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Jobs & pay: evidence and policy appraisals

Detailed research records, alternatives, costs and provisional assessments. These records preserve different scopes and historical reviews; they are not an additional ranked action plan.

Evidence → choices → outcomes

What could improve it?

More people in sustained, suitable work across Great Britain, and fewer young people out of education, employment or training for long spells.

These options link to their national assessment, including funding, delivery constraints and remaining uncertainties.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare

    Fidelity reviews, NHS integration and an impact evaluation inside Connect to Work.

    9/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Trials exist, but effects differ by setting; pooled out-of-work groups showed no employment impact. Do not infer a uniform national growth effect.

    Specify cohort and voluntary offer; secure clinical referrals, trained employment specialists, employer links and linked-data evaluation.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works

    7/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    Minimum-wage and Kickstart evidence address different policies. Existing Youth Guarantee funding cannot settle the additionality of all three.

    Separate wage-floor/enforcement, progression and targeted youth support; specify increment and monitor hours and access.

  • Assessed option · provisional

    Make childcare places work for working parents

    Test additional capacity, affordability and parental employment.

    8/10 criteria scored

    Coverage of the appraisal, not an impact score.

    Delivery: Amber

    Whole-life costs incomplete

    Evidence and delivery constraints

    IFS finds employment effects depend on the hours offered. This is indirect evidence for filling today’s local supply gaps. A September 2026 process evaluation exists; it is not a causal national impact estimate.

    Verify unmet demand, existing awards and provider viability; cost places, workforce, premises, operating subsidy and parental fees. Track access and sustained parental work. Proposed owners: councils, DfE and providers in England; separate devolved arrangements.

This domain in the UK SWOT →UK National Action Plan →

How we assessed these options

What would it take to improve this?

Detailed policy appraisal

The outcome we want: More people in sustained, suitable work across Great Britain, and fewer young people out of education, employment or training for long spells.

The main constraint: Most NEET young people and most people out of work through ill health are economically inactive, so job-search rules reach few of them; what helps is individual, depends on employers offering real jobs and on NHS capacity to refer, and needs trained employment specialists that DWP, councils and providers must recruit and keep.

Constraint type: workforce, coordination, market structure.

The options on the table

What is funded now, and the changes assessed against it — the current baseline and the alternatives, before the position today and the actions.

Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

  • Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcareDelivery risk: Amber

    Funded now
    Connect to Work has taken referrals since April 2025 and aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029/30; IPS also operates in NHS mental health services. The proposal here is to hold it to fidelity and integrate it with care, not to start something new.
    The change assessed
    Fidelity reviews, NHS integration and an impact evaluation inside Connect to Work.

    Range if completed: 17.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co))

  • Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it worksDelivery risk: Amber

    Funded now
    Baseline: the National Living Wage of £12.71 from April 2026; the Fair Work Agency established on 7 April 2026; HMRC enforcement (budget £31.5m in 2024/25) and naming rounds continuing (September 2026). Targeted enforcement with an evaluation of deterrence is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Not yet defined.

    Range if completed: 14.0–23.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Employer-linked shortage training beyond constructionDelivery risk: Amber

    Funded now
    Not yet stated in the record.
    The change assessed
    Appraise a defined adult or technical training cohort with employer placements in a verified non-construction shortage.

    Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

  • Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workersDelivery risk: Amber

    Funded now
    Funded baseline: Access to Work (£320.7m on provision in 2024–25) and 480 extra case managers and caseworkers to clear the backlog by September 2027 (May 2026; restated 2 October 2026). A defined decision standard for in-work cases, tested with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Test a defined assessment-to-adjustment improvement for workers facing verified delays, distinguishing employer duties from public support.

    Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Assessed with another page as home

These options also bear on this topic. The full assessment sits on the home page named under each.

  • Make childcare places work for working parentsDelivery risk: Amber

    Home: Education.

    Funded now
    Funded baseline (England): 30 hours a week for 38 weeks for working parents of children from 9 months (since September 2025), the universal 15 hours for 3–4-year-olds, and 15 hours for disadvantaged 2-year-olds, with £9.5bn for early years in 2026–27; school-based nursery and capital grants add places. Commissioning extra places only where a local gap is shown is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.
    The change assessed
    Commission specified additional places/hours in demonstrated local supply gaps beyond the funded baseline; adult-carer support remains a separate option.

    Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))

Alternatives already on record: 26 options listed under the points in the position today (15 without an action record), and 2 earlier options under other options compared. They have not been scored in the review.

The position today

  • What we can build on (2)
  • What is holding us back (6)About 2.7 million people of working age are economically inactive because of long-term sickness, 658,000 more than at the end of 2019, while the overall inactivity rate has barely moved. Labour Force Survey estimates carry sampling uncertainty and are revised. (June to August 2026 · United Kingdom)
  • What could improve things (1)Match the route to the barrier: paid jobs and apprenticeships for young people ready to work, and health-linked support for people out of work through ill health.
  • What could make it worse (1)

Which quadrant a point sits in is our analytical judgement, not a statistical category. Each point says whether it is a measured fact, our synthesis or a risk.

What we can build on Strengths

  • Health-linked employment support has been tested in large UK randomised trials: for out-of-work participants in the West Midlands it raised the share working 13 weeks or more in a year by 4 percentage points.

    Measured factConfidence: Moderate· Randomised 2018–2019; outcomes at 12 months· West Midlands and Sheffield City Region

    Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report (Synthesis report Table 2.1)

    Options assessed against this point: Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare (Amber delivery RAG)

    What government has committed to

    Funding: Connect to Work, a voluntary supported-employment programme built on Individual Placement and Support, is agreed to run 2025/26 to 2029/30 at an estimated £1.2bn and aims to support about 300,000 people by the end of 2029/30; funding is confirmed to 2028/29 (£114m for 2025/26 and £978m from Spending Review 2025), with £138m for 2029/30 onward still to be requested. DWP runs annual IPS fidelity reviews.

    Who and when:
    Starmer government (to July 2026), 26 November 2024.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Kept by the Burnham government. Business case 2 summary published 30 July 2026, after the change of PM; DWP re-stated on 23 September 2026 that Connect to Work 'will reach 300,000 sick or disabled people' within a £3.5bn employment support package. Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (Executive summary; paragraphs 3.1.1–3.1.2).
    Source:
    DWP, DfE and DHSC, Get Britain Working White Paper (Executive summary; Connect to Work)

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (3)
  • Paid and supported routes are funded: an £820 million Youth Guarantee package includes six-month paid jobs for young people long on Universal Credit, and Connect to Work has committed funding to 2028–29.

    Measured factConfidence: High· December 2025 to 2028–29· Great Britain (Jobs Guarantee); England and Wales (Connect to Work)

    Source: DWP and DfE, Almost a million young people to benefit from expanded support, new training and work experience opportunities (Opening paragraph); Department for Work and Pensions, Jobs Guarantee (Jobs Guarantee page); Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (Paragraph 3.1.2)

    What government has committed to

    Funding: An additional £1bn announced in March 2026 took total extra investment in the Youth Guarantee and the Growth and Skills Levy to £2.5bn over three years (superseding the £820m package of December 2025). The Jobs Guarantee offers six-month fully funded jobs (up to 25 hours a week) to all eligible 18-24-year-olds on Universal Credit and looking for work for 18 months, expected to support over 90,000 young people over three years; Phase One runs in six areas and national rollout across 25 areas goes live 'later in 2026'.

    Who and when:
    Starmer government (to July 2026), 16 March 2026.
    Since 20 July 2026:
    Kept by the Burnham government. Acted on and expanded under Burnham: first Jobs Guarantee starts announced 26 Aug 2026; on 27 Sep 2026 DWP announced an expansion to young people on health benefits from April 2027 (offer from week 13 after a Work Capability Assessment); £2,000 SME apprenticeship hiring payment live from 1 Oct 2026; apprenticeship brokerage extended to all 14 Mayoral Strategic Authorities from spring 2027 (£100m over two years, 28 Sep 2026). No announcement that the national rollout has gone live was found. Source: DWP, Thousands of young disabled people to be offered guaranteed jobs (Paras 4-8: offer from week 13 after Work Capability Assessment; 'will start from April 2027'; £2.5bn over three years).
    Source:
    DWP / DfE, Major employment drive to help unlock 200,000 new jobs and apprenticeships for next generation (Bullets; para 'These changes are backed by an additional £1bn, taking the total ... to £2.5 billion over the next three years'; 'From the Autumn 2026, we are expanding the Jobs Guarantee to all eligible 18-24 year olds')

    Checked 4 October 2026. A commitment is not delivery.

    Options (3)
    • ShortlistedRun the Jobs Guarantee as real jobs with wraparound support, judged on sustained work

      Six-month paid jobs with support move long-unemployed 18-24s into work; judging on unsubsidised work 12 months later guards against churn back to Universal Credit.

      Who: DWP and Jobs Guarantee delivery partners; employers · Evidence: Synthesis of robust evaluations · Status: Funded programme

      Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Jobs Guarantee (Landing text: 'over 90,000 young people over the next three years'; Phase One live in 6 areas; National Rollout 'will go live later in 2026' across 25 areas)

    • Extend the Jobs Guarantee to young people on health benefits as planned from April 2027

      A voluntary guaranteed job after the Work Capability Assessment reaches NEET young people with health conditions who are inactive rather than job-seeking.

      Who: DWP · Evidence: Untested proposal · Status: Announced proposal

      Source: DWP, Thousands of young disabled people to be offered guaranteed jobs (Paras 4-8: offer from week 13 after Work Capability Assessment; 'will start from April 2027'; £2.5bn over three years)

    • Use the £2,000 SME apprenticeship hiring payment and mayoral brokerage to add youth apprenticeships

      Paying non-levy employers £2,000 per apprentice aged 16-24 and matching young people to local SMEs lowers the cost of hiring and searching.

      Who: DfE/DWP; Mayoral Strategic Authorities; employers · Evidence: Observational analysis · Status: Funded programme

      Source: Department for Education / DWP, £2,000 boost for small businesses who take on young apprentices (1 October 2026) (Opening bullets; 'Additional information: Apprenticeship Hiring Payment')

What is holding us back Weaknesses

What could improve things Opportunities

What could make it worse Threats

The actions worth examining

Our shortlist for this page. Research quality, policy status, cost and funding are judged separately; none of these is government policy unless its status says so.Our shortlist. None is government policy unless its status says so.

  1. Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare — indicative costing / partial funding
  2. Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works — not yet costed / funding not identified
  3. Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workers — not yet costed / funding not identified

And 1 more in the full list.

  • Action 1A09Policy status: funded programme

    Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare

    Individual Placement and Support puts an employment specialist alongside health services to find matched work quickly and keep supporting the person once they start.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    DWP and local authority delivery areas (Connect to Work), with NHS commissioners (England and Wales)
    Evidence:
    Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation. Randomised trials of an adapted model found modest effects that varied by place; evidence is strongest for severe mental illness, a different group.
    Expected effect:
    +4 percentage points (22% vs 18%): working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants) (West Midlands Combined Authority). No effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months. 2 more results in “What it takes”.
    Cost and funding

    £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices; 2 further cost lines, some not yet costed

    Funding: Indicative costing / partial funding

    Why it is shortlisted here: Long-term sickness keeps more people out of work than before 2020; the best-evidenced support is already funded through Connect to Work and must be held to fidelity.

    What it takes
    The problem

    People with health conditions who want to work often get employment help that is separate from their care and does not stay with them in work.

    Who is affected, and where

    Adults with health conditions or disabilities who want to work, in England and Wales. Territory: England and Wales. Connect to Work covers England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland run their own employment support.

    Policy status

    A funded programme already exists. Connect to Work has taken referrals since April 2025 and aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029/30; IPS also operates in NHS mental health services. The proposal here is to hold it to fidelity and integrate it with care, not to start something new.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    Working 13+ weeks in a year: +4 percentage points for out-of-work participants in the West Midlands; +3 points for people in work in Sheffield City Region (weaker evidence); no effect for out-of-work participants there; no earnings effect at 12 months; small health gains in Sheffield City Region only.
    Evaluated on:
    9,785 adults with mild to moderate health conditions, in or out of work; Sheffield City Region and West Midlands, 2018–2020
    Transfer to this case:
    Results for severe mental illness or for one area should not be assumed for all economically inactive people.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Keep delivery at fidelity, integrate it with NHS care, and judge it by sustained work and health, not referrals or starts.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    One of three trial groups saw no employment effect and the Exchequer return within a year was 1–2p per £1; benefits were mainly in health and wellbeing, and only in one area.
    Effects on record
    • Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants): +4 percentage points (22% vs 18%) (randomised control group receiving usual support; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020; significant at the 99% level; no interval published). evaluated, moderate confidence; West Midlands Combined Authority. No effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months.
    • Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (people in work but struggling): +3 percentage points (randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020; significant only at the 90% level; no interval published). evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region. Weaker evidence than the West Midlands result.
    • Self-reported health (EQ-5D-5L) at 12 months: +0.10 standard deviations (randomised control group; 12 months after randomisation; significant at the 90% level (99% when Sheffield groups are pooled); no effect in the West Midlands). evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region. Small; not found in the West Midlands. Not evidence of reduced NHS demand.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Partly costed. Funding: Indicative costing / partial funding.

    • Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29 (recurring spending; paid by central government): £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices. Sum of the four years in the revised business case. Excludes £15.5m spent in 2023–24 and 2024–25.
    • Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32 (recurring spending; paid by central government): £134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices. Sum of the last three years in the revised business case.
    • NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS (recurring spending; paid by NHS): Not yet costed. Not in the DWP business case. An older national IPS price is not a current rollout budget.
    • Autumn Budget 2024 and Spending Review 2025 settlements for Connect to Work: £1.09bn, 2025–26 to 2028–29 — committed (allocated to this scope). £114m for 2025–26 plus £978m for 2026–27 to 2028–29. The business case says funding and costs differ because volume forecasts changed.
    • Connect to Work funding to be requested at a future Spending Review: £138m, 2029–30 to 2031–32 — not committed (no allocation). “Will be requested in a future Spending Review.”
    Who pays:
    DWP for Connect to Work grants; the NHS for clinical integration and IPS in mental health services.
    Financing proposed:
    £138m for 2029–30 onwards is to be requested at a future Spending Review.
    Gap remaining:
    Connect to Work is funded to 2028–29; the later years are not committed and the NHS-side integration cost is not established.
    What delivery needs
    Skills:
    Trained employment specialists and supervisors.
    Operational capacity:
    NHS referral routes and fidelity reviews.
    Infrastructure:
    None beyond services.
    Permissions:
    Data sharing between health and employment services.
    Law:
    No new law.
    Public consent:
    Voluntary for participants.
    First step and stages

    First step: Select the eligible group, service standard and an existing capacity gap in one area. (owner: DWP delivery areas and NHS commissioners)

    1. Recruit and train to fidelity — Connect to Work delivery areas (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    2. Refer and support into work — Providers with NHS teams (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
    3. Measure sustained work and health from payroll and survey data — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

    Depends on: NHS capacity to refer and integrate; Employer vacancies

    Trade-offs
    Who gains and who loses:
    Gains for participants who find suitable work; intensive support per person means fewer people reached.
    What else the money or effort could do:
    The same money could fund less intensive support for more people, or health services directly.
    Strongest counterargument:
    Trial effects were modest and inconsistent; scaling may dilute fidelity further.
    Risks:
    Unsuitable jobs, pressure on people who are not ready, and over-claiming benefit savings.
    How we would judge it
    Baseline:
    Economic inactivity due to long-term sickness (ONS Labour Force Survey).
    Leading indicator:
    Programme starts and the share in paid work within 12 months.
    Outcome:
    Employment sustained 6–12 months later (HMRC payroll data), job quality and health.
    Continue, adapt or stop:
    Continue where sustained work beats a matched comparison; adapt or stop where it does not.
    Earlier option on this page

    This card replaces the option “Health-related employment support (Individual Placement and Support)” (operating: Connect to Work: referrals since April 2025; updated business case approved March 2026.). Its evidence: IPS is well evidenced for people with severe mental illness in secondary care. A UK randomised trial in primary and community care (9,785 people, 2018–19) found a 4 percentage point rise in working 13+ weeks in a year for out-of-work participants in the West Midlands, a smaller effect for people in work in Sheffield City Region, and none for out-of-work participants there; no earnings effect at 12 months. DWP, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report (April 2023) · DWP, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (July 2026)

    Sources

    Source published April 2023 (trials); July 2026 (business case); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: Connect to Work impact evaluation results; The next Spending Review; New trials in different populations.

    Also on: NHS, Economy, Benefits — one shared record, so its cost is counted once.

  • Action 2A65Policy status: external proposal

    Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works

    The Fair Work Agency targets inspections and arrears recovery at the sectors and employers where underpayment is most common, and measures whether underpayment falls there relative to elsewhere.

    Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

    Who decides:
    The Fair Work Agency (BIST), with HMRC delivering minimum-wage enforcement until April 2027 (UK)
    Evidence:
    Observational analysis. Underpayment is measured by survey; enforcement recovers arrears, but no evaluation of deterrence or recovery exists; evidence on wage floors themselves shows little employment loss but is a different question.
    Expected effect:
    Direction plausible; size not established.
    Cost and funding

    Not yet costed

    Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

    Why it is shortlisted here: The national work-that-pays option (Equality list), narrowed to its evidenced part: about 445,000 jobs are paid below the minimum, and enforcement has never been evaluated; targeting and testing it is the bounded change. Youth support stays with A08.

    What it takes
    The problem

    About 445,000 jobs were paid below the legal minimum in 2025, but HMRC identified arrears for 25,200 workers in 2024/25 and there is no evaluation of whether enforcement deters underpayment.

    Who is affected, and where

    Workers entitled to the National Minimum or Living Wage across the UK, starting with sectors where survey estimates show the most underpayment. Territory: UK. The minimum wage applies UK-wide; in Northern Ireland workers complain through the Labour Relations Agency. The Fair Work Agency’s remit beyond the minimum wage in Northern Ireland was not verified.

    Policy status

    Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Baseline: the National Living Wage of £12.71 from April 2026; the Fair Work Agency established on 7 April 2026; HMRC enforcement (budget £31.5m in 2024/25) and naming rounds continuing (September 2026). Targeted enforcement with an evaluation of deterrence is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

    The evidence
    What the research found:
    Underpayment was estimated at 445,000 jobs in 2025 (382,000 in 2024); HMRC identified £5.8m of arrears for 25,200 workers in 2024/25. The Low Pay Commission judges recent rises have not significantly harmed employment.
    Evaluated on:
    Jobs at or below the minimum wage in the UK (Low Pay Commission analysis of ASHE); United Kingdom, 2024–2025
    Transfer to this case:
    ASHE-based underpayment is not proven non-compliance; enforcement effects are not established.
    Our recommendation (separate from the research):
    Direct inspections at the sectors with the most estimated underpayment, publish arrears and repeat offending by sector, and compare underpayment trends in targeted sectors with others.
    Strongest counter-evidence:
    Survey estimates overstate true underpayment, and targeting may shift rather than reduce it.
    Cost and funding

    Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

      Who pays:
      Central government (BIST); employers found underpaying through arrears and penalties.
      Financing proposed:
      Within the Fair Work Agency’s budget; not identified.
      Gap remaining:
      Unknown: the Fair Work Agency’s budget and the cost of targeted inspection and evaluation.
      What delivery needs
      Skills:
      Inspectors.
      Operational capacity:
      Transfer of about 500 HMRC staff from April 2027.
      Infrastructure:
      Case and data systems.
      Permissions:
      Data sharing with HMRC.
      Law:
      Employment Rights Act 2025 enforcement powers (commenced April 2026).
      Public consent:
      None.
      First step and stages

      First step: The Fair Work Agency publishes estimated underpayment and enforcement activity by sector and sets a targeted inspection plan with a comparison of sectors not targeted. (owner: Fair Work Agency (BIST))

      1. Publish underpayment and enforcement by sector — Fair Work Agency (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      2. Target inspections — Fair Work Agency with HMRC (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
      3. Compare underpayment trends — Low Pay Commission; Fair Work Agency (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

      Depends on: Staff transfer from HMRC; ASHE underpayment estimates

      Trade-offs
      Who gains and who loses:
      Low-paid workers in sectors such as hospitality, retail and care.
      What else the money or effort could do:
      Inspector time spent on targeted sectors is not available for complaints elsewhere.
      Strongest counterargument:
      Complaint-led enforcement may find the worst cases faster.
      Risks:
      Shifting underpayment between sectors; measuring arrears rather than compliance.
      How we would judge it
      Baseline:
      2025: about 445,000 jobs paid below the minimum (LPC); 2024/25: £5.8m arrears for 25,200 workers.
      Leading indicator:
      Inspections and arrears in targeted sectors.
      Outcome:
      Estimated underpayment in targeted sectors against others.
      Continue, adapt or stop:
      Continue targeting where estimated underpayment falls faster than in other sectors.
      Sources

      Source published 2 February 2026 (LPC); 5 November 2025 (DBT enforcement); 23 October 2025 (ONS); evidence reviewed 2026-10-07. Reconsider if: The Low Pay Commission’s enforcement report (later in 2026); ONS low pay statistics for April 2026; The April 2027 minimum wage rates.

    • Action 3A73Policy status: external proposal

      Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workers

      A fast route for people already in work or starting a job, with a defined decision standard and clear employer duties, gets adjustments in place before a job is lost.

      Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

      Who decides:
      Department for Work and Pensions, with employers (Equality Act 2010 s.20 duty to make reasonable adjustments) (Great Britain)
      Evidence:
      Expert or audit recommendation. The NAO finds DWP does not know whether the scheme provides value for money and recommends building evaluation in; qualitative research describes harms from delays; no study estimates the effect of faster adjustments on staying in work.
      Expected effect:
      Direction plausible; size not established.
      Cost and funding

      Not yet costed

      Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified

      Why it is shortlisted here: The workplace-adjustments option (related to work that pays, NE2): Access to Work decisions take months and some people lose work while they wait; a decision standard for in-work cases, phased in by region, is the bounded test. It builds on the adjustments option card, which stays.

      Builds on the option Workplace adjustments and support to stay in work compared below.

      What it takes
      The problem

      Disabled people wait months for Access to Work decisions — 109 working days on average in November 2025 against a 25-day target — and some work without support, cut their hours or lose work while they wait.

      Who is affected, and where

      Disabled people in Great Britain applying to Access to Work who are in work or have a job offer, starting with those at risk of leaving work while they wait. Territory: Great Britain. Northern Ireland runs a separate Access to Work (NI) scheme through the Department for Communities; not assessed.

      Policy status

      Proposed by researchers or others, not government policy. Funded baseline: Access to Work (£320.7m on provision in 2024–25) and 480 extra case managers and caseworkers to clear the backlog by September 2027 (May 2026; restated 2 October 2026). A defined decision standard for in-work cases, tested with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy.

      The evidence
      What the research found:
      Waits of weeks to months meant working without support, temporary adjustments or reduced hours, and some self-employed applicants lost work; 62,100 applications were awaiting a decision at 31 March 2025.
      Evaluated on:
      Access to Work applicants and employers (90 applicant and 26 employer interviews); the scheme as audited; Great Britain, 2024–2026
      Our recommendation (separate from the research):
      Set a decision standard for in-work and job-start cases, publish processing times as statistics, and compare job retention at six months for fast-tracked applicants with similar applicants before the standard applies.
      Strongest counter-evidence:
      There is no counterfactual estimate that faster decisions keep people in work; much of the benefit may depend on employers, who are often unsure of their own duties.
      Cost and funding

      Cost completeness: Not yet costed. Funding: Not yet costed / funding not identified.

        Who pays:
        DWP (within its departmental budget, so overspends are met from other DWP budgets); employers for reasonable adjustments.
        Financing proposed:
        Within DWP’s administration budget; not identified.
        Gap remaining:
        Unknown: no cost per adjustment delivered or per job retained, and the cost of the 480 extra staff is not published.
        What delivery needs
        Skills:
        Assessors and case managers.
        Operational capacity:
        Backlog clearance by September 2027.
        Infrastructure:
        Case management systems that can publish processing times.
        Permissions:
        None.
        Law:
        None new.
        Public consent:
        Employer cooperation.
        First step and stages

        First step: DWP publishes processing times as official statistics and sets a decision standard for in-work and job-start cases, phased in by region so retention can be compared. (owner: DWP)

        1. Publish processing times as statistics — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
        2. Phase in the decision standard by region — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
        3. Compare job retention at six months — DWP (evaluation) (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

        Depends on: Backlog clearance; The Pathways to Work decision on the future Access to Work model

        Trade-offs
        Who gains and who loses:
        Aimed at disabled workers at risk of leaving work, including deaf and neurodivergent people who rely on support workers.
        What else the money or effort could do:
        Prioritising in-work cases could lengthen waits for others.
        Strongest counterargument:
        Employers already hold the legal duty; faster public support may substitute for adjustments employers should make.
        Risks:
        Shifting delay to other applicants; measuring decisions rather than adjustments in place.
        How we would judge it
        Baseline:
        November 2025: 109 working days average processing time against a 25-day target (NAO); disability employment gap 29.7 points in Q2 2025.
        Leading indicator:
        Working days from application to decision for in-work cases.
        Outcome:
        Share still in work six months after applying, against comparison regions.
        Continue, adapt or stop:
        Keep the standard where retention rises without longer waits for other applicants.
        Sources

        Source published 6 February 2026 (NAO); 25 June 2026 (NatCen); 19 May 2026 (DWP); evidence reviewed 2026-10-07. Reconsider if: Access to Work statistics to March 2026 (29 October 2026); The Timms and Milburn reviews; A decision on the Pathways to Work consultation.

      • Action 4A08Policy status: funded programme

        Build paid routes into work for excluded young people

        Pair paid work — a fully subsidised six-month job or a foundation apprenticeship — with preparation, travel or other tailored support and employers offering real vacancies, so that young people move into jobs or training they keep.

        Budget 2026 responds to this

        Budget 2026 funds more Youth Guarantee and apprenticeship support for young people.

        Youth Employment and SkillsSpring 2026 Youth Employment and Skills Package

        Assessment (draft, 6 October review)

        Not assessed in the 6 October review; this action stays in the topic plan with its own evidence.

        Who decides:
        DWP (Jobs Guarantee, Youth Hubs) and DfE with Skills England (apprenticeships), with employers, colleges and local delivery partners (Great Britain)
        Evidence:
        Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation. A matched comparison of Kickstart and an earlier synthesis of apprenticeship studies both find modest employment gains; neither tests the Jobs Guarantee group, who have been out of work longer.
        Expected effect:
        +11 per 100: unsubsidised employment two years after starting a subsidised job (Kickstart) (Great Britain). Evidence from Kickstart, an earlier scheme for a less disadvantaged group; the Jobs Guarantee has not been evaluated.
        Cost and funding

        £820m in total, Announced 6 December 2025; the announcement gives no years, price basis not stated by the source; 1 further cost line, some not yet costed

        Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed

        Why it is shortlisted here: Nearly one in eight young people are NEET; paid routes are funded and the question is whether they reach the right young people and lead to work that lasts.

        What it takes
        The problem

        Most young people not in education, employment or training are economically inactive rather than looking for work, and many face health or other barriers that a job offer alone does not fix.

        Who is affected, and where

        Young people aged 16–24 not in education, employment or training: 18–24-year-olds long on Universal Credit (Jobs Guarantee, Great Britain) and 16–21-year-olds starting foundation apprenticeships (England). Territory: Great Britain. The Jobs Guarantee covers Great Britain (phase one included areas in Scotland and Wales); apprenticeships are devolved, and foundation apprenticeships are England only.

        Policy status

        A funded programme already exists. The £820 million Youth Guarantee package (December 2025) funds the Jobs Guarantee: six-month paid jobs of 25 hours a week, with wages paid in full by DWP, for 18–24-year-olds who have been on Universal Credit and looking for work for 18 months. Phase one runs in six areas; the national rollout goes live later in 2026 and DWP expects to support over 90,000 young people over three years. Foundation apprenticeships for 16–21-year-olds began in England on 1 August 2025, with an employer incentive of up to £2,000. On 27 September 2026 the Burnham government said the Jobs Guarantee will be offered, on a voluntary basis, to eligible young people on health benefits from April 2027. The proposal is to match routes to barriers and judge them on sustained work — not a new scheme.

        The evidence
        What the research found:
        DWP estimates that for every 100 Kickstart participants an extra 11 were in unsubsidised employment two years later, compared with a similar group; the Exchequer recovered 27p per £1 spent at two years (£1.18 counting all benefits). The Youth Futures Foundation rates apprenticeships as having a high positive impact on employment — about 10 more young people in work per 100 at 12–24 months — but the evidence as “emerging”, the cost as high, and notes very few studies.
        Evaluated on:
        Kickstart starters aged 16–24 on Universal Credit (March 2021 to January 2022) compared with similar eligible non-starters; young NEET apprentices in mainly international studies.; Great Britain, 2021–2024 (Kickstart); international studies (apprenticeships)
        Transfer to this case:
        Jobs Guarantee participants have been on Universal Credit for 18 months — a harder-to-help group than most Kickstart starters.
        Our recommendation (separate from the research):
        Segment young people by barrier, recruit employers with real vacancies before commissioning places, and judge each route on sustained work or learning 6–12 months after support ends.
        Strongest counter-evidence:
        Subsidised jobs can displace unsubsidised hiring and favour the young people easiest to help; apprenticeship evidence is thin and covers employment only, not education, training or wellbeing.
        Effects on record
        • Unsubsidised employment two years after starting a subsidised job (Kickstart): +11 per 100 (a matched group of eligible young people who did not start a placement; Starts March 2021 to January 2022; outcomes at two years; Matched comparison, not randomised; no interval in the executive summary). evaluated, moderate confidence; Great Britain. Evidence from Kickstart, an earlier scheme for a less disadvantaged group; the Jobs Guarantee has not been evaluated.
        • Employment 12–24 months after an apprenticeship (NEET young people): Direction plausible; size not established. evaluated, limited confidence; International studies. The toolkit reports about 10 more in work per 100 but rates the evidence “emerging” from few studies, so no size is plotted here.
        Cost and funding

        Cost completeness: Published programme envelope; project costs still needed. Funding: Programme funding exists; project allocation unconfirmed.

        • Youth Guarantee package (programme envelope), including the Jobs Guarantee (recurring spending; paid by central government): £820m in total, Announced 6 December 2025; the announcement gives no years, price basis not stated by the source. A package total covering several strands, not the cost of a sustained job. Jobs Guarantee national rollout grants are £2,150–£2,650 per participant for support on top of the wage subsidy (DWP grant guidance, June 2026). The same guidance’s ministerial foreword says a further £1bn was added in March 2026 over the spending review period (youth employment programmes with the Growth and Skills Levy: £2.5bn over three years); it is not added to this record because no Jobs Guarantee budget line or years are published (P-DWP-NJG-GUIDANCE-2026, foreword).
        • Support beyond the grant: travel, health support, employer supervision and evaluation (recurring spending; paid by central government, employers, households): Not yet costed. Employer supervision time and young people’s travel costs are real costs not covered by the subsidy.
        • Youth Guarantee package (£820m): £820m — not committed (programme envelope, not a project award). Not an award to any local route.
        Who pays:
        DWP (wage subsidy and support grants); employers (supervision, and wages after the subsidy ends); the apprenticeship budget and employers for apprenticeships; young people (travel and time).
        Financing proposed:
        Youth Guarantee funding; the apprenticeship budget and employer incentives.
        Gap remaining:
        Unknown: the £820 million package has no published years or cost per sustained job, and support beyond the grant (travel, health, supervision) is not costed.
        What delivery needs
        Skills:
        Work coaches, employer liaison staff and mentors.
        Operational capacity:
        Enough employers offering real jobs and training places.
        Infrastructure:
        Transport to work, especially in rural areas.
        Permissions:
        None.
        Law:
        None.
        Public consent:
        Voluntary participation; employers willing to take part.
        First step and stages

        First step: Segment young people by barrier and recruit employers with real vacancies before commissioning places. (owner: DWP and local delivery partners, with DfE)

        1. Evaluate phase one against a comparison group — DWP (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
        2. National rollout with delivery partners — DWP and delivery partners (proposed stage, not an official timetable)
        3. Track sustained work and learning at 6 and 12 months — DWP and DfE (payroll and education records) (proposed stage, not an official timetable)

        Depends on: Employer demand for young recruits; Health support for young people with conditions (A09)

        Trade-offs
        Who gains and who loses:
        Gains for young people long out of work; employers receive subsidised labour; the young people furthest from work may not be reached by a job offer.
        What else the money or effort could do:
        Money spent on the longest-unemployed is not spent on earlier prevention or on health support.
        Strongest counterargument:
        Subsidised placements add modestly and may displace other hires; many NEET young people need health or caring support before a job.
        Risks:
        Cream-skimming, poor-quality placements, displacement of unsubsidised jobs and counting starts as success.
        How we would judge it
        Baseline:
        NEET rate, 16–24 (ONS NEET Table 1).
        Leading indicator:
        Starts, and the share still in the job or apprenticeship at six months.
        Outcome:
        Unsubsidised work or learning 12 months after support ends, against a comparison group; earnings and wellbeing.
        Continue, adapt or stop:
        Expand routes whose participants beat a comparison group at 12 months; redesign or stop those whose participants return to Universal Credit at the same rate.
        Earlier option on this page

        This card replaces the option “Sustained youth pathways: guaranteed jobs, training and early support” (funded: Youth Guarantee package of £820 million announced December 2025. Jobs Guarantee phase one in six areas from spring 2026 (none in Hampshire); national rollout later in 2026, expected to support over 90,000 young people over three years (DWP, updated September 2026).). Its evidence: The closest UK evaluation is Kickstart (2020–22, subsidised six-month jobs for 16–24-year-olds on Universal Credit): DWP estimated that for every 100 participants an extra 11 were in unsubsidised work two years later. The new Jobs Guarantee targets a harder-to-help group (18 months on Universal Credit) and has not yet been evaluated. DWP, Kickstart Scheme: a quantitative impact assessment (October 2024) · DWP, Jobs Guarantee grant guidance (updated September 2026) · DWP and DfE, Almost a million young people to benefit from expanded support (December 2025)

        Sources

        Source published 7 October 2024 (Kickstart); 6 December 2025 (Youth Guarantee); 16 September 2026 (Jobs Guarantee page); evidence reviewed 2026-10-04. Reconsider if: A Jobs Guarantee evaluation; Updated Youth Futures Foundation apprenticeship evidence; A new Spending Review settlement for youth employment.

      How the options are assessed

      One shared record per option — the same one the national plan reads. Delivery risk, gate and list membership are separate judgements.

      • Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
      • Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
      • Employer-linked shortage training beyond construction — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending
      • Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workers — Amber delivery RAG; gate pending

      Provisional single-reviewer assessments from the 6 October 2026 review; not approved business cases, and not government policy.

      • A09Delivery risk: AmberGate: pending

        Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare

        Existing action A09, assessed at the same scope.

        Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

        Who and where
        Adults with health conditions or disabilities who want to work, in England and Wales. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: England and Wales.
        Result so far
        Range if completed: 17.0–20.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co))
        Funded now (baseline)
        Connect to Work has taken referrals since April 2025 and aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029/30; IPS also operates in NHS mental health services. The proposal here is to hold it to fidelity and integrate it with care, not to start something new. (from the action record)
        The change assessed (marginal)
        Fidelity reviews, NHS integration and an impact evaluation inside Connect to Work. (from the superseded 4 October selection table)
        What the evidence supports—and the next decision

        Evidence for supported employment is relevant, but it does not establish the additional effect of improving an already commissioned service.

        AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

        Define the change
        Select a Connect to Work delivery area with a documented fidelity or NHS referral gap. Compare the specified improvement with its funded delivery plan.
        Test whether it works
        Sustained employment and earnings at 6 and 12 months, health and participant experience; compare eligible participants offered the improvement with a credible comparison group. Record who never enters the service.
        Establish the cost
        Additional employment-specialist, clinical and supervision hours × loaded rates, plus data and evaluation. Deduct only costs genuinely displaced; never count the whole programme award as a new cost or saving.
        Protect against harm
        Participation stays voluntary. Monitor selection of easier cases, job quality and health deterioration.

        Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

        Full assessment of Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
        The ten criteria (0–3)

        Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

        1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

          Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

        2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

          Reviewer’s reason: Specify cohort and voluntary offer; secure clinical referrals, trained employment specialists, employer links and linked-data evaluation. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

        3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

          Reviewer’s reason: Trials exist, but effects differ by setting; pooled out-of-work groups showed no employment impact. Do not infer a uniform national growth effect.

        4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)1 of 3 — Small

          Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

          Reason and score disagree — under review

        5. Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards

          Reviewer’s reason: Clinical displacement; unsuitable pressure to work; variable fidelity.

        6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

          Reviewer’s reason: Cost integration, staff caseloads, clinical time, data and follow-up against commissioned provision.

        7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

          Reviewer’s reason: Specify cohort and voluntary offer; secure clinical referrals, trained employment specialists, employer links and linked-data evaluation.

        8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

          Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

        9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

          Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Sustained employment, earnings, health and wellbeing versus a comparator.

        10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

          Reviewer’s reason: DWP, health commissioners and local employment partners; Targeted delivery and evaluation

        Four weightings

        Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

        • Equal weights: Range if completed: 17.0–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 16.4–19.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 18.2–20.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 18.9–18.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: incremental affordability (Co). The missing criteria carry no weight here, so the ends meet; the record is still incomplete. Funding gate: not passed.

        Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

        Delivery risk and gate

        Delivery risk shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

        Review’s reason: Cost integration, staff caseloads, clinical time, data and follow-up against commissioned provision.

        Why it is not Green yet

        • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
        • No verified owner with the powers in place.
        • Delivery capacity not verified.
        • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
        • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
        • Safeguards not specified.
        • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

        Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

        Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

        Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

        The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

        Cost and funding

        Lifetime costing: Partial — some lines costed, no whole-life total. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

        • Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29 (complete for scope; C-CTW-2025-29)
        • Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32 (complete for scope; C-CTW-2029-32)
        • NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS (not costed; C-A09-NHS)

        Still to cost: Cost integration, staff caseloads, clinical time, data and follow-up against commissioned provision.

        Funding status: indicative costing or partial funding.

        Owner, powers and capacity

        Proposed owner: DWP, health commissioners and local employment partners (proposed, unverified).

        Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

        Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

        England:
        DWP and local authority delivery areas (Connect to Work), with NHS commissioners (action record)
        Scotland:
        not assessed
        Wales:
        DWP and local authority delivery areas (Connect to Work), with NHS commissioners (action record)
        Northern Ireland:
        not assessed

        Connect to Work covers England and Wales; Scotland and Northern Ireland run their own employment support.

        Dependencies, safeguards and risks

        Depends on: None recorded.

        Safeguards

        None specified yet.

        Risks and residual harms: Clinical displacement; unsuitable pressure to work; variable fidelity.

        Monitoring and measured results

        Metric: Sustained employment, earnings, health and wellbeing versus a comparator.

        Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

        Measures already on the domain page

        A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

        Evidence for the outcome

        Outcome: Sustained employment, earnings, health and wellbeing versus a comparator.

        Trials exist, but effects differ by setting; pooled out-of-work groups showed no employment impact. Do not infer a uniform national growth effect.

        Sources: gov.uk (not yet in the source register)

        Effect records for this action

        • Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants): +4 percentage points (22% vs 18%) (evaluated, moderate confidence; West Midlands Combined Authority)
        • Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (people in work but struggling): +3 percentage points (evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region)
        • Self-reported health (EQ-5D-5L) at 12 months: +0.10 standard deviations (evaluated, limited confidence; Sheffield City Region)
        Review record

        Assessment status: Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

        Reviewer: Original assessment author (name not supplied). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

        Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

        First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Specify cohort and voluntary offer; secure clinical referrals, trained employment specialists, employer links and linked-data evaluation. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

        Decision route: Targeted delivery and evaluation

        An earlier assessment exists on the 4 October 2026 selection table (nine H/M/L bands; superseded 7 October 2026). Its bands are kept, not converted into these scores.

        An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

      • A65Delivery risk: AmberGate: pending

        Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works

        Existing action A65, assessed at the same scope.

        Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

        Who and where
        Workers entitled to the National Minimum or Living Wage across the UK, starting with sectors where survey estimates show the most underpayment. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: UK.
        Result so far
        Range if completed: 14.0–23.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
        Funded now (baseline)
        Baseline: the National Living Wage of £12.71 from April 2026; the Fair Work Agency established on 7 April 2026; HMRC enforcement (budget £31.5m in 2024/25) and naming rounds continuing (September 2026). Targeted enforcement with an evaluation of deterrence is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy. (from the action record)
        The change assessed (marginal)
        Marginal change not yet defined
        What the evidence supports—and the next decision

        Wages, hours, security and in-work support are separate levers; higher gross pay alone does not establish higher disposable income.

        AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

        Define the change
        Choose a specific employment-standard, enforcement or support change beyond the current legal and funded baseline.
        Test whether it works
        Disposable income, hours, job retention, security and employer adjustment; report by household type and region.
        Establish the cost
        Enforcement and support budgets, employer costs, prices, tax and benefit interactions, with employment-response scenarios.
        Protect against harm
        Watch reduced hours, informal work and loss of opportunities for vulnerable workers; retain accessible redress.

        Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

        Full assessment of Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
        The ten criteria (0–3)

        Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

        1. Scale and severity (Sc)3 of 3 — Severe harm across a broad population

          Reviewer’s reason: Provisional problem-importance judgement from linked site pages; not the scale of achievable benefit.

        2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)Not yet assessed

          Reviewer’s reason: Separate wage-floor/enforcement, progression and targeted youth support; specify increment and monitor hours and access. A missing rating requires a defined marginal change.

        3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

          Reviewer’s reason: Minimum-wage and Kickstart evidence address different policies. Existing Youth Guarantee funding cannot settle the additionality of all three.

        4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

          Reviewer’s reason: Unknown unless a reasonably defined target-population benefit can be judged; no bonus merely for spanning domains.

        5. Residual harms (Hm)1 of 3 — Material harm/unresolved mitigation

          Reviewer’s reason: Reduced hours/hiring in some settings; displacement; inappropriate generalisation.

        6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

          Reviewer’s reason: Employer costs and incidence, enforcement, support programme costs and fiscal effects by option.

        7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

          Reviewer’s reason: Separate wage-floor/enforcement, progression and targeted youth support; specify increment and monitor hours and access.

        8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

          Reviewer’s reason: Provisional distribution judgement for the stated target; verify who pays, who gains and excluded groups.

        9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

          Reviewer’s reason: First meaningful outcome, not announcement: Hourly and weekly pay, hours, sustained employment and progression.

        10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

          Reviewer’s reason: Employment departments, employers, enforcement bodies and skills partners; Split pay, progression and youth support

        Four weightings

        Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

        • Equal weights: Range if completed: 14.0–23.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 13.6–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 15.5–23.6 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 15.6–22.2 out of 30. Not yet assessed: increment beyond baseline (Ad), expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

        Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

        Delivery risk and gate

        Delivery risk shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

        Review’s reason: Employer costs and incidence, enforcement, support programme costs and fiscal effects by option.

        Why it is not Green yet

        • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
        • No verified owner with the powers in place.
        • Delivery capacity not verified.
        • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
        • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
        • Safeguards not specified.
        • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

        Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

        Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending: incomplete appraisal”).

        Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

        The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

        Cost and funding

        Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Full incremental costing not established in reviewed material”.

        Still to cost: Employer costs and incidence, enforcement, support programme costs and fiscal effects by option.

        Funding status: not identified.

        Owner, powers and capacity

        Proposed owner: Employment departments, employers, enforcement bodies and skills partners (proposed, unverified).

        Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: unverified.

        Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

        England:
        The Fair Work Agency (BIST), with HMRC delivering minimum-wage enforcement until April 2027 (action record)
        Scotland:
        The Fair Work Agency (BIST), with HMRC delivering minimum-wage enforcement until April 2027 (action record)
        Wales:
        The Fair Work Agency (BIST), with HMRC delivering minimum-wage enforcement until April 2027 (action record)
        Northern Ireland:
        The Fair Work Agency (BIST), with HMRC delivering minimum-wage enforcement until April 2027 (action record)

        The minimum wage applies UK-wide; in Northern Ireland workers complain through the Labour Relations Agency. The Fair Work Agency’s remit beyond the minimum wage in Northern Ireland was not verified.

        Dependencies, safeguards and risks

        Depends on: None recorded.

        Safeguards

        None specified yet.

        Risks and residual harms: Reduced hours/hiring in some settings; displacement; inappropriate generalisation.

        Monitoring and measured results

        Metric: Hourly and weekly pay, hours, sustained employment and progression.

        Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

        Measures already on the domain page

        A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

        Evidence for the outcome

        Outcome: Hourly and weekly pay, hours, sustained employment and progression.

        Minimum-wage and Kickstart evidence address different policies. Existing Youth Guarantee funding cannot settle the additionality of all three.

        Review record

        Assessment status: Provisional single-reviewer assessment; not an approved business case.

        Reviewer: Original assessment author (name not supplied). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

        Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

        First 90 days (review): Produce a signed scope and current-delivery baseline; Separate wage-floor/enforcement, progression and targeted youth support; specify increment and monitor hours and access. Obtain incremental costs and an accountable decision before expansion.

        Decision route: Split pay, progression and youth support

        An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

      • A68Delivery risk: AmberGate: pending

        Employer-linked shortage training beyond construction

        Proposed new action A68; sourced research home and appraisal design; scope and funding remain provisional.

        Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.

        Who and where
        Appraise a defined adult or technical training cohort with employer placements in a verified non-construction shortage. (from the 6 October review) Jurisdiction: not defined.
        Result so far
        Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
        Funded now (baseline)
        Funded baseline not yet stated
        The change assessed (marginal)
        Appraise a defined adult or technical training cohort with employer placements in a verified non-construction shortage. (from the 6 October review)
        What the evidence supports—and the next decision

        Training effects vary with participants, course quality and employer demand; shortage forecasts do not prove a course works.

        AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

        Define the change
        Define a non-construction occupation, eligible cohort, recognised qualification and employer placement beyond existing provision.
        Test whether it works
        Completion, sustained employment and earnings against comparable eligible non-participants; follow those who leave early.
        Establish the cost
        Tuition, trainers, equipment, trainee support and employer time, including deadweight and displacement.
        Protect against harm
        Avoid selection of only the easiest applicants; verify genuine vacancies and prevent unpaid labour replacing paid jobs.

        Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

        Full assessment of Employer-linked shortage training beyond construction: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
        The ten criteria (0–3)

        Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

        1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

        2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

        3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        5. Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards

        6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        7. Delivery capacity (Ca)1 of 3 — Binding scarce resource

        8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

        9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

        Four weightings

        Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

        • Equal weights: Range if completed: 15.0–21.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 14.5–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 15.5–20.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 16.7–20.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

        Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

        Delivery risk and gate

        Delivery risk shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

        Review’s reason: Specify sector, cohort, placement and recognised completion; cost tuition, trainee support, employer time, trainers and evaluation. Track earnings and sustained employment. Proposed owners: skills bodies, colleges and employers.

        Why it is not Green yet

        • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
        • No verified owner with the powers in place.
        • Delivery capacity not verified.
        • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
        • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
        • Safeguards not specified.
        • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

        Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

        Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending baseline verification, incremental costing and funding; not a rollout approval”).

        Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

        The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

        Cost and funding

        Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Not fully costed in this review”.

        Still to cost: Specify sector, cohort, placement and recognised completion; cost tuition, trainee support, employer time, trainers and evaluation. Track earnings and sustained employment. Proposed owners: skills bodies, colleges and employers.

        Funding status: not established in review.

        Owner, powers and capacity

        Proposed owner: skills bodies, colleges and employers (proposed, unverified).

        Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: binding constraint.

        Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

        England:
        not assessed
        Scotland:
        not assessed
        Wales:
        not assessed
        Northern Ireland:
        not assessed

        Not defined in the review.

        Dependencies, safeguards and risks

        Depends on: None recorded.

        Safeguards

        None specified yet.

        Monitoring and measured results

        Metric: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

        Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

        Evidence for the outcome

        Outcome: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

        Training reviews find mixed results; employer involvement is promising, but no specific new programme or transferable benefit estimate is established.

        Sources: whatworksgrowth.org (not yet in the source register)

        Review record

        Assessment status: Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.

        Reviewer: Original assessment author (name not supplied). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

        Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

        An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

      • A73Delivery risk: AmberGate: pending

        Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workers

        Existing action A73, assessed at the same scope.

        Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.

        Who and where
        Disabled people in Great Britain applying to Access to Work who are in work or have a job offer, starting with those at risk of leaving work while they wait. (from the action record) Jurisdiction: Great Britain.
        Result so far
        Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30 (equal weights; not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co))
        Funded now (baseline)
        Funded baseline: Access to Work (£320.7m on provision in 2024–25) and 480 extra case managers and caseworkers to clear the backlog by September 2027 (May 2026; restated 2 October 2026). A defined decision standard for in-work cases, tested with a comparison, is a UK Facts proposal, not government policy. (from the action record)
        The change assessed (marginal)
        Test a defined assessment-to-adjustment improvement for workers facing verified delays, distinguishing employer duties from public support. (from the 6 October review)
        What the evidence supports—and the next decision

        Access to Work research identifies service experience and gaps; the effect of shortening a particular delay needs direct evaluation.

        AI-assisted analytical follow-up · 8 October 2026. Proposed appraisal design; the attributed scores below are unchanged. No funding or delivery agreement is implied.

        Define the change
        Specify the assessment-to-adjustment bottleneck for a defined worker group, distinguishing employer duties from public support.
        Test whether it works
        Time to a usable adjustment, job retention, worker experience and access against the existing pathway.
        Establish the cost
        Assessors, equipment, support, employer contributions and administration, including replacement and renewal.
        Protect against harm
        Do not substitute public support for employer obligations; protect consent, privacy and accessible appeals.

        Read with the outcome evidence and sources in the full assessment. Monitoring proposals are not existing baseline measurements. A numerical benefit or cost score needs evidence for the defined increment, not just the scale of the problem.

        Full assessment of Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workers: ten criteria, scenarios, delivery, costs and monitoring
        The ten criteria (0–3)

        Each criterion is scored 0 to 3 by the reviewer. “Not yet assessed” means unknown: it is never counted as zero.

        1. Scale and severity (Sc)2 of 3 — Serious harm to a defined group or widespread moderate harm

        2. Increment beyond baseline (Ad)2 of 3 — Specific material change to existing delivery

        3. Confidence in the proposed action (Ev)1 of 3 — Indirect, mixed, modelled or weak causal support

        4. Expected incremental benefit (Bn)Not yet assessed

        5. Residual harms (Hm)2 of 3 — Manageable harm with specified safeguards

        6. Incremental affordability (Co)Not yet assessed

        7. Delivery capacity (Ca)2 of 3 — Stretched but plausibly obtainable

        8. Distribution (Fa)3 of 3 — Benefits concentrated on disadvantaged people with assessed burdens

        9. Meaningful first outcome (Ti)2 of 3 — More than one and up to three years

        10. Readiness (Rd)2 of 3 — Named commissioning/allocation/coordination step

        Four weightings

        Normalised as 10 × weighted sum ÷ sum of weights, on a 0–30 scale. Where a criterion is not yet assessed, the range is the lowest and highest result if it were later scored 0 or 3 — not a score, a confidence interval or a rank.

        • Equal weights: Range if completed: 16.0–22.0 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Evidence doubled: Range if completed: 15.5–20.9 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Scale doubled: Range if completed: 16.4–21.8 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.
        • Cost ignored (the funding gate still applies): Range if completed: 17.8–21.1 out of 30. Not yet assessed: expected incremental benefit (Bn), incremental affordability (Co). Funding gate: not passed.

        Funding gate: Not passed — the cost is not yet assessed or no allocation is committed for this scope. Ignoring cost in a weighting never removes the gate.

        Delivery risk and gate

        Delivery risk shown: AmberReview’s claim: Amber. Best the recorded evidence allows: Amber.

        Review’s reason: Audit delays and current legal/service baseline; cost assessors, adjustments, employer contributions and administration. Measure retention, access and worker experience. Proposed owners: DWP, employers and support providers.

        Why it is not Green yet

        • Scope (population, place and increment) not verified against the delivery baseline.
        • No verified owner with the powers in place.
        • Delivery capacity not verified.
        • Lifetime incremental costs not complete.
        • No credible funding (a committed allocation for the scope).
        • Safeguards not specified.
        • Monitoring lacks a metric, a data source or a baseline.

        Green needs verified scope, a verified owner with the powers, verified capacity, complete lifetime costs with credible funding, specified safeguards and monitoring with a metric, source and baseline. Amber means appraisal gaps remain; Red means a material delivery obstacle. Red does not mean unimportant.

        Gate: Pending — appraisal incomplete (review label: “Pending baseline verification, incremental costing and funding; not a rollout approval”).

        Why: Scores incomplete; Funding gate not passed (cost unknown or no credible funding).

        The gate is separate from national list membership: being listed does not make an option eligible, and an eligible option need not be listed.

        Cost and funding

        Lifetime costing: Not established. Review: “Not fully costed in this review”.

        Still to cost: Audit delays and current legal/service baseline; cost assessors, adjustments, employer contributions and administration. Measure retention, access and worker experience. Proposed owners: DWP, employers and support providers.

        Funding status: not identified.

        Owner, powers and capacity

        Proposed owner: DWP, employers and support providers (proposed, unverified).

        Powers: needs a decision or allocation. Capacity: unverified.

        Powers and capacity read from the review’s Rd and Ca anchors; no proposed owner has agreed to act (the review: “Proposed owners have not agreed to act”).

        England:
        Department for Work and Pensions, with employers (Equality Act 2010 s.20 duty to make reasonable adjustments) (action record)
        Scotland:
        Department for Work and Pensions, with employers (Equality Act 2010 s.20 duty to make reasonable adjustments) (action record)
        Wales:
        Department for Work and Pensions, with employers (Equality Act 2010 s.20 duty to make reasonable adjustments) (action record)
        Northern Ireland:
        not assessed

        Northern Ireland runs a separate Access to Work (NI) scheme through the Department for Communities; not assessed.

        Dependencies, safeguards and risks

        Depends on: None recorded.

        Safeguards

        None specified yet.

        Monitoring and measured results

        Metric: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

        Data source: Not yet named. Baseline: Not yet established.

        Measures already on the domain page

        A page measure is not necessarily the review’s metric; linking the two is an editorial decision still to be made.

        Evidence for the outcome

        Outcome: Define and baseline the outcome described in delivery requirements before approval.

        DWP research describes Access to Work and evaluation challenges; it is not a causal estimate of this process improvement. This narrow proposal does not exhaust disability or gender equality.

        Sources: gov.uk (not yet in the source register)

        Review record

        Assessment status: Not stated in the review record; treated as a provisional single-reviewer assessment, not an approved business case.

        Reviewer: Original assessment author (name not supplied). Reviewed: 6 October 2026.

        Scored in the working review of 6 October 2026 on the shared ten-criterion scale (one reviewer); not independently calibrated.

        An editorial screening framework by one reviewer, not a formal appraisal or business case. Proposed owners have not agreed to act.

      Decision briefs

      • Run Connect to Work to the tested model, side by side with NHS care, and test whether it works
      • Match each young person out of work to the paid route that fits their barrier — and judge every route on work still held a year later

      The leading option set out as a decision someone could take: who decides, who benefits, the best evidence, cost and funding, and the main trade-off. The full research record is one click away.

      Decision briefExisting programmeReviewed 2026-10-04

      Run Connect to Work to the tested model, side by side with NHS care, and test whether it works

      Decision required
      Whether DWP and NHS commissioners add fidelity reviews, NHS referral routes and a payroll-data impact evaluation to Connect to Work, starting in one delivery area.
      Who and where
      Adults with health conditions or disabilities who want to work. Applies in: England and Wales.
      Accountable body
      Department for Work and Pensions
      Intervention
      Place employment specialists alongside health services, with rapid job search and support once in work, to the IPS model.
      Best evidence, and where it applies
      UK randomised trials of 9,785 people found modest, place-varying effects: +4 points working 13+ weeks in the West Midlands, none for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region.Studied in: 9,785 people with health conditions, in and out of work, in the West Midlands and Sheffield City Region (Trials 2018–2019, outcomes at 12 months).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Norway — partial.
      Extra cost of this change
      Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Connect to Work programme, 2025–26 to 2028–29 — £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices; Connect to Work after 2028–29 — £134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices; NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision — Not yet costed.One-off or mixed: Fidelity reviews and impact evaluation — not yet established.
      Funding
      Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: none identified.Unfunded: The NHS-side and evaluation costs are not established; Connect to Work’s committed money pays for the existing programme only, and 2029–30 onwards is not committed.
      Savings and wider benefits
      Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
      First 90-day step
      One delivery area agrees referral routes, a fidelity standard and a payroll-data comparison.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: DWP with the integrated care board. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
      Twelve-month milestone
      Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Fidelity and referral data within six months; sustained-work results 12 to 18 months after starts.
      Outcome, and when to scale or stop
      Measure: Fidelity scores and referrals from NHS services.Scale if: Sustained work beats the comparison once fidelity is confirmed.Stop if: No difference from the comparison after fidelity is confirmed.
      Main trade-off
      NHS staff time is drawn from other care, and the effect per person is modest.
      Source and review date
      Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report (April 2023). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

      An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A09 · effects E-A09-WORK-WMCA, E-A09-WORK-SCR, E-A09-HEALTH · costs C-CTW-2025-29, C-CTW-2029-32, C-A09-NHS

      Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

      1.The change, in plain words

      Run Connect to Work to the tested model, side by side with NHS care, and test whether it works

      2.The decision requested

      Decision
      In one delivery area first, agree the eligible group, an IPS fidelity standard, NHS referral routes and a payroll-data comparison; then fund the NHS side explicitly and decide on Connect to Work after 2028–29 using the results.
      Accountable institution
      Department for Work and Pensions
      Geography
      England and Wales
      Powers
      Existing powers: DWP grant agreements with delivery areas; NHS commissioning by integrated care boards.
      Delivery partners
      NHS England and integrated care boards; Connect to Work delivery areas (local authorities); Welsh Government and Welsh local authorities; HMRC (payroll data for evaluation)

      3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

      Target population
      Adults with health conditions or disabilities who want to work.
      Eligibility
      Connect to Work’s existing eligibility; the trial evidence is strongest for people referred through health services.
      Scale
      Connect to Work aims to support about 300,000 people by 2029–30; the change starts in one area and scales with fidelity.
      Baseline
      2.74 million people aged 16–64 were economically inactive because of long-term sickness (three months to Aug 2026, UK).

      Source: Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey: economically inactive because of long-term sickness, 16–64 (Series LF69); Department for Work and Pensions, Connect to Work: Programme Business Case 2 summary (Section 3.1)

      Change beyond existing law or funding
      Connect to Work’s funding pays for the programme; it does not pay for NHS-side integration, fidelity reviews or an impact evaluation — the change proposed here.

      4.How it would work

      Do: Place employment specialists alongside health services, with rapid job search and support once in work, to the IPS model. Changing: More people with health conditions start and keep matched paid work.

      • Working 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants, West Midlands)

        Measured for this interventionEffect record E-A09-WORK-WMCA

        +4 points in one trial area; none for the equivalent group in Sheffield City Region.

      • Working 13 or more weeks (people in work but struggling, Sheffield City Region)

        Measured for this interventionEffect record E-A09-WORK-SCR

        +3 points; weaker evidence.

      • Self-reported health at 12 months

        Measured for this interventionEffect record E-A09-HEALTH

        Gains in one area only; not counted as a supported benefit.

      Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

      5.Best evidence

      • Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report

        Author or institution:
        Department for Work and Pensions (Health-led Employment Trials evaluation synthesis)
        Published:
        April 2023
        Evaluation period:
        Trials 2018–2019, outcomes at 12 months
        Design:
        Randomised controlled trials in two areas
        Sample or population:
        9,785 people with health conditions, in and out of work, in the West Midlands and Sheffield City Region
        Effect and uncertainty:
        +4 points (West Midlands, out of work); +3 points (Sheffield, in work); none for Sheffield out of work; no earnings effect at 12 months
        Limits:
        Modest, place-varying effects; Exchequer return within a year about 1–2p per £1

        Where: Synthesis report Table 2.1. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

      6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

      Closest feasible alternative
      Lighter-touch employment support reaching more people for the same money; or paid placements for young people (A08), with a stronger measured effect for a different group.
      Strongest counter-evidence
      One of three trial groups saw no employment effect, and there was no earnings effect at 12 months.

      Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Health-led Employment Trials: evaluation synthesis report (Synthesis report Table 2.1)

      Distributional effects
      Gains for people with health conditions who want to work; people not ready for work must not be pressured.
      Main downside
      NHS clinical time is taken from other care, and benefits per person are modest.

      The options compared, including current policy

      • The proposal

        Add fidelity, NHS integration and an impact evaluation

        Who is reached
        People with health conditions referred through the NHS
        Evidence
        UK RCTs; Norway RCT for mental illness
        Likely outcome and timing
        Modest gains in sustained work within 12–18 months
        Cost and funding
        Incremental cost not established; route via ICBs and DWP
        Main trade-off
        NHS clinician time
      • Current policy

        Current policy: Connect to Work as funded

        Who is reached
        About 300,000 people by 2029–30
        Evidence
        No impact evaluation yet
        Likely outcome and timing
        Unknown effect
        Cost and funding
        Committed to 2028–29
        Main trade-off
        Fidelity and integration may drift at scale
      • Alternative

        Lighter-touch support for more people

        Who is reached
        More people, less intensively
        Evidence
        Not reviewed here
        Likely outcome and timing
        Unknown
        Cost and funding
        Within existing budgets
        Main trade-off
        Departs from the tested model

      7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

      Country lesson · Norway, Trial published 2019

      Individual Placement and Support inside Norway’s welfare system

      Evidence: Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluationPartial match: some conditions differ

      What was changed
      Individual Placement and Support delivered to the manual — an employment specialist in the treatment team, rapid job search for paid work and continued support in work — against high-quality usual care.
      Study design and population
      Randomised controlled multicentre trial; employment from national registry data. 410 people struggling to work because of moderate-to-severe mental illness.
      Measured outcome there
      Competitive employment 37.4% against 27.1% at 18 months (36.6% against 27.1% at 12 months), with better mental health and quality of life.
      Cost status
      Not reported in the abstract read; no cost transfer to the UK is made.
      What failed or remains uncertain
      Only the abstract was read; nearly two thirds of the IPS group were not in competitive work at 18 months; results are for a mental-illness population.
      Why the UK differs
      Norway has stronger job protection and a different benefit system; Connect to Work serves a broader group with physical and mental conditions, and UK trials found smaller, place-varying effects.
      First change required here
      Put the employment specialist inside NHS teams with fidelity reviews, and use registry (HMRC payroll) data to compare outcomes, as Norway did.

      Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health, A randomized controlled multicenter trial of individual placement and support for patients with moderate-to-severe mental illness (Abstract). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

      8.What delivery needs first

      • staff — NHS clinicians’ time for referral and joint working. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Integrated care boards)
      • data — Lawful data sharing with HMRC payroll data for a comparison. (Requirement; owner: DWP with HMRC)
      • staff — Trained employment specialists and fidelity reviewers. (Requirement; owner: Delivery areas)

      9.What it would cost

      How the cost is built up: Existing Connect to Work programme (funded) + NHS integration per area + fidelity reviews + impact evaluation. Only the last three are the proposal.

      • Connect to Work programme, 2025–26 to 2028–29

        England and Wales

        £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-CTW-2025-29)

        recurring; price year not stated; 2025–26 to 2028–29; Current quoted cost

        The existing programme; not the incremental change.

      • Connect to Work after 2028–29

        England and Wales

        £134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices (ledger C-CTW-2029-32)

        recurring; price year not stated; 2029–30 to 2031–32; Current quoted cost

      • NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision

        NHS side, per delivery area

        Not yet costed (ledger C-A09-NHS)

        recurring; price year not stated; From the first area; Not yet established

      • Fidelity reviews and impact evaluation

        First delivery area, then national

        Not yet established per evaluation

        one-off revenue; price year not stated; Two years; Not yet established

      10.Who pays, and what is missing

      Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
      None identified
      Allocation committed to this change
      None
      Remaining gap
      The NHS-side and evaluation costs are not established; Connect to Work’s committed money pays for the existing programme only, and 2029–30 onwards is not committed.
      Proposed financing
      NHS integration from integrated care boards’ commissioning budgets; evaluation from DWP’s Connect to Work evaluation budget.
      Responsible payer
      central government, NHS
      Budget displaced
      NHS community and mental-health services; other employment support.

      Committed money exists for the existing programme (Autumn Budget 2024 and Spending Review 2025 settlements for Connect to Work), but it does not pay for the change proposed here.

      11.First milestone and time to a useful result

      One delivery area agrees referral routes, a fidelity standard and a payroll-data comparison. (Owner: DWP with the integrated care board. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

      Time to first useful result: Fidelity and referral data within six months; sustained-work results 12 to 18 months after starts.

      What could delay it: NHS teams can release clinician time. Data-sharing agreements with HMRC are in place before starts.

      12.How we would know

      Baseline
      Share of participants in paid work at entry; inactivity through long-term sickness in the area.
      Comparison
      A matched comparison or phased roll-out between areas, using HMRC payroll data.
      Leading indicator
      Fidelity scores and referrals from NHS services.
      Follow-up
      Sustained work 6–12 months after starting.
      Continue if
      Sustained work beats the comparison once fidelity is confirmed.
      Adapt if
      Fidelity is low or referrals come mainly from outside the NHS; adjust the model or the eligible group.
      Stop if
      No difference from the comparison after fidelity is confirmed.
      Thresholds
      Not yet set: From DWP’s evaluation design and power calculation for Connect to Work.

      What is not yet known, and how to find out

      • What does NHS integration cost per area? (cost)Next step: Cost clinician time and supervision in the first area.Scope: NHS referral, joint working and supervision per delivery area · Data or quotes needed: Time-use data from the first area; ICB staff costs · Who can estimate it: The integrated care board with DWP
      • Does Connect to Work at scale reproduce the trial effects? (effect)Next step: A payroll-data comparison from the first areas.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery

      Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: ONS UK labour market: October 2026 (economic inactivity, long-term sickness) (20 October 2026) or the first trigger: Connect to Work programme statistics or the first evaluation report.

      Decision briefExisting programmeReviewed 2026-10-04

      Match each young person out of work to the paid route that fits their barrier — and judge every route on work still held a year later

      Decision required
      In one Jobs Guarantee delivery area in England, DWP and its delivery partner, with the council and colleges, assess each young person’s main barrier before placing them in a fully paid six-month job, a foundation apprenticeship or a supported internship, and judge all three routes on the same measure: work or learning 6 and 12 months after support ends, against a comparison group.
      Who and where
      Young people aged 16–24 in the chosen area who are not in education, employment or training, in three groups: 18–24-year-olds on Universal Credit for 18 months (Jobs Guarantee); 16–21-year-olds, or up to 25 for care leavers, prison leavers and young people with an EHC plan, suited to a foundation apprenticeship; and 16–24-year-olds with an EHC plan suited to a supported internship. Applies in: Local.
      Accountable body
      Department for Work and Pensions (Jobs Guarantee, Jobcentre Plus), with the Department for Education and Skills England (foundation apprenticeships, supported internships)
      Intervention
      Assess each young person’s main barrier at referral and offer the paid route designed for it, with wraparound support, travel help and a named employer contact.
      Best evidence, and where it applies
      Kickstart, the closest UK scheme, left 11 more in every 100 participants in unsubsidised work two years on than a matched group (DWP, 2024), but 54 in 100 of that group found work anyway. The Jobs Guarantee itself is unevaluated and serves young people further from work.Studied in: 163,000 placements started across the scheme; 16–24-year-olds on Universal Credit at risk of long-term unemployment (Starts March 2021 to January 2022; outcomes to 24 months, extrapolated to five years).How closely the comparison transfers to this decision: Australia (national) — partial.
      Extra cost of this change
      Capital: none identified in the brief.Recurring: Youth Guarantee package, including the Jobs Guarantee (programme envelope) — £820m in total, Announced 6 December 2025; the announcement gives no years, price basis not stated by the source; Jobs Guarantee delivery partner grant (wraparound support, job sourcing, administration) — £2,650 per participant (maximum); Jobs Guarantee wages (up to 25 hours a week at the age-relevant minimum wage, plus employer National Insurance and pension, for up to six months) — not yet established; Supported internship place — £15,697 per intern; Support beyond the grant: travel, health support, employer supervision — Not yet costed.One-off or mixed: Employer onboarding costs (Jobs Guarantee) — £250 per participant (maximum); Foundation apprenticeship employer incentive (first wave) — £2,000 per apprentice (maximum); Barrier assessment, 6- and 12-month outcome tracking and evaluation by route — not yet established.
      Funding
      Not funded yet: a possible funding route exists, but nothing is allocated to this change.Committed to this change: none.Possible source, not an award: Youth Guarantee package (£820m) (£820m).Unfunded: Unknown: no Jobs Guarantee budget or cost per sustained job is published, and the assessment, support beyond the grant and evaluation are not costed.
      Savings and wider benefits
      Not yet specified: no cashable saving or avoided cost has been costed for this change. Expected outcomes are listed one by one in the research appendix and are never added together or counted as money available.
      First 90-day step
      Agree the barrier assessment, route rules and the 6- and 12-month outcome record with the delivery partner, council and colleges before the area’s first national-rollout referrals.The proposed first milestone; a 90-day date is not yet specified. Owner: DWP with the area’s Jobs Guarantee delivery partner. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.
      Twelve-month milestone
      Not yet specified.Time to a first useful result: Placement completion within about six months of the first starts; work or learning 12 months after support ends needs roughly 18 months from first starts, and a two-year result like Kickstart’s about two and a half years.
      Outcome, and when to scale or stop
      Measure: Starts by route and barrier group, and the share still in the job, apprenticeship or internship at three and six months.Scale if: Participants in a route are more often in unsubsidised work or learning at 12 months than the comparison group, and employer-reported deadweight is low enough that the cost per additional person in lasting work is acceptable in the business case.Stop if: Participants return to Universal Credit at the same rate as the comparison group, or most placements are jobs employers say they would have filled anyway.
      Main trade-off
      A fully paid job costs a lot per extra person in lasting work and some placements fill jobs that would have been filled anyway; assessing barriers takes adviser time and can leave those furthest from work deferred with no offer.
      Source and review date
      Kickstart Scheme: a quantitative impact assessment (full report) (7 October 2024); Apprenticeships (Youth Employment Toolkit) (26 August 2026 (last updated)). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

      An editorial proposal by UK Facts for discussion, not government policy. Records: A08 · effects E-A08-WORK, E-A08-APPRENTICE · costs C-YG-2025, C-A08-SUPPORT

      Research appendix: study design, effect sizes and limits, alternatives, full costing, international comparisons and how we would know

      1.The change, in plain words

      Match each young person out of work to the paid route that fits their barrier — and judge every route on work still held a year later

      2.The decision requested

      Decision
      Agree, for one national-rollout delivery area, a shared barrier assessment at referral, route rules and a single outcome record across three paid routes; and ask DWP’s Jobs Guarantee evaluation to report sustained work by route and barrier group, with employer-reported additionality, before the next funding decision.
      Accountable institution
      Department for Work and Pensions (Jobs Guarantee, Jobcentre Plus), with the Department for Education and Skills England (foundation apprenticeships, supported internships)
      Geography
      Local
      Powers
      Existing powers: Employment and Training Act 1973, section 2 (DWP arrangements to help people obtain and keep work, including temporary employment) and the Jobs Guarantee grant funding agreements; DfE apprenticeship funding rules; councils’ duties to young people with EHC plans under the Children and Families Act 2014. No new law.
      Delivery partners
      Jobs Guarantee delivery partner for the area; Jobcentre Plus work coaches; Employers offering real vacancies; Further education colleges and apprenticeship training providers; Council SEND, leaving-care and supported-internship teams; DWP Access to Work (job coaching)

      3.Who it is for, and what changes beyond today

      Target population
      Young people aged 16–24 in the chosen area who are not in education, employment or training, in three groups: 18–24-year-olds on Universal Credit for 18 months (Jobs Guarantee); 16–21-year-olds, or up to 25 for care leavers, prison leavers and young people with an EHC plan, suited to a foundation apprenticeship; and 16–24-year-olds with an EHC plan suited to a supported internship.
      Eligibility
      Each route’s existing rules (Jobs Guarantee: continuously on Universal Credit for 18 months in the Intensive Work Search regime, referred by DWP; foundation apprenticeships: England, level 2, at least eight months; supported internships: an EHC plan). The added step is an assessment of the main barrier — no work experience, qualifications below level 2, a health condition or disability, caring, housing or travel — which decides the route and the support.
      Scale
      The Jobs Guarantee referrals DWP already expects in that delivery area under its grant agreement, plus the apprenticeship and supported-internship places that local employers will actually offer — set in the local business case, not a national number. One area lets the routing and the outcome record be tested before anything wider.
      Baseline
      981,000 people aged 16–24 in the UK (13.0%) were not in education, employment or training in Apr–Jun 2026; 588,000 of them were economically inactive rather than looking for work, and the rate among 18–24-year-olds was 15.2%. No published series follows young people on any paid route to see whether they are still in unsubsidised work or learning 12 months after it ends, so the local baseline must be built from payroll and education records.

      Source: Office for National Statistics, Young people not in education, employment or training (NEET), UK (Table 1 (seasonally adjusted))

      Change beyond existing law or funding
      The Jobs Guarantee, foundation apprenticeships and supported internships are already funded and running in separate systems. What is added: one barrier assessment at referral that decides the route; one outcome measure for all three (work or learning 6 and 12 months after support ends, from payroll and education records); employer additionality questions at the end of each placement; and routes judged against a comparison group rather than by starts.

      4.How it would work

      Do: Assess each young person’s main barrier at referral and offer the paid route designed for it, with wraparound support, travel help and a named employer contact Changing: more young people complete a placement and move into work or training they keep, and fewer are put in a route that does not fit

      • Unsubsidised work two years after starting a subsidised job

        Measured for this interventionEffect record E-A08-WORK

        Measured for Kickstart starters (2021–22), who were closer to work than Jobs Guarantee participants will be; the Jobs Guarantee effect is not yet known.

      • Employment 12–24 months after an apprenticeship for NEET young people

        Measured for this interventionEffect record E-A08-APPRENTICE

        From a synthesis of mainly international studies, rated “emerging”; foundation apprenticeships themselves have not been evaluated.

      • Paid work after a supported internship for young people with an EHC plan

        Hypothesis to test

        Provider and council surveys report 32% to 45% of interns in paid work, but with no comparison group the added effect is unknown.

      • More sustained work when young people are placed by barrier rather than by eligibility alone

        Hypothesis to test

        Untested anywhere we found; this is what the pilot must show.

      Outcomes are kept separate and never added into one impact figure.

      5.Best evidence

      • Kickstart Scheme: a quantitative impact assessment (full report)

        Author or institution:
        Department for Work and Pensions (analysts’ impact assessment)
        Published:
        7 October 2024
        Evaluation period:
        Starts March 2021 to January 2022; outcomes to 24 months, extrapolated to five years
        Design:
        Propensity-score matching of starters with eligible young people on Universal Credit who did not start, with a difference-in-differences check, using HMRC payroll records
        Sample or population:
        163,000 placements started across the scheme; 16–24-year-olds on Universal Credit at risk of long-term unemployment
        Effect and uncertainty:
        Employment +11 percentage points at 24 months (confidence interval 0.5 points); 54% of the comparison group were in work anyway; two thirds of starters completed the six months. Average cost per start: £4,368 wages, £1,692 employer start-up payment, £785 departmental cost; the Exchequer lost £4,970 per participant at two years (27p back per £1). No cost per additional job is published, and earnings gains are imputed in the cost-benefit model rather than measured from payroll records.
        Limits:
        Not randomised, and sensitive to the comparison group: against young people referred but not started, 65% vs 59% were in work. Before matching, starters were better qualified and less likely to have had special educational needs than eligible non-starters, so the group helped was closer to work. Assumes no substitution in the central case.

        Where: Section 3.2 (net impacts); Chart 3.5 (sensitivity); section 4 (unit costs and additionality). Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

      • Apprenticeships (Youth Employment Toolkit)

        Author or institution:
        Youth Futures Foundation (What Works centre for youth employment)
        Published:
        26 August 2026 (last updated)
        Evaluation period:
        Studies of varying dates; outcomes 12–24 months after the intervention starts
        Design:
        Synthesis of high-quality impact studies (Youth Employment Toolkit)
        Sample or population:
        Young people not in education, employment or training, mainly in international studies
        Effect and uncertainty:
        Apprenticeships: high positive impact on employment, about 10 more young people in work per 100 at 12–24 months; evidence rated emerging; cost rated high.
        Limits:
        Very few studies; employment only (no measured effect on education or training); best for young people well equipped to pursue an apprenticeship.

        Where: Headline panel; limitations. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

      • Wage subsidies (Youth Employment Toolkit)

        Author or institution:
        Youth Futures Foundation
        Published:
        26 August 2026 (last updated)
        Evaluation period:
        Studies of varying dates; outcomes 12–24 months after the intervention starts
        Design:
        Synthesis of impact studies of wage subsidies delivered within targeted youth employment programmes
        Sample or population:
        NEET young people aged 16 to 24
        Effect and uncertainty:
        About 3 more young people in work per 100 at 12–24 months (low positive impact); evidence emerging; cost high; larger for 18–24-year-olds and those with the biggest barriers, treated with caution.
        Limits:
        A different outcome window and method from the Kickstart assessment, so the two figures are not comparable or additive.

        Where: Headline panel; key findings; costs. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

      • Evaluation of the strengthening of the supported internship programme: research report

        Author or institution:
        CooperGibson Research and St Mary’s University, for the Department for Education
        Published:
        March 2026
        Evaluation period:
        September 2022 to March 2025
        Design:
        Mixed-methods programme evaluation with surveys, case studies, administrative data and provider costing surveys; no comparison group
        Sample or population:
        Supported interns aged 16–24 with an EHC plan (1,977 survey responses; costing data for about 440–450 interns a year)
        Effect and uncertainty:
        Providers reported 45% of the previous year’s interns in permanent paid work and 17% NEET; council surveys 32% (2022/23) and 43% (2023/24). Average cost per intern £14,676 to £15,697.
        Limits:
        Self-reported destinations at unclear time points, no counterfactual, and costing from 12–13 providers.

        Where: Executive summary pp.8–14. Affiliation is provenance, not proof of quality.

      6.Alternatives, counter-evidence and who loses

      Closest feasible alternative
      Keep the Jobs Guarantee as designed — a job offer for everyone who reaches 18 months on Universal Credit — and judge it through DWP’s national evaluation, leaving apprenticeships and supported internships to separate DfE systems and measures.
      Strongest counter-evidence
      Kickstart’s result shrinks against the closest comparison: among young people referred but not started, 59% were in work at two years against 65% of starters, rather than 54% in the main model. In Australia, among host businesses that hired their PaTH intern, 30% said they would have hired the same young person anyway and 55% would otherwise have hired someone else. The wage-subsidy synthesis puts the employment gain at about 3 in 100.

      Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Kickstart Scheme: a quantitative impact assessment (full report) (Chart 3.5 (sensitivity analysis)); Australian Government Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Youth Jobs PaTH evaluation report (pp.99–100); Youth Futures Foundation, Wage subsidies (Youth Employment Toolkit) (Headline panel)

      Distributional effects
      Gains go to young people long on Universal Credit and to young disabled people who get a supported route; employers receive subsidised labour. Most NEET young people are economically inactive and many do not claim Universal Credit, so they are outside the Jobs Guarantee; those with the most complex needs may be judged unsuitable and deferred. Substitution can move jobs away from other young jobseekers.
      Main downside
      The cost per additional person in lasting work is high and unpublished: the Exchequer lost £4,970 per Kickstart participant at two years, and the Jobs Guarantee pays the whole wage for a group DWP expects to have more complex needs.

      The options compared, including current policy

      • The proposal

        Barrier assessment across three paid routes, judged on work or learning a year later (this brief)

        Who is reached
        NEET young people in one area: long-term Universal Credit claimants, care leavers and young disabled people
        Evidence
        Each route has some evidence (below); routing by barrier is untested
        Likely outcome and timing
        Completion within six months; 12-month outcomes after about 18 months
        Cost and funding
        Routes already funded; assessment, tracking and evaluation not costed or allocated
        Main trade-off
        Adviser time and data linkage; those judged unsuitable may get no offer
      • Current policy

        Current policy: the Jobs Guarantee as designed — a paid six-month job for everyone reaching 18 months on Universal Credit

        Who is reached
        18–24-year-olds on Universal Credit for 18 months; DWP expects over 90,000 over three years
        Evidence
        Unevaluated; closest scheme (Kickstart) +11 in work per 100 at two years for an easier-to-help group
        Likely outcome and timing
        National rollout later in 2026; DWP evaluation planned, no date published
        Cost and funding
        Wages plus £2,150–£2,650 per participant delivery grant, within the Youth Guarantee (£820m announced December 2025, plus £1bn added March 2026); no Jobs Guarantee budget published
        Main trade-off
        Misses inactive young people not on Universal Credit; deadweight and substitution
      • Alternative

        Foundation apprenticeships

        Who is reached
        16–21-year-olds, or up to 25 for care leavers, prison leavers and young people with an EHC plan, in England
        Evidence
        Apprenticeships: about 10 more in work per 100 at 12–24 months (emerging, mainly international); foundation apprenticeships unevaluated
        Likely outcome and timing
        At least eight months of paid training; employment effect after 12–24 months
        Cost and funding
        Apprenticeship budget plus an employer incentive of up to £2,000 (first wave)
        Main trade-off
        Depends on employers creating places; suits young people ready to start a job
      • Alternative

        Supported internships for young people with an EHC plan

        Who is reached
        16–24-year-olds with an EHC plan
        Evidence
        Observational: 32% to 45% in paid work reported by councils and providers; no comparison group
        Likely outcome and timing
        One academic year, then job outcomes
        Cost and funding
        £14,676–£15,697 per intern (2022/23–2023/24); 16–19 and high-needs funding
        Main trade-off
        Needs job coaches and Access to Work; families fear losing benefits
      • Alternative

        Health-linked employment support (Connect to Work, including IPS) — see the national decision brief

        Who is reached
        Adults of any age with health conditions or disabilities who want to work, in England and Wales
        Evidence
        Randomised UK trials: +4 percentage points working 13+ weeks in a year (West Midlands, out of work); no earnings effect
        Likely outcome and timing
        Results at 12 months
        Cost and funding
        Funded to 2028–29; later years and NHS integration not committed
        Main trade-off
        Not designed for young people specifically; depends on NHS referral capacity

      7.What other countries or the devolved nations show

      Country lesson · Australia (national), Wage subsidy from January 2017, internships from April 2017; evaluation covers starts to 31 March 2018 (report 2020)

      Internships and a youth wage subsidy in Australia

      Evidence: Observational analysisPartial match: some conditions differ

      What was changed
      Youth Jobs PaTH: two blocks of employability training; voluntary internships of four to 12 weeks with a host business (A$1,000 to the business, A$200 a fortnight to the young person on top of income support); and a Youth Bonus Wage Subsidy of up to A$10,000 over 26 weeks for hiring an unemployed 15–24-year-old into an ongoing job of at least 20 hours a week. Delivered through the national employment-services providers, including Transition to Work and Disability Employment Services.
      Study design and population
      Departmental mixed-methods evaluation: administrative and income-support records, one-off surveys of employment-services providers, host businesses and young people, and interviews. No comparison group; deadweight and substitution were estimated from what host businesses said they would have done. 37,064 young people who used at least one element between January 2017 and March 2018; 4,498 internship starts; 19,423 young people placed with a wage subsidy by 11,817 businesses.
      Measured outcome there
      About half of interns had a job placement within three months of the internship ending (57% under jobactive, 54% under Transition to Work, 43% under Disability Employment Services). About half of young people whose last placement carried the wage subsidy were off income support three months later (51% jobactive, 49% Transition to Work). Of host businesses that hired their intern, 30% said they would have hired that young person anyway (deadweight), 55% would otherwise have hired someone else (substitution) and 14% said the job was additional.
      Cost status
      The 2016–17 Budget committed A$762.6 million over four years for the whole programme; the evaluation does not publish a cost per job or per additional job.
      What failed or remains uncertain
      Outcomes are gross placement and off-benefit rates, not effects against a comparison group. Employer-reported deadweight and substitution were large, so most placements were not additional jobs. A few young people believed internships were compulsory; early on, low referrals led training providers to cancel or reschedule courses; job-placement rates after internships were lower in Disability Employment Services (43%) than elsewhere.
      Why the UK differs
      Australia used contracted national employment-services providers and a wage top-up for any ongoing job, while the Jobs Guarantee pays the whole wage for a six-month job for young people out of work for 18 months, a harder-to-help group. Australian award wages, benefit rules and the scale of provider incentives differ from the UK’s.
      First change required here
      Ask employers the same additionality questions at the end of each Jobs Guarantee placement, and report deadweight and substitution alongside DWP’s payroll-based comparison, so “jobs filled” is never reported as “jobs created”.

      Not a UK forecast: the effect above was measured in that place and population. Source: Australian Government Department of Education, Skills and Employment, Youth Jobs PaTH evaluation report (Executive summary pp.8–10; “Additionality, substitution, deadweight and displacement” pp.99–100). Reviewed 2026-10-04.

      8.What delivery needs first

      • dependency — Employers in the area offering real vacancies, apprenticeship places and supported-internship placements, recruited before places are commissioned. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: Jobs Guarantee delivery partner and DWP employer teams, with colleges)
      • staff — Work coaches with time for a barrier assessment, employer liaison staff and trained job coaches for supported internships. (Scarce resource shared with other priorities; owner: DWP (Jobcentre Plus) and the delivery partner; council supported-internship providers)
      • data — Linked payroll (RTI), Universal Credit and Individualised Learner Record data by route at 6, 12 and 24 months, under an agreed data-sharing arrangement. (Requirement; owner: DWP and DfE analysts)
      • dependency — Health and mental-health support for young people whose main barrier is a health condition, through Connect to Work or NHS services. (Requirement; owner: Connect to Work delivery area and NHS commissioners)
      • infrastructure — Affordable transport to placements, especially outside towns. (Requirement; owner: Council or combined authority)

      9.What it would cost

      How the cost is built up: Per young person: the route cost (Jobs Guarantee wages + delivery grant + onboarding; or apprenticeship training funding + employer incentive; or cost per supported intern) + support beyond the grant + barrier assessment; plus area-level tracking and evaluation. Cost per sustained additional job = total added cost ÷ (young people in work or learning at 12 months − the number expected from the comparison group). No source yet publishes this figure for any of the three routes.

      • Youth Guarantee package, including the Jobs Guarantee (programme envelope)

        Great Britain: Jobs Guarantee, training and work-experience places, Youth Hubs and intensive support

        £820m in total, Announced 6 December 2025; the announcement gives no years, price basis not stated by the source (ledger C-YG-2025)

        recurring; price year not stated; Announced December 2025; years not published; Current quoted cost

        Read from the ledger. An announced package across several strands, not the cost of this pilot or of a sustained job. DWP’s June 2026 grant guidance says a further £1 billion was added in March 2026 over the spending review period; the ledger figure does not include it.

        Source: DWP and DfE, Almost a million young people to benefit from expanded support, new training and work experience opportunities (Opening paragraph); Department for Work and Pensions, National Jobs Guarantee Scheme: grant guidance (national rollout) (Ministerial foreword)

      • Jobs Guarantee delivery partner grant (wraparound support, job sourcing, administration)

        Each young person starting a Jobs Guarantee job in the pilot area

        £2,650 per participant (maximum) (range £2,150 to £2,650 per participant)

        recurring; 2026 (cash) prices; Per participant, national rollout; Current quoted cost

        The published band for applications; the figure shown is its maximum. Participant numbers come from the area’s grant agreement.

        Source: Department for Work and Pensions, National Jobs Guarantee Scheme: grant guidance (national rollout) (Section 4.2)

      • Jobs Guarantee wages (up to 25 hours a week at the age-relevant minimum wage, plus employer National Insurance and pension, for up to six months)

        Each young person starting a Jobs Guarantee job

        Not yet established per participant

        recurring; price year not stated; Up to six months per participant; Not yet established

        Reimbursed at actual cost; DWP publishes no per-participant amount. Kickstart’s average wage payment was £4,368 per start in 2021–22, a different wage rate and completion pattern.

        Source: Department for Work and Pensions, National Jobs Guarantee Scheme: grant guidance (national rollout) (Sections 4.1 and 4.3)

      • Employer onboarding costs (Jobs Guarantee)

        Each young person starting a Jobs Guarantee job

        £250 per participant (maximum)

        one-off revenue; 2026 (cash) prices; Once per participant; Current quoted cost

        Source: Department for Work and Pensions, National Jobs Guarantee Scheme: grant guidance (national rollout) (Sections 4.1 and 4.4)

      • Foundation apprenticeship employer incentive (first wave)

        Each foundation apprentice aged 16–21 (or up to 25 if eligible) placed through the pilot

        £2,000 per apprentice (maximum)

        one-off revenue; 2025–26 (cash, first wave) prices; Once per apprentice; Historic cost

        Training costs come from the apprenticeship budget and are not priced here.

        Source: Department for Education, DfE update: further education, 21 May 2025 (foundation apprenticeships) (Item 5)

      • Supported internship place

        Each young person with an EHC plan placed on a supported internship through the pilot

        £15,697 per intern (range £14,676 (2022/23) to £15,697 (2023/24) per intern)

        recurring; 2023/24 (cash; provider costing survey, May 2025) prices; One academic year per intern; Historic cost

        Already paid from 16–19 and high-needs funding; only extra places are a new cost. Based on 12–13 providers.

        Source: Department for Education (CooperGibson Research and St Mary’s University), Evaluation of the strengthening of the supported internship programme: research report (Executive summary, value for money)

      • Support beyond the grant: travel, health support, employer supervision

        Young people starting a Jobs Guarantee job or foundation apprenticeship

        Not yet costed (ledger C-A08-SUPPORT)

        recurring; price year not stated; Each year of operation; Not yet established

        Read from the ledger record, which has no amount.

        Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Jobs Guarantee (Jobs Guarantee page)

      • Barrier assessment, 6- and 12-month outcome tracking and evaluation by route

        All referrals in the pilot area, for at least two years

        Not yet established per area

        one-off revenue; price year not stated; Two to three years; Not yet established

      10.Who pays, and what is missing

      Programme envelope (a possible route, not an award)
      Youth Guarantee package (£820m): £820m
      Allocation committed to this change
      None
      Remaining gap
      Unknown: no Jobs Guarantee budget or cost per sustained job is published, and the assessment, support beyond the grant and evaluation are not costed.
      Proposed financing
      The Jobs Guarantee grant, part of the Youth Guarantee (announced as an £820 million package in December 2025 and expanded by £1 billion over the spending review period in March 2026; no Jobs Guarantee budget line is published), already pays wages and delivery for eligible young people; apprenticeships are paid from the apprenticeship budget and the employer incentive; supported internships from 16–19 and high-needs funding. The barrier assessment, tracking and evaluation would need to be agreed within DWP’s Jobs Guarantee evaluation or a joint DWP–DfE allocation. Nothing is allocated to them.
      Responsible payer
      central government, employers, councils
      Budget displaced
      DWP employment-support money not spent on earlier prevention or health-linked support; employers’ supervision time; council high-needs budgets, already in deficit in many areas, for extra supported internships.

      11.First milestone and time to a useful result

      Agree the barrier assessment, route rules and the 6- and 12-month outcome record with the delivery partner, council and colleges before the area’s first national-rollout referrals. (Owner: DWP with the area’s Jobs Guarantee delivery partner. Proposed by UK Facts, not an official deadline.)

      Time to first useful result: Placement completion within about six months of the first starts; work or learning 12 months after support ends needs roughly 18 months from first starts, and a two-year result like Kickstart’s about two and a half years.

      What could delay it: Employers offer enough real vacancies and placements Payroll, Universal Credit and education records can be linked by route Referral volumes reach the level in the grant agreement A credible comparison group can be formed (matched non-starters or a phased start)

      12.How we would know

      Baseline
      For the area: NEET young people by group, Jobs Guarantee referrals, and the share of recent participants in each route in unsubsidised work or learning 12 months after leaving, from payroll, Universal Credit and Individualised Learner Record data.
      Comparison
      Matched eligible young people who did not start, as in the Kickstart assessment, reported against both referred-not-started and non-referred groups because the result depends on which is used; a phased start across areas if more join.
      Leading indicator
      Starts by route and barrier group, and the share still in the job, apprenticeship or internship at three and six months.
      Follow-up
      6, 12 and 24 months after support ends: unsubsidised work or learning, earnings from payroll records, return to Universal Credit, and employer-reported additionality and substitution.
      Continue if
      Participants in a route are more often in unsubsidised work or learning at 12 months than the comparison group, and employer-reported deadweight is low enough that the cost per additional person in lasting work is acceptable in the business case.
      Adapt if
      A route fills its places but completion or 12-month outcomes are no better than the comparison group: change the barrier rules, the support or the employers used before expanding.
      Stop if
      Participants return to Universal Credit at the same rate as the comparison group, or most placements are jobs employers say they would have filled anyway.
      Thresholds
      Not yet set: An acceptable cost per additional sustained job and the smallest effect worth detecting need the area’s referral volumes, a power calculation and DWP’s evaluation design, none of which is published yet.

      What is not yet known, and how to find out

      • What is the cost per additional young person in sustained work for each route? (cost)Next step: Estimate it from actual spend and the comparison-group result in DWP’s Jobs Guarantee evaluation, and apply the same method to the apprenticeship and supported-internship routes in the pilot area.Scope: Each route in the pilot area: cost per participant and per additional person in work or learning at 12 months · Data or quotes needed: Actual wage, delivery-grant and onboarding spend per participant; apprenticeship training funding; cost per supported intern; support beyond the grant; matched comparison outcomes · Who can estimate it: DWP analysts (Jobs Guarantee evaluation) with DfE
      • What do the barrier assessment, support beyond the grant and outcome tracking cost? (cost)Next step: Price them in the area’s business case before the first referrals.Scope: All referrals in one delivery area for two to three years · Data or quotes needed: Adviser time per assessment, travel and health-support quotes, data-linkage and evaluation costs · Who can estimate it: The Jobs Guarantee delivery partner with DWP
      • Does the Jobs Guarantee add lasting work for young people out of work for 18 months? (effect)Next step: Report DWP’s planned evaluation against a comparison group, by barrier group and route.Defensible route: evaluation of existing delivery
      • Does placing young people by barrier improve outcomes compared with one offer for everyone eligible? (effect)Next step: Test it in one area with a phased start or matched comparison and pre-registered 12-month outcomes.Defensible route: bounded pilot
      • Can payroll, Universal Credit and learner records be linked by route at 6 and 12 months? (data)Next step: Agree a DWP–DfE data-sharing arrangement before the first referrals.
      • Are there enough employers with real vacancies in the area? (delivery)Next step: Map vacancies and placements with the delivery partner and colleges before commissioning places.

      Sources last checked 4 October 2026 · Owner: Evidence editor (James Harris) · Next check: ONS young people not in education, employment or training (NEET), UK: November 2026 (26 November 2026) or the first trigger: DWP Youth Guarantee or Jobs Guarantee guidance changes.

      What it would take

      The order things have to happen in, who pays, and the effects and appraisals on record.

      The order things have to happen in

      1. First, the prerequisite

        Segment young people by barrier and recruit employers with real vacancies

        Owner: DWP and local delivery partners, with DfE

        No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

      2. Then, the decision

        Fund NHS referral routes and fidelity reviews alongside Connect to Work

        Owner: DWP delivery areas and NHS commissioners

        No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

      3. Then, delivery

        Jobs Guarantee national rollout; IPS referrals from clinical teams

        Owner: DWP delivery partners; Connect to Work providers with NHS teams

        No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

      4. Finally, the measured outcome

        Sustained work at 6–12 months against comparison groups; NEET and sickness inactivity falling

        Owner: DWP (payroll data) and ONS

        No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

      5. Then, the decision

        Set an Access to Work decision standard for in-work cases and publish processing times as statistics

        Owner: DWP

        No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

      6. Then, delivery

        Target minimum-wage inspections by sector and publish arrears and repeat offending

        Owner: Fair Work Agency

        No date: the timing depends on the steps before it.

      Who pays, and what is still missing

      Cost, committed funding and the remaining gap for the same scope and years. A programme envelope is not an award to a project; a proposal is not committed money. No total is shown because these costs are on different bases or periods and cannot be added.

      Connect to Work (A09): cost and funding by period

      £ in total, cash (nominal) prices. Outline = cost; solid = committed; hatched = proposed, not committed; empty = no funding identified.

      • Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29: cost £1.03bn; committed £1.09bn

      • Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32: cost £134.4m; nothing committed; proposed £138m

      The same records as on the NHS page, counted once. Committed funding for 2025–26 to 2028–29 is slightly above the revised cost; the later years are costed but not funded. NHS integration costs are not established.

      Cost and funding ledger

      • Youth Guarantee package (programme envelope), including the Jobs Guarantee

        A08 · recurring spending · published programme envelope

        Amount
        £820m in total, Announced 6 December 2025; the announcement gives no years, price basis not stated by the source
        Who pays
        central government
        Committed
        None identified
        Proposed, not committed
        £820m (Youth Guarantee package (£820m))
        Gap
        Not established
      • Support beyond the grant: travel, health support, employer supervision and evaluation

        A08 · recurring spending · not costed

        Amount
        Not yet costed
        Who pays
        central government, employers, households
        Committed
        None identified
        Proposed, not committed
        —
        Gap
        Not established
      • Connect to Work grant and programme costs, 2025–26 to 2028–29

        A09 · recurring spending · complete for scope

        Amount
        £1.03bn in total, 2025–26 to 2028–29, cash (nominal) prices
        Who pays
        central government
        Committed
        £1.09bn
        Proposed, not committed
        —
        Gap
        None for this scope
      • Connect to Work costs, 2029–30 to 2031–32

        A09 · recurring spending · complete for scope

        Amount
        £134.4m in total, 2029–30 to 2031–32, cash (nominal) prices
        Who pays
        central government
        Committed
        None identified
        Proposed, not committed
        £138m (Connect to Work funding to be requested at a future Spending Review)
        Gap
        £134.4m
      • NHS clinical integration, referral and supervision for IPS

        A09 · recurring spending · not costed

        Amount
        Not yet costed
        Who pays
        NHS
        Committed
        None identified
        Proposed, not committed
        —
        Gap
        Not established

      “Not yet costed” means no defensible cost has been found — not that the action is free. Lifetime benefits, benefit-cost ratios and forecast savings are never shown here as money available to spend.

      Effects on record, with evidence ratings (5 records)

      What the evidence says each action changes

      Effects on record — these measure different outcomes, so they are not drawn on one scale
      ActionOutcome and areaEffectCompared withEvidence
      Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcareWorking 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (out-of-work participants) Work and pay+4 percentage points (22% vs 18%)significant at the 99% level; no interval publishedrandomised control group receiving usual support; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020evaluated; moderate confidence; West Midlands Combined AuthorityNo effect for out-of-work participants in Sheffield City Region, and no effect on earnings at 12 months.
      Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcareWorking 13 or more weeks in the year after joining (people in work but struggling) Work and pay+3 percentage pointssignificant only at the 90% level; no interval publishedrandomised control group; 12 months after randomisation, 2018–2020evaluated; limited confidence; Sheffield City RegionWeaker evidence than the West Midlands result.
      Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcareSelf-reported health (EQ-5D-5L) at 12 months Health and care+0.10 standard deviationssignificant at the 90% level (99% when Sheffield groups are pooled); no effect in the West Midlandsrandomised control group; 12 months after randomisationevaluated; limited confidence; Sheffield City RegionSmall; not found in the West Midlands. Not evidence of reduced NHS demand.
      Build paid routes into work for excluded young peopleUnsubsidised employment two years after starting a subsidised job (Kickstart) Work and pay+11 per 100Matched comparison, not randomised; no interval in the executive summarya matched group of eligible young people who did not start a placement; Starts March 2021 to January 2022; outcomes at two yearsevaluated; moderate confidence; Great BritainEvidence from Kickstart, an earlier scheme for a less disadvantaged group; the Jobs Guarantee has not been evaluated.
      Build paid routes into work for excluded young peopleEmployment 12–24 months after an apprenticeship (NEET young people) Work and payDirection plausible; size not established—evaluated; limited confidence; International studiesThe toolkit reports about 10 more in work per 100 but rates the evidence “emerging” from few studies, so no size is plotted here.

      How we would know

      Young people aged 16–24 not in education, employment or training; Economically inactive because of long-term sickness, aged 16–64; Unemployment rate, aged 16–24; and 2 more.

      The outcome measures to watch. A baseline is where we start, not a target; where there is no official target we say so.

      Measured results

      What each option would be judged on, and the latest value of the measures already on this page. A measure moving is not proof that an option caused it.

      Where the ideas come from

      Research, counter-evidence and methods (19 sources; 1 claim held back)

      Counter-evidence and criticism

      • Build paid routes into work for excluded young people: Subsidised jobs can displace unsubsidised hiring and favour the young people easiest to help; apprenticeship evidence is thin and covers employment only, not education, training or wellbeing. (Youth Futures Foundation)
      • Offer evidence-based employment support alongside healthcare: One of three trial groups saw no employment effect and the Exchequer return within a year was 1–2p per £1; benefits were mainly in health and wellbeing, and only in one area. (Department for Work and Pensions)
      • Timely workplace adjustments for disabled workers: There is no counterfactual estimate that faster decisions keep people in work; much of the benefit may depend on employers, who are often unsure of their own duties. (National Audit Office)
      • Target minimum-wage enforcement where underpayment is highest, and test whether it works: Survey estimates overstate true underpayment, and targeting may shift rather than reduce it. (Office for National Statistics)

      Claims held back

      • The Jobs Guarantee will cut the NEET rate by a given amount — The scheme has not been evaluated and targets a narrower group than all NEET young people. Needed: The phase-one evaluation against a comparison group.

      “Full text checked” means we read the report itself; “relevant passages” means the sections behind each figure; “summary or abstract only” means we could not read the full study, so no number from it is published here without another source.

      Other options compared — not on the shortlist (2)

      Other options compared

      Options from earlier work on this page that are not on the shortlist. They remain valid choices; their evidence is shown as before.

      • preventionStatus: announced

        Workplace adjustments and support to stay in work

        Aims to:
        Fewer people leave work when they develop a health condition.
        How:
        Employers make early adjustments — hours, duties, equipment, phased returns — and get occupational health advice, so sickness absence does not become a permanent exit.
        Who decides:
        Employers; DWP (Keep Britain Working vanguard, and Access to Work grants for adjustments).
        Main constraint:
        Small employers rarely have occupational health; uptake is voluntary; people who have already left work are not reached.
        Evidence:
        Limited evidence — plausible mechanism, little direct evaluation
        See the trade-offs and evidence
        What the evidence shows
        The Keep Britain Working review (November 2025) set out the case and proposed a three-year vanguard phase with employers to build the evidence base; it is a programme designed to produce evidence, not one that already has an evaluated effect in the UK.
        Policy status
        Vanguard phase with employers under way; government updates published through March 2026.
        Resources
        Employer time and occupational health capacity; grants for adjustments through Access to Work.
        Consent and decisions needed
        Voluntary for employers; any statutory duty would need legislation and would be contested by business groups.
        Time
        Vanguard runs about three years; effects on inactivity would show later.
        Cost and yield
        No official costing of a national rollout.
        Trade-offs and who pays
        Costs fall on employers; a voluntary approach may reach mainly large employers that already do this.
        How we would know it worked
        Leading indicator: Share of employers with access to occupational health and making recorded adjustments. Outcome: Fewer people moving from sickness absence into long-term sickness inactivity. It would not be working if: Flows from work into health-related inactivity do not fall at participating employers relative to similar ones.
      • immediate reliefStatus: operating

        Practical barriers: childcare and transport

        Aims to:
        People who could work, or study, are not stopped by the cost of getting there or of childcare.
        How:
        Help with upfront childcare costs and travel to work or training lowers the cost of taking a job or course.
        Who decides:
        DWP (Universal Credit childcare element, Flexible Support Fund); DfE (childcare entitlements, 16–19 Bursary Fund); local transport authorities.
        Main constraint:
        Support paid in arrears can still block a start; rural bus services may not exist to be subsidised.
        Evidence:
        Not evaluated — a mechanism to test, not an evidenced fix
        See the trade-offs and evidence
        What the evidence shows
        Universal Credit already reimburses up to 85% of childcare costs, within monthly caps. No UK evaluation is cited here showing how much extra childcare or transport support changes employment or NEET rates for these groups.
        Policy status
        Existing support operates; no new national programme for young people’s transport.
        Resources
        Benefit and grant spending; local bus networks.
        Consent and decisions needed
        Changes to Universal Credit rules need DWP and Treasury agreement; bus support is a local decision.
        Time
        Can act within months.
        Cost and yield
        Depends on design; no official costing cited.
        Trade-offs and who pays
        Spending on cost barriers helps those nearly ready to work, not those furthest from it.
        How we would know it worked
        Leading indicator: Take-up of childcare and travel support among people starting work or training. Outcome: Job and course starts that last six months or more. It would not be working if: Take-up rises with no change in sustained starts.
      The options side by side
      OptionResourcesTimeEvidenceOutcome to watch
      Workplace adjustments and support to stay in workEmployer time and occupational health capacity; grants for adjustments through Access to Work.Vanguard runs about three years; effects on inactivity would show later.limitedFewer people moving from sickness absence into long-term sickness inactivity.
      Practical barriers: childcare and transportBenefit and grant spending; local bus networks.Can act within months.not evaluatedJob and course starts that last six months or more.

      Plan reviewed 2026-10-07. How we judge evidence.