| 2017 | 101.3 | 96.9 | 93.0 | 87.8 |
| 2018 | 101.4 | 99.6 | 98.5 | 96.4 |
| 2019 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2020 | 87.5 | 87.2 | 89.3 | 77.2 |
| 2021 | 86.0 | 91.6 | 94.2 | 78.6 |
| 2022 | 94.3 | 94.8 | 109.9 | 100.0 |
| 2023 | 89.1 | 94.6 | 112.7 | 108.2 |
| 2024 | 86.5 | 92.3 | 120.9 | 115.0 |
| 2025 | 85.8 | 91.7 | 126.5 | 118.5 |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
Imports: sourcing shifted away from the EU
Did imports from the EU fall too?
Goods imports from the EU are 2% below 2019; from elsewhere, +10%
1996–2026 · recorded figures.
Britain buys fewer goods from the European Union and more from elsewhere than in 2019, after price changes are removed. This comparison alone cannot tell us how much Brexit caused.
United Kingdom · 1997 to 2025, calendar years · Accredited official statistics; recent years are revised as new data arrive
Show the workings — Goods imports from the EU are 2% below 2019; from elsewhere, +10%
UK goods imports by origin, excluding precious metals, volume index 2019 = 100.
Imports moved differently from exports. Volumes from the EU in 2025 were −2% on 2019, while imports from the rest of the world were +10%. A shift in sourcing away from the EU is consistent with the academic estimate that the trade deal caused a sudden 25% fall in UK imports from the EU relative to the rest of the world. These are observed volumes; the counterfactual is the study’s estimate, not this chart.
- Geography:
- United Kingdom — UK imports of goods, balance-of-payments basis
- Measure:
- Volume index, 2019 = 100 (chained volume measures, seasonally adjusted)
- Period:
- 1997 to 2025, calendar years
- Status:
- Accredited official statistics; recent years are revised as new data arrive
- Calculation:
- Site calculation: each ONS chained-volume series divided by its own 2019 value × 100. Volumes remove price changes, so nominal and real values are not mixed.
- Compare with:
- Each series’ own 2019 level
- Not included / breaks:
- Same January 2021 break in EU goods data as BREXIT-02. Import controls on EU goods were phased in from 2022 onwards, later than export checks, so timing differs between the two directions.
Source: ONS, UK trade time series (MRET), chained volume measures, CDIDs JIM8, JIN3, JIM7, JIN2 (goods excluding precious metals); IKBE, IKBF (services) (released 11 September 2026).
View the data as a table
| Year | Goods imports from EU | Goods imports from non-EU |
|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 42.7 | 45.7 |
| 1998 | 45.8 | 48.8 |
| 1999 | 48.9 | 52.2 |
| 2000 | 51.9 | 60.0 |
| 2001 | 57.8 | 61.2 |
| 2002 | 63.7 | 59.3 |
| 2003 | 63.2 | 61.7 |
| 2004 | 66.1 | 68.7 |
| 2005 | 72.4 | 73.1 |
| 2006 | 83.3 | 78.7 |
| 2007 | 77.7 | 82.4 |
| 2008 | 76.1 | 81.7 |
| 2009 | 67.8 | 77.2 |
| 2010 | 74.4 | 85.8 |
| 2011 | 77.7 | 87.5 |
| 2012 | 81.3 | 87.0 |
| 2013 | 84.2 | 86.0 |
| 2014 | 88.4 | 88.3 |
| 2015 | 92.3 | 92.1 |
| 2016 | 96.4 | 96.3 |
| 2017 | 98.7 | 98.7 |
| 2018 | 100.1 | 97.4 |
| 2019 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2020 | 86.7 | 91.6 |
| 2021 | 87.3 | 103.9 |
| 2022 | 98.0 | 110.0 |
| 2023 | 98.2 | 101.8 |
| 2024 | 97.2 | 102.8 |
| 2025 | 98.0 | 109.8 |
The break in the data
Until the end of 2020, UK goods trade with the EU was recorded from the Intrastat business survey; since January 2021 it comes from customs declarations. ONS says a structural break remains in EU goods series from that date. The method changed at the same moment as the trading relationship, so comparisons across 2021 — including the 2019-based changes on this page — are indicative rather than exact. The charts show the break as a gap rather than a continuous line. ONS UK trade bulletin.
What changed at the border
The Trade and Cooperation Agreement kept zero tariffs and quotas on goods that meet its rules of origin. What it added were non-tariff costs — the items below. Which matters most depends on the sector: for food the checks dominate, for manufacturers rules of origin, for professional services the loss of recognition.
Customs declarations
Every consignment crossing the border now needs a declaration, a commodity code and a customs intermediary or in-house capability.
Who it hits: Hardest on small exporters, because the cost per consignment is broadly fixed. A firm sending one pallet pays much the same paperwork cost as one sending a lorry.
Rules of origin
Zero tariffs apply only to goods that qualify as UK-originating. Proving that requires tracking the origin of components through the supply chain.
Who it hits: Manufacturers assembling goods from imported parts, and businesses re-exporting goods made elsewhere, which may not qualify for zero tariffs.
Sanitary and phytosanitary checks
Food, animal and plant products need export health certificates, often signed by a vet, and are subject to physical inspection.
Who it hits: Agrifood, fishing and horticulture. Perishable goods are worst affected because delay is itself the cost. The 2025 UK–EU reset targets exactly this area.
Loss of mutual recognition for services and qualifications
No automatic right to provide services across the EU, and no blanket recognition of professional qualifications. Firms need establishment or authorisation in individual member states.
Who it hits: Professional services, legal, audit, and touring musicians and performers. The agreement’s services provisions are much narrower than its goods provisions.
VAT and fiscal representation
Cross-border VAT accounting changed, and some member states require a fiscal representative for non-EU sellers.
Who it hits: Small e-commerce sellers, for whom the compliance cost is large relative to the value of each order.
The government’s own figures for food and plant checks: export health certificates cost up to £200 a consignment, and products such as dairy, fish and meat face 100% document checks and up to 30% physical checks (UK–EU Summit explainer, May 2025).
What studies estimate — and what they cannot
The charts show what happened, not what would have happened inside the EU. Two kinds of estimate try to answer that.
Comparing EU and non-EU trade. Freeman, Manova, Prayer and Sampson (CEP, LSE, 2022) estimate that the trade deal caused a sudden and persistent 25% fall in UK imports from the EU relative to the rest of the world, a smaller and temporary relative fall in exports, and a large, lasting drop in the number of low-value export relationships — consistent with fixed paperwork costs pushing small exporters out. They found no significant relative fall before 2021.
Forecasters’ assumptions. The OBR assumes UK exports and imports will be about 15% lower in the long run than if the UK had remained, and judged in March 2024 that this appeared broadly on track. That is a long-run assumption about trade intensity, not a measurement of any year’s trade.
New trade deals. The government’s impact assessments estimate small long-run gains: UK–Australia FTA +0.08% of GDP (about £2.3bn) by 2035; UK–New Zealand FTA +0.03% of GDP (about £0.8bn) by 2035; UK accession to CPTPP about +£2.0bn of GDP a year, compared with 2040 projections. These are modelled effects of each agreement, and are much smaller than the estimated effect of the new EU relationship.
Options that would reduce the frictions — a food-and-plant-checks agreement, linked carbon markets, recognition of qualifications, or a customs union — are compared, with the policy autonomy each would cost, in What can change within the present relationship?
Sources and methods (9)
- ONS, UK trade time series (MRET), chained volume measures, CDIDs JIM8, JIN3, JIM7, JIN2 (goods excluding precious metals); IKBE, IKBF (services) (released 11 September 2026) — goods and services trade volumes
- ONS, UK trade bulletin (structural break in EU goods series from January 2021) — structural break in EU goods data
- UK Government, Agreements reached between the UK and the EU (Trade and Cooperation Agreement, December 2020) — Trade and Cooperation Agreement
- Freeman, Manova, Prayer and Sampson, “UK trade in the wake of Brexit”, CEP Discussion Paper 1847 (LSE) (released April 2022) — estimated effect of the trade deal on UK–EU trade
- Office for Budget Responsibility, Brexit analysis (released page last updated 20 July 2026) — long-run trade-intensity assumption
- Department for International Trade, Impact assessment of the UK–Australia FTA — UK–Australia FTA: +0.08% of GDP (about £2.3bn) by 2035
- Department for International Trade, Impact assessment of the UK–New Zealand FTA — UK–New Zealand FTA: +0.03% of GDP (about £0.8bn) by 2035
- Department for Business and Trade, Impact assessment of the UK’s accession to the CPTPP — UK accession to CPTPP: about +£2.0bn of GDP a year, compared with 2040 projections
- UK Government, UK–EU Summit package explainer (19 May 2025) — certificate and check costs for food and plant products
Method notes
- Volumes are ONS chained volume measures (prices held constant), seasonally adjusted, balance-of-payments basis, summed to calendar years by ONS.
- Goods exclude precious metals (non-monetary gold), whose London trading flows swing the non-EU totals without reflecting UK output.
- ONS publishes services in volume terms only for all partners; an EU/non-EU services split exists only in current prices and is not compared with goods volumes here.